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Overview of the introduction
The publication of the seminal collective work The Generic Book
[Carlson and Pelletier, 1995] gave rise to a flourishing research program. A
principal contribution of The Generic Book was the establishment of a unified
terminology that paved the way for detailed and specific studies, the results of
which are intended to be cumulative. Since then, much of the research has focused
on syntactic, semantic and pragmatic issues, and researchers have made important
advances within these fields as well as at their interfaces.
The growing interest in genericity and subsequent development of new analyses
have been nourished by a synergy between three areas of study.
First, the empirical range of facts pertaining to genericity has widened
impressively. During the last decade, much work has been conducted on various
languages that are typologically remote from English, such as the Romance
languages, Creole languages, Hindi, Korean, Chinese, and Japanese.
Second, developments in key areas of theoretical linguistics and related fields have
contributed to the understanding of old and new facts pertaining to genericity.
These areas include logics of conditionals and vagueness, modeling of modalities,
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and algebraic approaches to plurality.
Finally, new theoretical tools in lexical semantics, type theory, and information
theory have made it possible to model important issues that arise at the interface
between the lexicon, the syntax, and the semantics of generic expressions.
Interaction with these areas of research has brought about questions as to what
might be the sources of genericity itself. While the theory at the time of The
Generic Book relied heavily on the contribution of a hidden operator GEN (first
introduced in [Farkas and Sugioka, 1983]), as a replacement for the unitary
Carlsonian operator Gn [Carlson, 1977b], subsequent research has tried to
individuate the sources of the generic interpretation in overt material in generically
interpreted sentences. These developments in formal semantics and pragmatics
echo recent findings in cognitive science, which seem to favor theories of generics as
primarily non quantificational (see [Leslie, 2007]).
Linguistic research on generics has developed in three primary directions. Some
authors have focused on the generic interpretation of the subject DP. This research
has mostly concentrated on the notion of kinds and their possible expressions in
natural languages. Other authors locate the sources of genericity in the VP. And a
third group, starting from the assumption that genericity is a feature of the
sentence rather than one of its components, have focused on the variety of generic
readings of generic sentences.
This introduction is organized in three parts that follow these lines of research.
The first part, which includes sections 1-3, focuses on the syntactic structure and
compositional interpretation of DPs, and frames the ontological issues related to
reference to kinds in this context. What is the role of DPs in generic sentences,
and what is the proper contribution of determiners and nouns to generic
interpretation? To account for the variety of types of noun phrases which refer to
kinds across languages (singular and plural bare nouns, as well as singular and
plural definite noun phrases), it would be necessary to precisely describe the
2
ontology of the domain of reference, the denotation of singular and plural nouns,
and the contribution of definite determiners and of the plural morpheme. This part
thus addresses a series of ontological issues relevant to the analysis of natural
language: in order to account for linguistic data, must we postulate the existence
of kinds, viewed as type of entities, distinguished from particulars or tokens? What
is the relationship between kinds and sets of entities, between kinds and properties,
between kinds and sets of properties? There is a rich literature on these topics in
philosophy, but our aim in this first part is not to propose an overview of the
philosophical debate. For instance, when we ask whether non-ordinary individuals
such as kinds exist, we wish to investigate whether natural language semantics
needs to postulate the existence of entities such as kinds in order to achieve
empirical adequacy, and what type of expressions (and in what languages) denote
such entities.
The second part, which includes sections 4-6, is comprised of three sections which
are dedicated respectively to the stage-level/individual level distinction, to the
contribution of unboundedness and plurality, and to the dispositional reading of
generic sentences. The questions addressed in this part pertain to the relationship
between genericity, habituality, abilities, and dispositions. We survey various
accounts of these notions and contrast genericity viewed as the repetition of events
across relevant situations with genericity as explicative principle for the
manifestation of properties. We compare the view that ILP are context
independent with the view that considers them as maximal sums of their
manifestations. Likewise we explore the view of habituality as repetitions of
events, as opposed to abilities as explicative behaviors. The role of aspect and
tense are taken into account in the discussion of these notions.
The third part, which includes sections 7 and 8, examines the type of generic
sentences, opposing analytic vs. synthetic judgements and raises the question of
the notion of normality. Section 7 addresses the issue of the linguistic
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manifestation of the analytic/synthetic distinction and investigates the sources of
the available interpretations for indefinite generic sentences, bare plurals, and
definite plural generics. It starts from the old assumption that indefinite singular
generics are used to express analytic statements, and questions both the
descriptive and theoretical well-foundedness of this claim. It thus considers
whether the analytic/synthetic distinction play a role in natural language
semantics, and when this is recognized to be the case, asks why certain linguistic
forms are preferred for expressing certain types of judgement.
Section 8 is dedicated to the discussion of the notion of normality, comparing the
view of normality as a statistical fact and the view of normality as a normative one.
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PART I: GENERICITY AND THE DP
Traditionally, generic sentences have been thought of as falling into two categories:
(i) those sentences in which genericity comes from the DP (what
[Krifka et al., 1995] called reference to a kind), as in (1-a) and (1-b), and
(ii) those sentences in which genericity comes as a feature of the whole sentence
(called characterizing sentences in [Krifka et al., 1995]) as in (99).
In (1-a) the DP the potato does not refer to a particular potato, but to a type of
vegetable, the kind Potato. The same holds for the DP potatoes in (1-b), which
does not refer to a particular set of potatoes, but rather to potatoes as a kind.
(1-a) and (1-b) share the property of expressing claims about kinds. Thus both
DPs are said to be kind-referring DPs. The case is diﬀerent in (99): the sentence
does not report a particular event, but instead describes a habit (what John
usually does after dinner), a kind of generalization over events. Contra to Krifka et
al.who assume that in (99) genericity is a feature of the whole sentence, we assume
that genericity comes from the VP.
(1) a. The potato was first cultivated in South America
b. Potatoes were first cultivated in South America
(2) John smokes a cigar after diner
As noted by Krifka et al., both phenomena can occur simultaneously, as in (3).
(3) a. Potatoes are served whole or mashed as a cooked vegetable
b. The potato is highly digestible
The first part of this introduction focuses on kind-referring DPs, addressing two
major topics:
(i) What are the linguistic forms that can be used to refer to kinds across
languages and what are the conditions governing their uses as well as the subtle
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semantic diﬀerences that they convey? While in English bare plurals and singular
definite DPs may be kind-referring, in other languages, bare singulars or plural
definite DPs also seem to be appropriate for referring to kinds.
(ii) How can we account for the semantic computation of kind-referring DPs and
what are the consequences of assuming kind-reference into the ontology of natural
language?
To answer these questions, we first consider English bare plurals and begin with a
presentation of two seminal studies about kinds, namely [Carlson, 1977b] and
[Chierchia, 1998]. These studies have shown that English bare plurals may be
analyzed as referring to kinds in all of their uses. Carlson’s proposal is based on a
series of contrasts between bare plurals and indefinites in English. Chierchia has
shown how to integrate Carlson’s proposals within a formal framework which uses
lattice structures (to account for plurality), operators, and type-shifting rules (to
establish a link between kinds and properties). Sections 2 and 3 present two other
proposals, developed contra Carlson and Chierchia, according to which English
bare plurals refer directly to kinds: (i) the ambiguity hypothesis, according to
which bare plurals are ambiguous between an indefinite and a generic
interpretation and (ii) the property-denotation hypothesis, based on the idea that
bare plurals denote properties and may be incorporated into the VP. We present
arguments for and against each of these proposals. In the last part, we consider
DPs other than English bare plurals which are kind-referring, and examine data
from a multitude of languages, in particular Romance languages and languages
without determiners such as Hindi, which must be accounted for. Initially,
investigations into kind-reference were primarily concerned with English bare
plurals, and to a lesser extent English definite singulars. However it can be shown
that most, if not all, DPs can be interpreted as kind-referring given the
appropriate context, and thus we explore the source of genericity in DPs. In the
last section, we assume that there is no generic determiner, but that the source of
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genericity in the nominal domain is anchored in the noun itself, which is
ambiguous and may describe a property of kind rather than a property of
individual. To account for the varieties of linguistic forms which are interpreted as
referring to kinds, we introduce a distinction between two types of kind-referring
DPs: DPs which refer directly to a kind, and DPs which refer indirectly to a kind.
1 English Bare Plurals as Kind-Referring DPs
1.1 Carlson 1977
An important starting point is for any discussion of genericity is [Carlson, 1977b]’s
seminal study about bare plurals (BPs) and kind reference. Carlson showed that
BPs in English are not the plural counterpart of singular indefinites (SIs). The
book contains ample evidence that constrasts BPs and SIs: they do not give rise to
the same ambiguities when they interact with quantified DPs, with modal
expressions, or with temporal adverbs. Examples (4) through (123) are Carlson’s
original examples.
(4) a. Everyone read a book on caterpillars.
b. Everyone read books on caterpillars.
(5) a. A dog was everywhere.
b. Dogs were everywhere.
(6) a. An accident happened today at 3, 4:30 and 6.
b. Accidents happened today at 3, 4:30 and 6.
(7) a. Max discovered two rabbits in his yard (in two hours / ?? for two
hours).
b. Max discovered rabbits in his yard (??in two hours / for two hours).
(8) a. ?? Harvey continued to kill a rabbit.
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b. Harvey continued to kill rabbits.
In (119-a), ‘a book on caterpillars’ can be interpreted with a narrow scope or wide
scope reading. But bare plurals are incompatible with a wide scope interpretation,
as we see in(119-b), which cannot mean ’there are books on caterpillars that
everyone read’. No specific collection of books is evoked. With the bare plural
‘books on caterpillars’, only the narrow scope interpretation is available. (5-a) is
odd: it seems to imply that the same dog occupies diﬀerent places, which does
conflict with our knowledge that dogs are not ubiquitous. On the other hand, (5-b)
expresses a perfectly sensible and possibly true proposition, namely that there were
diﬀerent dogs in diﬀerent locations. So with (5-b), inverse scope is available: the
universal everywhere can scope over the BP, even if everywhere doesn’t c-command
‘dogs’ at the surface. The examples in (137) illustrate scopal interpretations with
respect to temporal adverbials. It seems that the plural can take narrower scope
than the singular. To interpret (6-a), we imagine the same type of accident
occurring three times on the same day, such as a fire, explosion, or power outage.
The reading involving three accidents of diﬀerent types, e.g. a fire, an explosion
and a power cut all on the same day, is unavailable. On the other hand, in (6-b),
we are not asked to imagine recurrent accidents. The contrast in (7) concerns the
interaction between indefinite DPs and bare plurals on the one hand and aspect on
the other. (138) describes a situation in which Max needed two hours to discover
two rabbits, and the sentence becomes bizarre if we replace in two hours by for
two hours. The relevant opposition here is telic vs. atelic. For-complements are
incompatible with telic processes. Finally, example (123) illustrates the interaction
between plurality and aspect. When the verb kill is used with a bare plural
argument, the aspect of the predicate changes and becomes durative. This explains
why it can combine with an aspectual verb like continue. But the case with
singular indefinites is diﬀerent. Consequently, Carlson concludes that bare plurals
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cannot be analyzed as the plural counterpart of singular indefinites, but are rather
comparable to proper names which denote kinds. Like proper names, they are bare
and they can serve to instantiate diﬀerent values of a universal quantification, as
illustrated in (140) and (141):
(9) a. One of these men sleeps
b. ∃x[x is a man][x sleeps]
c. John sleeps or Peter sleeps or Bill sleeps . . .
(10) a. One of these kinds of bird flies
b. ∃x[x is a kind of birds][x flies]
c. Sparrows fly or penguins fly or chicken fly . . .
(9-a) is true if and only if (9-c) is true, and (10-a) is true if and only if (10-c) is
true. Intuitively, we have assigned proper names to x in the logical form (9-b), and
names of kinds to x in the logical form (10-b). According to Carlson, the bare
plural acts as the proper name of a kind, and kinds are to be construed as
individuals. 1.
Carlson was the first to propose enriching the ontology with kinds, a new type of
entity distinct from “normal individuals” like John. But he also introduced a
distinction between individuals and stages of individuals. This distinction parallels
the distinction between properties and states. Carlson assumes that states can be
predicated not of John, but of stages of John. A stage of individual is a
temporally-bounded portion of that individual. “The stages aren’t simply things
that are; they are more akin to things that happen. That is, stages are conceived
of as being much more closely related to events than to objects.” ([Carlson, 1977b,
448]). A stage of an individual corresponds to the realization of that individual at
a certain time. An individual can be identified with the set of its stages. This is
illustrated in (124), for John. R(x,j) means that x is a stage of John, in other
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words, x is a realization of the individual j.
(11) λxR(x, j)
Properties are predicated of an individual, and states are predicated of a stage of
an individual. For example, being intelligent is a property of John (see (12-a), and
being sick is a not a property of John, but rather a state, which can be predicated
of one of John’s realizations (see (13-a). (12-a) corresponds to the Logical Form
(12-b), which reduces to (12-c) , and (13-a) translates to (13-b), which reduces to
(13-c) .
(12) a. John is intelligent
b. λPP(j) I
c. I(j)
(13) a. John is sick
b. λPP(j) λx∃y[R(y, x)∧sick(y)]
c. ∃y [R(y,j) ∧ sick (y)]
When we compare John runs and John is running, we see the same type of
distinction: runs is a property (in this case a disposition or habit), and is running
is a state. Carlson assumes that the progressive turns a property into a state. 2
(14) a. John λP P(j)
b. John runs run(j)
c. John is running ∃y[R(y, j)∧run(y)]
We see the same thing with the bare plural dogs which is analyzed as a name of a
kind. To this extent, dogs and John are comparable.
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(15) a. Dogs λP P(d)
b. Dogs run run(d)
c. Dogs are running ∃y [R(y, d)∧run(y)]
It follows that BPs are not ambiguous between existential and generic
interpretation, but rather in all of their uses, they denote kinds. When BPs are
existentially interpreted (as in (14c)), the existential quantifier comes from the
predicate, which is a predicate of a stage of an individual, and not from the BP in
itself.
According to Carlson, English displays of a specific form, namely bare plurals, that
refers to kinds. He claims that as such, English bare plurals are unanalyzable, they
directly refer to kinds, which are abstract entities, not reducible to sets of
individuals. The following quotation makes this fact explicit.
(16) “Let us agree then to treat bare NPs as a proper name of a kind, and let us
think of kinds as being abstract individuals. In this treatment, Bare NPs
are treated semantically as if they were unanalyzable wholes”
([Carlson, 1977b, 443])
Since bare plurals are names of kinds, they can be viewed as the set of all the
properties that the kind has, just as a proper name of a “normal” individual can be
identified, in Montague Grammar, as the set of all properties this individual has.
(17) a. proper name of individual: John λP P(j)
b. proper name of kind: dogs λP P(d)
In summation, Carlson proposes to distinguish two types of entities : “normal”
individuals and kinds. The most important diﬀerence between kinds and normal
individuals concerns their location: “Kinds are a little diﬀerent from more normal
individuals in that kinds can be here and there, whereas normal individuals are
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generally confined to one location, at a given time.” ([Carlson, 1977b, 442]). He
introduces another distinction between individuals and stages of individuals that
correlates with the diﬀerence between two types of predicates: i-level predicates,
which denote stable properties and are predicated of individuals, and s-level
predicates which refer to states, are temporally anchored, and are predicated of
stages of individuals. 3 He uses the distinction between these two classes of
predicates to account for habitual sentences, and draws a parallel between generic
sentences based on quantification over individuals such as (18-a), and habitual
sentences such as (18-b). In each case, an i-level predicate is applied to a name.
(18) a. Whales are mammals
b. John smokes
Carlson’s analysis is very elegant: it presents a unified analysis of English bare
plurals and predicts the correct existential and generic readings. Nevertheless, it is
important to note that his analysis is not compositional to the extent that it does
not take into account the fact that bare plurals involve a plural morpheme.
1.2 Chierchia 1998
Chierchia’s reflection on the issue of reference begins with a cross-linguistic
comparison. Chierchia proposed a typological classification of DPs according to
the features [+/- argument, +/- predicate]. This classification is based on the idea
that the NP could denote either properties or kinds: in some languages they
denote kinds, in others they denote properties, and in yet others they can denote
either. According to him, kinds are entities, and as such, can be the syntactic
argument of verbs just like proper names. Consequently, in languages where NPs
denote kinds, they can serve as arguments of verbs: no DPs are needed and bare
nouns are allowed in argument position. On the contrary, in languages where NPs
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denote properties, bare nouns cannot appear in argument position and a
determiner is always needed.
Chierchia assumes that this diﬀerence between languages corresponds with a
semantic parameter and he claims that the cross-linguistic variations in the way
languages refer to kinds can be derived from this semantic parameter. Chierchia
assumes that this semantic parameter is composed of two features [+/- argument]
and [+/- predicate]. He claims that:
• N can function as an argument (being of type e either an object or a kind) iﬀ
N is [+ argument]
• N can function as a predicate (being of type ￿e,t￿) and be used to restrict the
range of determiners iﬀ N is [+ predicate]
• If N is [+ argument, + predicate], both are possible.
• No language can be [- argument, - predicate].
Although very influential, Chierchia’s proposal has also been much debated in the
literature. The main points of debate concern not only the data (see a.o.
[Longobardi, 2001], [Zamparelli, 2000]) and the validity of some empirical
predictions (see a.o. [Chung, 2000], [Schmitt and Munn, 2000],
[Munn and Schmitt, 2005] on Brazilian Portuguese, [Déprez, 2005] on Haitian
Creole, [Dayal, 2005] on Hindi) but also the very idea of such a semantic
parameter, which would be enough to base a typology of languages. Nonetheless,
Chierchia’s analysis had the virtue of extending the study of the nominal
expression of genericity to languages other than English. Another important
aspect of his paper is that it presents an elaboration of Carlson’s thesis within a
formal framework, on which we will focus here.
Chierchia is a neo-Carlsonian, his proposals may be viewed as an elaboration of
Carlson’s analysis, as he assumes that English bare plurals are not ambiguous, but
13
rather must be analyzed as kind-referring in all of their uses. Nevertheless, their
proposals diﬀer on several points.
• First, Chierchia doesn’t use the notion of stage of an individual, which played
a crucial role in Carlson’s analysis, since it gives rise to a distinction between
two types of predicates, i.e. individual-level predicates on the one hand and
stage-level predicates in the other.
• Secondly, Chierchia analyses the semantic contribution of plurality in English
bare plurals. Indeed, contra Carlson, who compares English bare plurals with
proper names (they are analyzed as constants at the logical form and are
bare, i.e. built without any determiner), Chierchia proposes a compositional
analysis of English bare plurals, in which the semantic import of the plural
morpheme is analyzed. Bare plurals result from the composition of a plural
morpheme with a singular predicate to form a plural predicate, which is
nominalized.
• Finally, Chierchia proposes a formal and compositional analysis of
kind-referring DPs. He addresses the ontological issues related to the
structure of the domain of reference of discourse entities, and he makes
explicit the relations between singular individuals, plural individuals, kinds,
and properties. He introduces new operators, the up and the down operators,
which allow for an account of the relations between individuals and
properties.
Chierchia relied on previous formal work on the semantics of plurals by
[Link, 1983] and [Landman, 2000], which argued that the formal ontology of
natural language should encompass both singular and plural individuals. Chierchia
assumed that singular count nouns4 denote singular properties, i.e. properties that
are true of singular individuals, while plural count nouns denote plural properties,
i.e. properties that are true of plural individuals. Singular individuals are atomic
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entities of type e, and plural individuals may be viewed either as sets of singular
individuals (such as {a,b,c}) or as sums of individuals (such as a ⊕ b ⊕ c). The
domain involving both singular and plural entities forms a complete atomic join
semilattice, built from the bottom, which involves singular entities, via either the
operator ∪ or the operator ⊕. Since the domain of reference is a semilattice in
both cases, there always is a maximal element in this lattice, and this maximal
element corresponds precisely to the denotation of English bare plurals, or, in
other terms, always denotes a kind. Chierchia’s claim is that a bare plural has a
kind as its denotation, where the kind is obtained by applying the down-operator
to the plural property associated with the bare noun. The down-operator is
intensional: it maps any given world onto the maximal plural individual having the
property associated with the noun.
[Chierchia, 1998, 352] claims that “kinds and (plural) properties can in a way be
seen as two modes of packaging the same information”. He only considers plural
properties because plurality plays a crucial role in his analysis. There is no kind
associated with nouns such as God or sun, as these nouns denote properties of
singular entities, which can not be pluralized. Indeed, there is only one God and
one sun in every possible world.
Chierchia raised the issue of the relation between kind and property, and
introduced the down- and up-operators that make it possible to switch from one to
the other.
Figure 1: Up and Down operators
Chierchia also uses the Russellian operator iota. Iota applies to the denotation of a
singular or plural noun and yields the largest member included in this denotation,
if there is one. Consequently, the iota operator is a maximalisation operator: when
the noun is plural, [[ι Ns]] yields the largest plurality of [[Ns]]; when the noun is
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singular, since there is no atom larger than any other one, [[ιN]] is only defined for
singletons. It is important to highlight that iota is an operator defined with
respect to a given world.
Besides the iota, Chierchia introduces another operator, the down operator, which
is a nominalisation operator. It can only apply to plural properties, and according
Chierchia it is, to some extent, an intensional iota (cf. note 10 page 351). Ps is the
extension of P in s.
(19) For any property P and world or situation s,
∩P = λs ιPs, if λs ιPs is in K (the set of kinds)
undefined otherwise
The down operator, which is also called NOM in some papers, is simply an
intensional version of the maximality operator associated with the definite
determiner:
(20) Plural Kind Formation: NOM: λP￿s,￿e,t￿￿λs ι x[Ps(x)]
Regular Definiteness IOTA: λP￿s,￿e,t￿￿ ι x[Ps(x)]
Let us now return to English bare plurals. Chierchia assumes that they directly
refer to kinds. What is not very clear in Chierchia’s proposal is the semantic type
assigned to kinds. Are they of type e or ￿s,e￿? Do they refer to singular or plural
entities? [Chierchia, 1998, 349] writes that “it seems natural to identify a kind in
any given world (or situation) with the totality of its instances”. The diﬃculty is to
determine whether and how, in a given world, Chierchia makes a distinction
between a kind and the totality of the individuals which belong to the kind. This
issue is not absolutely crucial for the analysis of English, which has two distinct
forms, bare plurals on the one hand, and plural definites on the other (see (21)).
But for a language such as French, in which there are no bare nouns, it is not
immediately obvious whether plural definites are ambiguous between referring to a
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kind and referring to a maximal set of individuals (note that the example in (22),
which are the French counterparts of (21), both contain definite plurals).
(21) a. Whales are becoming extinct
b. The whales are late this year
(22) a. Les baleines sont en voie de disparition
b. Les baleines sont en retard cette année
Then Chierchia analyzes generic sentences containing an NP which denotes a kind.
He distinguishes the case of direct kind predication, in which the predicate is a
kind-level predicate as in (23-a), from the case where BPs occur with
non-kind-selecting predicates, as in (23-b) and (23-c). In this case, BPs typically
give rise to a universal reading in generic contexts, and to an existential one in
episodic contexts.
(23) a. Whales are becoming extinct
b. Whales breath under water
c. Whales were beached near the house this morning
Whenever an object-level argument slot in a predicate is filled by a kind in an
episodic sentence, the predicate type is automatically adjusted and predication is
no longer on the kind but on the individuals which instantiate the kind.
[Chierchia, 1998, 364] calls this mechanism the derived kind predication (see (24)).
(24) Derived Kind Predication (DKP):
If P applies to ordinary individuals and k denotes a kind,
then P(k) = ∃x[∪k(x) ∧ P(x)]
This rule explains the existential readings for kind-referring DPs. In (25), the DP
denotes a kind and occurs in an episodic sentence. (25) is about instances of the
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kind, and the LF associated with it is given in (25-b)) and is obtained by applying
DKP. The same mechanism is applied in (26); (26-c) is obtained from (26-b) via
DKP.
(25) a. That kind of animal is ruining my garden
b. ∃x [ ∪ that kind of animal (x) ∧ ruin my garden (x)]
(26) a. Lions are ruining my garden
b. ruin my garden ( ∩ lions)
c. ∃x [ ∪∩ lions(x) ∧ ruin my garden (x)]
In characterizing sentences, Chierchia adopts a quantificational analysis in terms of
the GEN operator as in [Chierchia, 1995] and in [Krifka et al., 1995]. This is
illustrated in (27) but also in a sentence like (28-a) including a DP built with the
noun kind in subject position.
(27) a. Dogs barks
b. GEN x,s [ ∪∩dog(x) ∧ C(x,s)] [bark(x,s)]
(28) a. [That kind]k [suckles its young]o
b. GEN x,s [ ∪that kind(x) ∧ C(x,s)] [suckles its young(x,s)]
In (27) and (28-a), the subject is a kind-referring DP, and variables over instances
of the kind are accommodated in the restriction of the quantifier GEN. C is a
contextual restriction on appropriate individuals and situations. Chierchia assumes
that the process whereby this happens is analogous to that illustrated in (29).
(29) a. Those boys are mostly Italian
b. MOST x [ x ≤ those boys] [Italian(x)]
To conclude, let us highlight a diﬀerence between the proposals of Carlson and
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Chierchia. On Carlson’s analysis, existential readings are correlated with s-level
predicates, and the VP is the source of the existential interpretation of BPs, since
s-level predicates involve an existential quantifier ranging over a stage of an
individual. For Chierchia, existential readings of BPs always come from the
application of DKP and are the consequence of a type mismatch between the
predicate and its argument. Unlike what happens in Carlson’s original proposal,
DKP is not a lexical operation on predicates but a rather type shifter that applies
on demand.
2 The Ambiguity Hypothesis
2.1 Proposal
Contra Carlson and Chierchia, who assume that both existential and generic
interpretations of English BPs are derived from kind reference, [Wilkinson, 1991],
[Diesing, 1992], and [Krifka and Gerstner-Link, 1993] claim that English BPs are
systematically ambiguous between Heimian indefinites and kind-denoting DPs. As
kind-denoting terms, they may appear in an argument position of kind-level
predicates. And as indefinites, they may be arguments of object-level predicates.
Like other indefinites, they introduce discourse referents, which can be caught by
the generic operator or by existential closure, depending on the context and in
particular the aspect of the verb. Let us consider the three following sentences,
which illustrate each type of configuration. In (30-a), the DP is argument of a
kind-level predicate. It is analyzed as a name of kind, as shown in (30-b). In (31-a)
and (32-a), the DP dogs is the argument of an object-level predicate. It is analyzed
as an indefinite DP, which introduces a free variable in the logical form. In (31-b),
the variable x is bound by the generic quantifier GEN, a unselective quantifier
which is introduced by the VP textitbark which denotes a disposition or a habit.
Gerstner-Link & Krifka shown that the relation between habituals and genericity
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can be formally incorporated by the introduction of variables over situations. They
give an interpretation of habituals in terms of generic quantification over situations
(see (31-b)). We can conclude that in (31-a), the generic interpretation of the bare
plural is not due to the bare plural itself, but to the generic operator associated
with the verb ‘bark’. On the contrary, in (32-a), the progressive form barking
excludes a habitual interpretation. The VP does not introduce a quantifier, and
consequently the free variable associated with the bare plural is bound by the
existential quantifier introduced by the rule of existential closure (see (32-b)).
(30) a. Whales will be extinct soon
b. will-be-extinct-soon (W)
(31) a. Dogs bark
b. GEN s, x [dogs(s, x) ∧ in(s, x)] [bark(s, x)]
(32) a. Dogs are barking
b. ∃ s, x [dogs(s, x) ∧ barking(s, x)]
2.2 Advantages
The ambiguity hypothesis presents several advantages. First, it seems more
appropriate than Carlsonian or neo-Carlsonian approaches to account for languages
such as French, Finnish or Japanese in which generic and existential readings are
associated with diﬀerent morphological realizations. In French, the definite plural
determiner ‘les’ is used to refer either to a kind or to a specific group of dogs,
whose existence is not asserted but presupposed (see (33-a)), while the indefinite
determiner ‘des’ is used in the existential reading, and is incompatible with generic
readings (see (33-b)). (34) illustrates the fact that Finnish uses nominative case for
kind-denoting DPs (which occur in characterizing sentences), while the partitive
case is used for existential readings (associated with episodic sentences). And (35)
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shows that in Japanese, kind-referring DPs carry a topic marker, which is replaced
by the nominative case in episodic sentences, triggering an existential reading.
(33) a. Les chiens aboient (French: GEN/∃ )
def.PL dogs bark
Dogs bark
b. Des chiens ont aboyé (*GEN/∃)
Indef.PL dogs barked
Dogs barked
(34) a. Koirat haukkuvat (Finnish :GEN/*∃ )
Dogs.NOM bark.PL
Dogs bark
b. Koiria haukku (*GEN/∃)
dogs.PART bark.SG
Dogs are barking
(35) a. Inu wa hasiru (Japanese: GEN/*∃))
dog TOP run
Dogs run / A dog runs
b. Inu ga hasitte iru (*GEN/∃)
dog NOM run PROGR
Dogs are running / A dog is running
A second advantage is that the ambiguity hypothesis predicts both existential and
generic readings for BP subjects of stage-level predicates (see (36)). It also
accounts for data such as (90-a) and (38-a), observed by Carlson but left
unexplained by his analysis.
(36) Firemen are available
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(37) a. John is looking for (parts of that machine/people in the next room)
b. John is looking for (machines/people)
(38) a. John didn’t see (parts of that machine/people in the next room)
b. John didn’t see (machines/people)
Sentence (90-a) allows both an opaque reading and a transparent one, unlike
(90-b), which only allows an opaque one. Something comparable happens with
sentence (38-a), which involves a negation. (38-a) is ambiguous: on one reading it
means that John did not see any part of the machine; on the other it says that
there are parts of the machine that John didn’t see. The existential quantifier
associated with the bare plural scopally interacts with negation in a way that
sharply contrasts with the minimally diﬀerent sentence (38-b). Indeed, (38-b) is
non ambiguous: the BP is in the scope of the negation and cannot have scope over
the VP. Carlson’s analysis does not explain this diﬀerence: indeed, on his analysis,
all BPs denote kinds and the existential or generic readings always depend on the
predicate. But in examples (37) and (38), the verb is the same. This leads to the
conclusion that some BPs do not denote kinds. This is in contradiction with
Carlson’s analysis of English bare plurals, but absolutely compatible with the
ambiguity hypothesis. In this framework, BPs like parts of that machine and
people in the next room, which do not denote kinds, should behave like regular
indefinites. 5
The ambiguity hypothesis resolves also the problem raised by the presence of BPs
in there- sentences. In the Carlsonian approach, BPs are analyzed as names of
kinds, and as such, may be compared with definite DPs. And it is well-known that
definite DPs cannot appear in the argument position of there- sentences, as
illustrated in (39-a). However BPs may occur in there-sentences (see (39-b). And
so do kind-referring DPs built with the common noun there- kind, as in (39-c).
These data, which need a special explanation in either the Carlson or Chierchia
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framework, are not problematic if BPs are analyzed as ambiguous.
(39) a. * There is John/that boy/the boy
b. There are dogs
c. There is that kind of animal in the zoo
And finally, data concerning scope may be viewed as providing an empirical
argument in favor of the ambiguity hypothesis. Indeed, if BPs are kind-referring,
as assumed by Carslon and Chierchia, they must take narrow scope. Even if this is
frequently the case, empirical research has found some counter-examples. In this
volume, Le Bruyn, Min Que et de Swart present an experimental investigation on
the scope of English bare plurals and Mandarin Chinese and Dutch bare nominals.
Their results show that in appropriate contexts, BPs are actually able to take wide
scope, just like indefinites. This result casts doubts on [Carlson, 1977b]’s assertion
that BPs in English necessarily take narrow scope with respect to other
scope-bearing operators in the sentence. This paper defends the idea that even if
wide scope readings of BPs are rare, such readings are not definitively excluded by
the grammar.
2.3 Problems
One problem with the ambiguity hypothesis is that it also predicts that BP
subjects of individual-level predicates have both generic and existential readings,
which is not supported by the data. For example (40-a) only has the generic
reading, which corresponds to (40-b) and involves an overt adverb of quantification.
(40) a. Firemen are intelligent
b. Firemen usually are intelligent
23
[Diesing, 1992] proposes to solve the problem of (40-a) by limiting existential
closure to the VP. She claims that subjects of stage-level predicates are generated
in Spec VP, whereas subjects of individual-level predicates are generated in Spec
IP. Consequently, subjects of individual-level predicates cannot be bound by
existential closure, and thus cannot give rise to existential readings.
To summarize, neither the theory according to which BPs are uniformly
kind-referring, nor the ambiguity hypothesis are able to correctly account for the
complexity of data. On the one hand, there is clear evidence that BPs are not
interpreted only as the plural versions of indefinite DPs (see Carlson on scope
properties of English BPs), on the other, there is equally clear evidence that not all
uses of bare BPs refer to kinds.They significantly diﬀer from other kind-referring
DPs such as definite singular DPs, and they show many similarities with indefinite
NPs. To solve this dilemma, [Krifka, 2004] elaborates a new theory of bare nouns,
according to which they are neither kind-referring, nor indefinites, but basically
properties, which can be lifted to one or the other interpretation in appropriate
linguistic contexts.
3 Bare Plurals and Property-Denotation
3.1 Krifka 2004
Krifka discusses an alternative to [Chierchia, 1998] that remains quite close in
spirit to this work, to the extent that he assumes that the NP denotation can be
type shifted and that type shifting does not occur freely, but only as a last resort
principle, if there is a type mismatch and the language cannot achieve the same
eﬀect by overt means. In other words, type shifting is blocked by the existence of
overt determiners.
Krifka uses the same type shifting operators as Chierchia, namely the existential
type shift inherited from [Partee, 1987], the iota operator which turns a set into its
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maximal element, and the down operator which turns a property into a kind. Both
authors also consider that generic readings of BPs in characterizing sentences such
as dogs bark involve a phonologically null generic quantifier, whose meaning can be
glossed by in general, and both assume that existential readings of BPs are
provided by type shifting. They also share the idea that type shifting is local,
which explains why existential BPs have always narrow scope.
The main diﬀerence between Krifka and Chierchia concerns the way they analyze
bare plurals. As we have seen above, according to Chierchia, BPs always denote
kinds, and existential readings of BPs are derived from kind reference via the DKP
rule. For Krifka, however, BPs denote properties in all of their uses; generic as well
as existential readings are obtained in context by type shifting from this basic
property-denotation. Before looking for empirical arguments that support one or
the other of these hypotheses, let us present Krifka’s analysis.
In his analysis of bare plurals, Krifka pays attention to the compositional
derivation of expressions. The basic idea is that count nouns have a number
argument in their lexical representation (see (41-a)). 6
DOG(w, n, x) means that in the world w, the individual x consists of n dogs. DOG
is of type ￿s,￿n,￿e,t￿￿￿. The number argument can be filled by a numeral, as in
(41-b). The plural morpheme on the noun dogs in two dogs is a matter of syntactic
agreement between the noun and the number word. This agreement is not always
realized: for example Hungarian lacks such an agreement.
(41) a. [[dog]] = λwλnλx[DOG(w, n, x)]
b. [[two dogs]] = λwλx[DOG(w, 2, x)]
In addition to the agreement plural present in such forms as two dogs, Krifka
assumes that English also has a semantic plural that is responsible for BPs. The
lexical representation associated with BPs is given in (42), where the number
argument n is left unspecified.
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(42) [[dogs]] = λwλx∃n[DOG(w, n, x)]
Thus, Krifka introduces a distinction between two types of plural: one is syntactic,
marked by agreement, and the other is semantic, and plays a role in the semantic
composition of bare plurals. Singular count nouns diﬀer in semantic type from
plural count nouns (which are comparable to mass nouns and nouns with explicit
number): the former are functions from numbers to predicates and are of type
￿s,￿n,￿e,t￿￿￿, while the latter are predicates and are of type ￿s,￿e,t￿￿.
Let us now turn to the semantic composition of bare plurals in the following
sentences, where BPs are respectively combined with a kind-selecting predicate,
with a object-selecting predicate in a characterizing sentence, and with a s-level
predicate.
(43) a. Dogs are extinct
b. Dogs bark
c. Dogs are barking
In (43-a), the predicate is kind-selecting. Since BPs denote properties, there is a
type mismatch. Krifka proposes resolving it via the down operator, which changes
the property into a kind (see (44-a). The logical form associated with (43-a) is
given in (44-b). On Chierchia’s account, the semantic composition in this type of
sentence is direct, since BPs denote kinds. However Krifka needs to type-shift the
subject from property-denotation to kind-denotation.
(44) a. dogs is type shifted into ∩dogs
b. λw BE-EXTINCT (w,∩dogs)
Krifka claims that in characterizing and existential sentences the type-shift from
properties to kinds is not motivated by type mismatch, hence, by the last resort
principle, it should not occur. Thus he assumes that the BPs in such sentences
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remain property-denoting: in characterizing sentences there is a phonologically null
generic operator which establishes a relation between two properties. The LF
associated with (43-b) is given in (253).
(45) GEN [∃ndog(n, x)] [bark(x)]
As for existential readings, as illustrated by (43-c), they can be obtained without
changing the type of the DP. Dogs denotes a property which is applied to an
object-predicate: thus there is a type mismatch. But according to Krifka, this
mistmatch cannot be resolved by an existential type shift, since there are overt
determiners that allow a property to turn into an entity: the singular indefinite a
and the plural indefinite some. Thus, if the last resort principle is true, some
should block the application of type shifting and the forms associated with the
existential reading should be (46-a) or (46-b) rather that (43-c), which should not
be grammatical.
(46) a. A dog is barking
b. Some dogs are barking
So, to resolve the type mismatch in the case of existential readings, Krifka assumes
that it is the VP which type shifts, rather than the DP. This corresponds exactly
with what is proposed by van Geenhoven and Dayal in terms of incorporation (see
following). The VP is changed as in (47-a) and after reduction, the LF associated
with (43-c) is (47-b).
(47) a. λwλP ∃x[BE-BARKING(w, x)∧ P(w, x)]
b. λw∃x∃n(BE-BARKING(w, x)∧ DOG (w, n, x))
In sum, [Krifka, 2004] abandons the ambiguity hypothesis, which he previously
defended for English BPs, and proposes a new analysis according to which BPs
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always denote properties that can be either type shifted or incorporated. The main
point of divergence between [Chierchia, 1998] and [Krifka, 2004] concerns their
analysis of number and the relationship between plurality and kind. According to
Chierchia, kinds are only defined for plural properties, while for Krifka, no such
restriction exists. This restriction over kinds permits Chierchia to predict that
English bare singulars are excluded for generic sentences such as (48-a) or (48-b).
But if this constraint appropriately describes the grammar of bare nouns in
English, it seems incompatible with languages which allow both existential bare
singulars and DPs built with an indefinite article. In this regard, the case of
Brazilian Portuguese constitutes a challenge for Chierchia’s theory and the
hypothesis of the nominal mapping parameter (see [Munn and Schmitt, 2005]).
(48) a. * Dog is extinct
b. * Dog barks
On the contrary, according to Krifka, there is no constraint on the down operator:
it is defined both for singular and plural properties. For example, he claims that “
∩[one dog] is defined and stands for an individual concept that maps every world
that has exactly one dog to that dog" ([Krifka, 2004, 127]). To account for the
asymmetry between bare plurals and bare singulars in English, Krifka assumes the
existence of a semantic plural in English (which is responsible for bare plurals) but
denies the existence of a semantic singular in English. And he restricts the use of
the down operator to true kind predications, i.e. predications made with a kind
selecting predicate.
It is diﬃcult to find empirical arguments that distinguish between Chierchia’s and
Krifka’s proposals. As already mentioned, the main point of divergence is that for
Chierchia, all readings of BPs are derived from a kind reference, which is not the
case for Krifka. [Cohen, 2007] suggests that if a language could be found in which
BPs cannot denote kinds, but nevertheless occur in characterizing sentences or in
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existential sentences, then the conclusion could be drawn that generic and
existential readings of BPs are not derived from kind reference. So such a language
would be problematic for Chierchia, and may be viewed as arguing for Krifka’s
analysis. According to [Cohen, 2007], Italian is precisely a language of this type.
3.2 Property Denotation and Incorporation
This change of perspective by Krifka’s change of perspective is partly due to the
work of Dayal, who showed that the ambiguity approach is not tenable for the
interpretation of bare nominals in languages without determiners. She instead
proposes an analysis of bare nominals in terms of incorporation.
3.2.1 Existential bare plurals analyzed as a case of semantic
incorporation
[Van Geenhoven, 1998] studied the syntax and semantics of incorporated nouns in
West Greenlandic. She proposed an analysis of these nominals as
property-denoting expressions. The claim is that incorporated nouns denote
neither individuals nor quantifiers but rather properties, which combine with verbs
and impose restrictions on the interpretation of their arguments. More precisely,
the nominal expression N restricts the domain of variation of the verbal argument
x, as described below. (49-a) gives the translation of a transitive verb V ; (49-b)
shows how the incorporated noun (N) combines with the transitive verb (V) and
(49-c) gives the result of the semantic composition after reduction.
(49) a. V : λQλx∃y[V(x, y) ∧ Q(y)]
b. V-N : λQλx∃y[V(x, y) ∧ Q(y)] N
c. V-N : λx∃y[V(x, y) ∧ N(y)]
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Such an analysis predicts weak readings and narrow scope eﬀects of incorporated
nouns. From the observation that incorporated nouns in West Greenlandic and
English bare plurals share the same semantic properties (narrow scope and weak
reading), van Geenhoven suggests that existential readings of English bare plurals
are the result of semantic incorporation. She thus proposes that English bare
plurals in existential contexts are not kind-denoting but property-denoting.
3.2.2 Bare nouns and incorporation
In the line of van Geenhoven, other authors were interested in the semantics of
incorporation, including [Dayal, 1999] for Hindi, [Farkas and de Swart, 2003] for
Hungarian, and [Chung and Ladusaw, 2004] for Chamorro. All these authors were
interested in languages other than English that allow not only bare plurals, but
also bare singulars. The challenge is to expand the account from the semantics of
bare plurals to the semantics of bare nouns in general. The study of the
distribution and interpretation of bare nouns across languages revealed the
importance of number morphology in the analysis of bare nouns. Indeed, it has
been observed that languages which allow both bare singulars and bare plurals
place very diﬀerent constraints on each: first, bare singulars occur in very few
contexts and are usually less productive than bare plurals; and second, bare
singulars frequently trigger number neutrality eﬀects. These facts require
explanation, and seem to co-vary with whether the language in question
morphologically marks number, and whether it has articles. We will first discuss
the case of Romance languages, distinguishing Brazilian Portuguese which presents
peculiarities, and then we explore the case of Hindi, which marks number but has
no articles. The issues to resolve are the following: what is the denotation of bare
singulars and bare plurals in these languages and how are generic and existential
interpretations of bare nouns are derived in context? What is the role of number in
interpretation, and how should number neutrality eﬀects be explained?
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Bare nouns in Romance languages. [Espinal, 2010] investigates the structure
and meaning of bare nominal expressions in Catalan and Spanish, two Romance
languages that display both number morphology and articles. Unlike English,
these languages allow both bare singular and bare plural count nominals in
internal argument position. This is illustrated in (50).
(50) a. necesitar cotxe [Catalan]
need car
b. necesitar zapatos
need shoes
Bare count nominals are encountered in object position, not only in idiomatic
constructions ([Espinal, 2001]), but also in non-idiomatic expressions
([Laca, 1999]).7 BSs share three main properties with BPs: obligatory narrow
scope, atelicity, and type-anaphora ([Espinal and McNally, 2007]). But there is an
important asymmetry between BSs and BPs: while object BPs combine
unrestrictedly with any class of verbs, object BSs can only combine with a
restricted class of verbs.
To account for this diﬀerence, Espinal focuses on the role of number in the
semantics of nominal expressions. She claims that bare nominals without plural
morphology in Catalan and Spanish are not bare singulars (BSs), but rather simple
bare nouns (BNs). Bare nouns in object position (such as cotxe /car in (50-a)) are
not singular, but unmarked for number. So she distinguishes between three types
of nominals: bare nouns (BNs), number phrases (NumPs) including bare plurals,
and determiner phrases (DPs). Her claim is that BNs in Catalan and Spanish lack
both a number and a determiner. Syntactically, they are unmarked for number and
determiner and therefore cannot be considered canonical arguments. Semantically,
they are property-denoting expressions which modify the transitive verb of which
they are an object by semantic incorporation. Espinal defends the idea that BNs
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which do not have inherent number denote properties of atomic kinds, whereas
BPs which are number phrases, have a plural interpretation, and denote
non-atomic sums of individuals that have the property N. The denotation of a BN
must be contrasted with the denotation corresponding to BPs, but also to singular
definites, and singular indefinites. According to Espinal, the presence of number is
suﬃces to license postverbal plural bare nominals as internal arguments, but is not
suﬃcient to license BNs. This and the fact that BNs denote properties of singular
kinds explains why BNs can occur in object position only when the V-N complex
predicate provides a characterizing property of the external subject (e.g., being the
author of a book, being a car-owner, a bank account-holder, an apartment-buyer, a
watch-wearing person). She adds that the absence of number phrase in BNs
explains why they are interpreted as number neutral: BNs denote properties of
kinds and convey a number-neutral interpretation that is compatible with atomic
as well as non-atomic entailments. She shows how a number-neutral reading can
lead to either an enriched singularity or a plural interpretation in appropriate
contexts. The final interpretation depends on the contextual information available.
The case of Brazilian Portuguese. Among Romance languages, Brazilian
Portuguese presents several peculiarities. Brazilian Portuguese has been presented
by Munn & Schmidt as a counterexample to Chierchia’s typology based on the
Nominal Mapping Parameter, because like other Romance languages, Brazilian
Portuguese has definite singular and plural kind terms and yet it diﬀers from them
in admitting bare singulars as well as bare plurals in generic contexts (see
[Schmitt and Munn, 2000], [Munn and Schmitt, 2005]; Müller [Müller, 2002]).
Another diﬀerence between Brazilian Portuguese and other Romance languages is
that BSs as well as BPs are acceptable in subject position. However, bare singulars
are ruled out from the preverbal subject position of episodic sentences, unlike bare
plurals (see (51-a)). Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in (51-b), the post
verbal subject crianca, which is morphologically singular, is interpreted as number
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neutral: the sentence is interpreted as true whether one or more than one child
arrived.
(51) a. * Crianca chegou [Brazilian Portuguese]
child arrived
b. Chegou crianca
arrived child
A child/children arrived
There is no consensus on how to analyze the distribution and interpretation of BSs
in Brazilian Portuguese. The fact that both singular and plural bare nouns in
Brazilian Portuguese obligatorily take narrow scope, as well as the number neutral
readings associated with bare singulars, can be viewed as evidence that they are
incorporated. But two issues remain open: the issue of generic readings of bare
singulars (to the extent that there is no agreement about the status of bare
singulars as kind terms) and the issue of number neutral readings.
Semantic Incorporation in Hindi or Russian. Languages such as Hindi and
Russian display morphological number (like English) but do not have articles (like
Chinese). Dayal provides syntactic and semantic arguments that Hindi exhibits
cases of incorporation of bare nouns. In Hindi, accusative marking is optional on
inanimate objects. But the situation with animate objects is more nuanced. Case
marking is obligatory if the object has a determiner, as in (52-a), but optional if
there is no determiner. The fact that an animate nominal occurs without case
marking only when it has no determiner provides a piece of evidence that non case
marked animates represent instances of incorporation. Furthermore, it has been
observed that the case-marked form of an animate object in (52-b) refers to some
particular child, while the unmarked form refers to one or more children. So,
although the nominal is singular, it is interpreted as number neutral. Furthermore,
narrow scope eﬀects have been observed with unmarked forms, which strengthens
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the idea that bare nouns are sometimes incorporated in Hindi.
(52) a. anu (*har bacca/ har bacce-ko) sambhaaltii hai [Hindi]
Anu every child/every child-ACC looks after
Anu looks after every child
b. anu bacca/ bacce-ko sambhaaltii hai
Anu child/ child-ACC looks-after
Anu looks after (one or more) children/the child.
Languages like Hindi or Russian freely allow bare singular arguments as well as
bare plurals, and both types of bare noun display kind and generic readings.
However, bare singulars are not trivial variants of bare plurals. The following
example from Russian demonstrates that bare singulars and bare plurals behave
diﬀerently with respect to scope eﬀects.
(53) a. #Sobaka byla vesde
dog SG was SG everywhere
A dog was everywhere
b. Sobaki byli vesde
dog PL was PL everywhere
Dogs were everywhere
(53-a) is strange because it suggests that one and the same dog was everywhere.
Similar examples can be found in Hindi.
(54) a. #caro taraf baccaa khel rahaa thaa
four ways child SG was playing SG
The same child was playing everywhere.
b. caro taraf bacce khel rahe the
four ways child PL was playing PL
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Children (diﬀerent ones) were playing in diﬀerent places
In (54-a) the bare singular does not have a narrow scope indefinite reading.
However the bare plural in a similar context has a plausible narrow scope indefinite
reading. Dayal argues that this type of example proves that bare singulars in Hindi
as well as in Russian can have weak indefinite readings but they cannot be
considered bona fide indefinites, since they can never take wide scope over other
scopal expressions like everywhere in (53) and (54).
The diﬀerence between bare singulars and bare plurals can be captured if it is
assumed that the two types of bare nouns provide two diﬀerent ways to refer to
kinds. Dayal notes that in languages without determiners, bare nominals do
double-duty as definites and indefinites, and she suggests that bare singulars in
Hindi or Russian should be compared with definite generic NPs like the dog in
English, whereas bare plurals are similar to English bare plurals. According to
Dayal, the specificity of bare singulars is that they cannot refer non-maximally.
This can be explained if bare nominals in languages without determiners are
assumed to be only ambiguous between kinds and definites, and not ambiguous
between kind and indefinites. The apparent indefinite reading of bare nouns arises
from the intervention of DKP and is constrained by morphologically-triggered
number restrictions. So in this respect, Dayal follows the analysis of Carlson and
Chierchia in that she assumes that indefinite readings of bare plurals are derived
from kind reference via DKP.
Concerning the issue of number-neutral readings of bare singulars, Dayal shows
that in Hindi these readings are always dependent on some aspectual specifications
in the sentence. She concludes that they are not derived from the ability of bare
nouns to denote in the plural domain but rather from interactions between bare
singulars with aspectual expressions associated with pluractional operators. She
assumes that number neutrality is not inherent to bare singulars but is a
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by-product of aspect. So number neutrality is an eﬀect of incorporation: number
neutral readings of incorporated nominals are the result of the interaction between
a pluractional operator (responsible for example for an iterative reading) and
nominal arguments.
To conclude, the various studies mentioned above shown that syntactic
incorporation and semantic incorporation may be defined and characterized
independently. Semantic incorporation does not rely on a requirement that the
incorporated nominal surface as a morphological or a syntactic unit with the verb.
Semantic incorporation can be identified on the basis of three semantic properties:
obligatory narrow scope, number neutral readings of singular or unmarked
incorporated nominals, and the ability or inability of incorporated nominals to
support discourse anaphora.8 Although Dayal’s proposal is in the line of the
analysis of incorporating verbs in [Van Geenhoven, 1998], there are nevertheless
important diﬀerences, in particular concerning the relationship between
incorporation and indefiniteness. Van Geenhoven wrongly conflated existential
readings of kind terms and incorporation, and assumed that semantic
incorporation can be regarded as a subtheory of indefiniteness. Dayal shown that
Hindi militates against this conflation, as only non-case marked bare singular
direct objects, i.e. those that can plausibly be argued to undergo incorporation,
have number neutral readings. All other bare singulars carry strict singular
implicatures. More generally, she shows that incorporation is independent from
indefiniteness, as she analyzes Hindi bare singulars in generic contexts in terms of
incorporation, and compares them with English definite generics.9 A second point
which deserves to be highlighted here is that all the studies on bare nouns and
incorporation in various languages have provided a fresh perspective in the debate
over bare nouns and kind reference. They have contributed to the emergence of
new areas of exploration, such as the source of number neutral readings or the role
of number in the building of kind reference. All works on incorporation are
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presented as alternatives or complements to Carlson’s thesis, according to which
English bare plurals directly refer to kinds and provide empirical evidence that
languages oﬀer various ways to refer to kinds. Thus distinctions between singular
and plural kinds on the one hand and between direct and indirect kind reference
on the other should be made clear.
4 Varieties of kind-referring DPs
Since [Carlson, 1977b]’s paper, the existence of kinds in ontology, as opposed to
individuals, has been widely assumed. But the issue of which linguistic means are
used to refer to kinds deserves attention. Carlson and Chierchia have focused on
English bare plurals. Yet English displays another way of kind referring, namely
the singular definite, as attested by the diagnostic of kind-level predication (see
(55-a) which can be compared with (55-b)).
(55) a. The dinosaur is extinct
b. Dinosaurs are extinct
The bare plural and the singular definite are both kind-referring expressions, but
the latter has been much more studied than the former. Yet both types of
nominals are not in free variation: their behavior diﬀers in statements where
aspect supports an episodic interpretation. The bare plural lends itself to an
existential interpretation ((56-a) means (56-b)) while the definite singular kind
term does not ((56-c) does not mean (56-d)). (56-d) can only be interpreted as a
statement about a contextually salient dog.
(56) a. Dogs are barking
b. Some dogs are barking
c. The dog is barking
37
d. A dog is barking
So kind-referring definite singulars in languages like English are not trivial variants
of kind-referring bare plurals. It follows that any theory of genericity has to
account for the diﬀerences between singular and plural terms with respect to kind
formation. And if there is a grammatical diﬀerence between kind-referring bare
plurals and kind-referring definite singulars in languages like English, if bare
plurals and definite singulars correspond to two diﬀerent ways to refer to kinds in
English, new issues arise about Romance languages as well as languages without
determiners, such as Russian or Hindi. First, what are the counterparts of English
bare plurals and definite singulars in languages like French and Italian, and are
kind-referring definite plurals comparable with English definite singulars or with
English bare plurals? And second, in languages without articles, where there is a
free type shift from properties to kinds (singular kinds as well as plural kinds), how
should we account for kind-referring bare nouns and for the relationship between
number and kind formation? In the last decade, studies about bare nouns in
languages other than English and the relationship between definitness,
indefinitness and genericity have provided fresh insight into the the issue of the
kind formation in natural language. The aim of this subpart is to determine the
semantic contribution of the determiner, of number, and of the noun itself in the
computation of the reference of kind-referring DPs, in a compositional manner. It
has been observed that most languages display diﬀerent methods of referring to
kinds and use either bare nouns or definite noun phrases, but that no language has
a specific determiner dedicated to kind formation (see part 4.1). Furthermore,
since [Dayal, 2005]’s proposal, it has generally been accepted that common nouns
are ambiguous and may denote either a property of individuals, or a property of
kind, a result that predicts the taxonomic uses of DPs, as well as the kind-referring
uses of definite singulars (see part 4.2). The issue of the relationship between a
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kind and its instances remains to be clarified, proposing a distinction between two
diﬀerent ways to access to kinds: directly, without mentioning the instances of the
kind, and indirectly, by referring to the maximal sum of its instances.
4.1 No specific determiner
It has been remarked that natural languages generally do not have specific
linguistic means to express genericity in the nominal domain: there is no
determiner specifically dedicated to the expression of genericity. According to
Dayal, this can be explained by the fact that languages do not lexicalize
extensional vs. intensional distinctions. We have seen that in English, BPs may be
used to refer to kinds. But they give rise to two types of readings (generic or
existential) depending on the context in which they occur (see the contrast
between (57-a) and (57-b)). So it cannot be assumed that English bare plurals are
dedicated to the reference to kinds. Moreover, English can use other types of DPs
to achieve reference to a kind, as illustrated by the synonymy between (57-a) and
(57-c). Thus both BPs and singular definites may be used to refer to kinds.
Nevertheless, singular definites, like BPs, are not specialized for kind reference and
may be used to refer to individuals, as in (57-d), where the NP The son of my
neighbors is presuppositional and denotes a particular man.
(57) a. Tigers are striped
b. Mary bought oranges
c. The tiger is striped
d. The son of my neighbors is blond
The same is true in French, where singular and plural definite DPs may sometimes
be used to refer to a kind (see (58-a) and (58-b)), and sometimes to ordinary
individuals (as in (58-c) and (58-d)).
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(58) a. La baleine est un mammifère
b. Les hommes sont des bipèdes sans plumes
c. Le lion est mort dans l’après-midi
d. Les manifestants ont envahi l’assemblée nationale
More generally it has been observed that all types of DPs (be they definite,
indefinite, or quantified) may be used to refer to a kind or a subkind, as illustrated
in the following examples. In (59-a), the lion refers to the species of lions, in (59-b)
the indefinite DP refers to a subkind of whales, and (59-c) and (59-d) involve
quantified DPs (most mammals, all mammals) which range over subkinds.
Examples (59-b), (59-c), and (59-d) illustrate taxonomic readings in which the
noun phrase quantifies over subkinds of N.
(59) a. The lion is a predatory cat
b. A whale - the blue whale - is being extinct
c. Most mammals belong to the placental group
d. All mammals are warm blooded
4.2 The noun ambiguity
In English, besides bare plurals, singular definite DPs may also refer to kinds. A
singular definite DP such as the lion is ambiguous and may refer either to a simple
lion or to lion-kind. To account for this ambiguity in a compositional way, three
options are available: either the ambiguity comes from the determiner, from the
noun, or from both of these. One thesis, first defended by [Dayal, 1999],
[Dayal, 2004] and now largely accepted, is that common nouns are ambiguous and
may denote either a property of an individual or a property of a kind. Any
determiner can combine with these two denotations. In the first case, composition
yields the familiar reading with a denotation in the object domain; in the second
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case, it yieds a taxonomic reading with a denotation in the domain of kinds and
subkinds (see (59)).
Thus the ambiguity of definite singulars comes from the noun and not from the
determiner. Once it is assumed that a common noun may denote a property of a
kind, it becomes easy to account for the kind reading of definite singulars, as well
as taxonomic readings of indefinite or quantified noun phrases, such as (59-b),
(59-c), and (59-d). If the noun can denote a property of kind, the simplest way to
make reference to a kind in those languages that have a definite determiner is by
means of a singular definite. The noun phrase the lion means "the kind called
lion" and the use of the definite determiner is allowed because the presupposition
attached to the definite determiner (according which there is one and only one
kind called lion) is satisfied. And when the kind noun is preceded by an indefinite
determiner or by a quantifier, the role of this determiner is to set oﬀ one or several
sub-species or subkinds belonging to the species or kind denoted by the noun. In
other words, when the noun whale denotes a property of kind, noun phrases a
whale, three whales, most whales and all whales denote generalized quantifiers that
are defined over subkinds of whales, not over individual whales. Consequently a
whale means "a subkind of whale", three whalesmeans "three subkinds of whales",
most mammals means "most subkinds of mammals" and all mammals means "all
subkinds of mammals".
There is a important diﬀerence between kinds and individuals. While individuals
may be structured as a lattice, as shown by [Link, 1983] and [Landman, 1989],
kinds and subkinds are structured as a taxonomy but not as a lattice. Indeed, the
plural object a ⊕ b can be built from two individuals, a and b. Similarly, the
plural entity k1 ⊕ k2 can be built from two subkinds k1 and k2, but this plural
entity k1 ⊕ k2 may be neither a kind nor a subkind. So there is no lattice built
over subkinds and kinds. But kinds and subkinds are structured as a taxonomy,
such that the sum of all subkinds of N corresponds precisely to the kind N, to the
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extent that they share exactly the same instances. So in a sense, when the noun is
interpreted as a property of kind, the two noun phrases the whale and the whales
convey the same meaning, since their denotations cover the same individuals, the
same instances. Nevertheless, a distinction has to be maintained between kinds
viewed as entities and kinds viewed as the sum (or the set) of their instances.
When the noun is interpreted as a property of a kind, it refers to kinds or subkinds
viewed as entities, and only indirectly to sums or sets of instances. We will come
back to the diﬀerence between a kind and its instances in the next part.
In sum, the ambiguity of definite singulars follows from the assumption that
common nouns are ambiguous and may denote properties of kinds. But plural
predicates also are ambiguous. A noun phrase such as lions may be analyzed as
denoting either the closure under sum formation of the subkinds of lions, or the
closure under sum formation of individuals which are lions. Consequently, the
definite plural the lions may denote either the sum of all subkinds of lions or the
sum of all individuals which are lions. The choice between these two denotations is
determined contextually. Nevertheless, these two analyses do not provide the same
interpretation, since the sum of subkinds is built from intensional entities, while
the sum of individuals is extensional and defined only in the actual world. This
explains why, in a language like English where bare plurals lexicalize the down
operator (see [Chierchia, 1998] and [Krifka, 2004]), bare plurals, whose reference is
intensional, are not equivalent with definite plurals, whose reference is extensional
when the noun is analyzed as denoting a property of individuals. This is diﬀerent
in Romance languages like French and Italian, where the down operator is
lexicalized by the plural definite article. In these languages, definite plurals are
systematically ambiguous and may denote either a kind viewed as an entity or a
maximal sum of individuals, which is extensional and defined in the actual world.
Thus, definite singulars in English and Romance languages are similar (the noun
denotes a property of kind and the definite article is the usual iota), but definite
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plurals in Romance languages are ambiguous, and correspond both to English bare
plurals and English definite plurals.
The noun ambiguity hypothesis provides an explanation of the fact that languages
display various ways to express kind-reference: bare plurals and definite singulars
in English, or definite singulars and definite plurals in Romance languages. To
account for the fact that in English as well as in Romance languages, the use of
kind-referring definite singulars is more constrained than the use of the other
linguistic forms, it is enough to assume that not all common nouns are able to
denote a property of kind. A definite nominal may denote a kind only if the noun
itself is able to denote a property of kind. It has been observed that this is not the
case for all nouns. For example, modified nouns cannot (see (60-a)), unless they
refer to what [Krifka et al., 1995] called well-established kinds and what
[Beyssade, 2005] called compound nouns or lexicalizations for French (see (60-b).
(60) a. # The green bottle has narrow neck
b. The coke bottle has narrow neck
The same thing happens with nouns which occupy a high position in the taxonomy
of kinds and subkinds. For example, while the train or the whale may be
kind-referring in context (see (61-a) and (61-b)), it is never the case with the
mammal (see (61-c)).
(61) a. The train is less dangerous than the car
b. The whale is a mammal
c. #The mammal suckles its young
Various observations have been made on the constraints which restrict the use of
kind-referring definite singulars, but no systematic study on this issue has been
made. Nevertheless, in the last decade, the issue of relationships between concepts
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and kinds has been investigated by cognitivists such as a. o. Gelman, Prasada, and
Leslie.
To conclude, there is an observation which has yet to be explained in the
framework of the noun ambiguity hypothesis. English mass terms, regardless of
whether they refer to objects or kinds, never occur with a definite determiner (see
(62-a) and (62-b)).
(62) a. *Man invented the steel
b. *Max finished rice you cooked for him
Yet mass terms belong to taxonomic hierarchies and may receive taxonomic
interpretations on a par with count nouns (see for example wine, red wine, white
wine). If the definite article encodes the iota operator and freely applies to the
taxonomic domain, one would expect it to occur with mass terms as well as with
count nouns. [Chierchia, 1998] accounts for bare uses of mass nouns by assuming
that mass nouns are semantically plural and are built with the down operator. In
fact, he predicts that mass nouns may occur bare, but he does not predict that
they cannot occur with a definite determiner. An answer could be that mass
nouns, unlike count nouns, are not predicates (i.e. words denoting a property of an
individual or a property of a kind), but they could be basically kind-denoting.
They would be similar to proper names and would thus not require a determiner
when used in argument position. We will not develop this idea here as it brings up
the issue of the count-mass distinction and the semantics of mass nouns, which is
beyond our present purpose, centered on genericity and kind reference.
4.3 Direct and indirect reference to kind
From the noun ambiguity hypothesis, it follows that natural languages display at
least two diﬀerent ways to form kind-referring terms.
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• a name of a kind is built by applying the down operator to a plural property,
as suggested by [Chierchia, 1998]
• a singular noun denotes a property of kind with the iota operator
These two ways to refer to kinds diﬀer in two respects: the former involves a plural
noun which refers to a property of an object while the latter involves a singular
noun which refers to a property of kind; moreover, the former uses the down
operator while the latter uses the iota operator. To distinguish between these two
modes of kind formation, Dayal (to appear) calls "plural kinds" the kind terms
built with a plural nouns and the down operator and "singular kinds " the kind
terms built with a singular noun and the iota operator.
In English, the first way corresponds to bare plurals, and the second to definite
singulars. It has been claimed that in Romance languages, the definite singular
article lexicalizes the iota operator and the definite plural article lexicalizes the
down operator. And Dayal suggests that in languages without determiners such as
Russian or Hindi, bare singular nouns illustrate the second type of kind formation,
i.e. singular kind formation.
We have seen that singular and plural kind terms are not trivial variants. In
English, bare plurals (BPs) and definite singulars (DSs) diﬀer in frequency and
distribution. DSs are more limited than BPs in generic sentences.
• DSs are limited to well-established kinds ([Krifka et al., 1995]), i.e. natural
kinds such as the lion and concepts such as the sonnet [Carlson, 2009]
• DSs are excluded for human categories (such as the lawyer or the piano
player)
• DSs are excluded for overly general terms (such as the parabola or the curve)
(see [Vendler, 1971])
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Similar observations have been made concerning the contrast between definite
singulars and definite plurals in French. [Beyssade, 2005] focuses on generic uses of
French definite DPs and accounts for cases where singular and plural DPs are not
equivalent. The claim is that in French, generic definite singular DPs involve a
noun which refers to a kind, as in English. As for generic plural definite DPs,
instead of being interpreted as referring to the maximal sum of entities in the
actual world, they are interpreted as referring to the maximal sum of entities in
any world: the plural definite determiner may be viewed as the lexicalization of the
down operator.
Dayal claims that singular kinds diﬀer from plural kinds in not having a
semantically transparent relation to their instantiations. She observes that in
languages with number marking but no determiners (like Hindi or Russian), bare
plurals behave more or less like English bare plurals, but bare singulars are
substantively diﬀerent. She claims that what distinguishes singular kind terms
from plural kind terms is the way they relate to their instantiations. An analogy
can be drawn with what distinguishes collective nouns like the team and plural
nouns like the players. [Barker, 1992] and [Schwarzschild, 1996] have argued that
collective nouns diﬀer from plural nouns in being group-like rather that sum-like:
collective nouns like the team must be represented as groups, which are atomic
entities with no access to their parts, while nouns like the players correspond to a
sum of individuals, whose atomic parts are available for predication. The following
examples illustrate this diﬀerence between groups and sums.
(63) a. The players live in diﬀerent cities
b. *The team lives in diﬀerent cities
Following the work of [Chierchia, 1998] which rules out bare singular kinds in
English, Dayal assumes that the down operator applies only to plural nouns and
yields a kind term that allows semantic access to its instantiations, analogously to
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sums. Singular kind terms restrict such access and to this extent are analogous to
collective nouns. Like groups and sums, singular and plural kinds are conceptually
associated with the same set of entities, but diﬀer in their relation to these entities.
We will say that singular kind terms directly refer to kinds, while plural kinds
terms only refer indirectly, because the plural indicates the trace of a reference to
the instances of the kind.
For the moment, we only have compared bare plurals and definite singulars in
English and definite plurals vs. definite singulars in French. But in order to give a
better description of kind-referring noun phrases at least in English, we have
expand the picture to include definite plurals. Condoravdi ([Condoravdi, 1994],
[Condoravdi, 1997]) has shown that there are contexts in English in which bare
plurals and definite plurals convey the same meaning (see (64-a) and (64-b)).
According to Condoravdi, the bare plural students in (64-a) is not existential, since
((64-a) doesn’t mean (64-c). But students isn’t generic either, because it is not
lawlike. She concludes that besides the generic and existential readings of English
bare plurals, there is a third reading of bare plurals, which she calls the functional
reading, which corresponds precisely to situations where bare plurals and definite
plurals seem to converge. According to her, the bare plural in (64-a) conveys a
quasi-universal reading.
(64) a. In 1985 there was a ghost haunting the campus. Students were afraid.
b. In 1985 there was a ghost haunting the campus. The students were
afraid.
c. In 1985 there was a ghost haunting the campus. There were students
who were afraid.
Condoravdi adopts a very radical position, since she considers that English bare
plurals are compatible with not two, but three diﬀerent readings. This claim is
debated in the literature and it seems possible to analyze Condoravdi’s examples
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as a subcase of generic readings, called restricted generics by [Drewery, 1998].
Nevertheless Condoravdi’s data show that, in languages which have both bare
nouns and definite determiners, it is important to compare the uses and
interpretations of these two forms in order to determine whether and how each
language lexicalizes the down operator. Schaden’s paper in this volume addresses
the issue in German and accounts for the diﬀerences between BPs and definite
plurals. Several dimensions are relevant in the characterization of the diﬀerences:
one can refer to a kind either via its extension (i.e the set of all of its members) or
via its intension (i.e. the set of the characteristic properties of the kind); one can
refer to all the actual instances of a kind, or to a kind as an abstract entity.
Conclusion
It is commonly accepted that reference is not only limited to individuals or
pluralities but also to kinds. The most convincing evidence for kind reference
comes from the existence of kind-level predicates such as be extinct. We have
shown that in every attested language, kind terms are either bare or occur with the
definite determiner. Furthermore, languages often display several ways to express
kind reference, but these various ways are trivially equivalent. The presence or
absence of number morphology seems to play a crucial role in kind formation and
in the way a kind is related to its instances. Recent works in psychology
concerning generics (e.g., [Gelman, 2003], [Gelman and Bloom, 2007]),
[Prasada et al., 2008], [Prasada, 2010], [Leslie, 2008], [Leslie et al., 2009]) oﬀer a
new perspective concerning linguistic studies on genericity. These studies test the
empirical validity of theoretical proposals concerning the logical form of generic
sentences. For example, to discriminate the neo-Carlsonian approaches, which
claim that existential readings of English bare plurals derive from kind-referring
denotations, from the ambiguity approach, it would be useful to test the validity of
basic contrasts concerning the scope of generic NPs. In this volume, Le Bruyn et
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al’s paper presents some initial results which seem to invalidate the scope contrasts
invoked by Carlson and the neo-Carlsonians. Empirical studies could also be made
in order to establish a complete description of diﬀerences in distribution between
BPs, indefinite DPs and definite DPs that contribute to generic sentences. And
finally, the issue of relationships between concepts and kinds, recently investigated
by cognitivists, remains to be clearly articulated in the theoretical literature on
generics.
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PART II: GENERICITY AND THE VP
The second part is dedicated to the VP. Section 5 focuses on the distinction
between stage level and individual level predicates, which, in Carlsonian terms,
describe, respectively, stages of an individual and individuals themselves. At the
time of the Generic Book, two assumptions were made. First, it was assumed that
these predicates have diﬀerent logical forms. Notably, stage level predicates involve
an event argument ([Kratzer, 1995]). Alternately ([Chierchia, 1995]), both types of
predicates were viewed as involving a situation argument, but only individual level
predicates were considered to enter the logical form with a generic operator that
binds the situation argument inducing the eﬀect of permanency, which is
characteristic of individual-level predicates. We will show how both diﬀerences in
logical form have been abandoned, and how individual-level readings of predicates
are no longer considered to be an eﬀect of a hidden generic operator.
Section 6 addresses the related question of the role played by unboundedness and
plurality in the generic interpretation. It concludes that sentences with overt
quantificational adverbs are to be distinguished from the generic reading of
sentences without overt adverbs. This argues for entirely reconsidering the view
according to which genericity is a consequence of a hidden generic operator.
Section 7 addresses the question of the dispositional reading of generic sentences
according to which generic sentences involve a hidden abilitative operator can.
Here again, contrasting the available interpretations of overt and covert can, the
issue of the interpretation and nature of such hidden quantifiers is addressed.
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5 ILP - SLP distinction
5.1 The distinction
5.1.1 The conceptual distinction
In 1974, Milsark had established a distinction between state descriptive and
property descriptive predicates. Milsark’s distinction is essentially temporal:
property predicates permanently characterize an entity, whereas state level
predicates denote non-permanent, or accidental properties. In Milsark’s terms
([Milsark, 1977, 212]):
” . . . states are conditions in which an entity finds itself and which are
subject to change without there being an essential alteration of the
entity . . . [Properties] are description which name some trait possessed
by the entity and which is assumed to be more or less permanent or at
least to be such that some significant change in the character of the
entity will result if the description is altered . . .”
[Carlson, 1977b] uses the terms stage level and individual level predicates
(SLP/ILP), which correspond to, respectively, the state level and the property
predicates of Milsark. The major novelty of Carlson’s view is that the distinction
is explicitly stated to correspond to the ontological diﬀerence between the domains
on which the predicates operate. Stage level predicates operate on the domain of
stages of individuals and individual level predicates operate on the individuals
themselves. In Carlson’s terms ([Carlson, 1979, 57]):
” . . . [The ILP/SLP] distinction is correlated with the sort of entity the
predicate meaningfully applies to. If the predicate speaks of general
characteristics, or dispositions, we represent it as applying to a set of
objects. If something more fleeting is intended, somehow more
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temporary, and in some sense less intrinsic to the nature of a given
individual, the predicate is represented as denoting a set of stages. This
distinction is intended to correspond to the basically atemporal nature
of individuals as opposed to their time-bound stages . . ."
Carlson’s distinction between two types of domains has seen greater popularity in
the subsequent syntactic and semantic literature on SLP-ILP, as the issue of the
lexical, logical, and conceptual representation of the predicates is overtly raised by
assuming that their domains contain either stages of individuals or individuals
themselves. At the lexical and logical level, the question arises as to how this
distinction emerges in the grammar and how it must be coded in the logical form.
5.1.2 The conceptual distinction in the grammatical realm
The conceptual distinction between SLP and ILP is reflected in grammatical
distinctions. In particular, bare plural subjects have an existential interpretation
with SLPs only ((65-a) vs. (65-b)).
(65) a. Firemen are available (existential reading possible)
b. Firemen are altruistic
Only SLPs can be used in the ’there’-coda ((66-a) vs. (66-a)).
(66) a. There were men naked
b. *There were men blond
Only SLPs can combine with locative modifiers ((67-a) vs (67-b)), be complements
of perception verbs ((68-a) vs. (68-b)) and be used as depictives ( (69-a) vs.
(69-b)).
(67) a. Maria was friendly in the car
b. *Maria was tall in the car
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(68) a. Maria saw Susan sick
b. *Maria saw Susan tall
(69) a. Maria sat tired in the waiting room
b. *Maria sat blond in the waiting room
The question thus arises as to how to interpret these facts, and what are the
logical forms.
5.1.3 The conceptual distinction implemented
In view of these facts, [Chierchia, 1995] argued that ILPs are intrinsically generic.
Chierchia posits a GEN operator which quantifies over spatio-temporally bounded
situations.
According to the dyadic quantifier analysis (e.g. [Krifka et al., 1995]), GEN is
analyzed as a tripartite quantificational structure, consisting of a quantifier, a
restrictive clause and a nuclear scope, see (70):
(70) GEN [restrictor] [matrix]
GEN is an unselective quantifier à la [Lewis, 1975], that can bind any free variable.
For clarity, for the rest of the introduction we specify the variable over which GEN
quantifies for each of the cases discussed.
According to the analysis proposed in Chierchia, a sentence like (71-a) is analyzed
as in (71-b). Here C is a free variable for ‘contextually relevant situations’. GEN
quantifies over such relevant situations, and in all these relevant situation John is
intelligent. The permanent character of the predicate intelligent is captured via
the generic quantification on all relevant situations that involve John. Relevant
situations are those situations that require ’intelligence’.
(71) a. John is intelligent
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b. GEN s [C(john,s)] [intelligent(john,s)]
In section 6.1 we propose an alternative view, which interprets the lack of
spatio-temporal localization of ILP properties in terms of property unboundedness,
and considers the latter as a source of the generic interpretation (rather than
positing a hidden quantifier GEN).
The Generic Book also addressed the question of the lexical representation of these
predicates, a question to which Kratzer’s paper ([Kratzer, 1995]) provides an
answer which has been the focus of much debate in the subsequent years.
Adopting a Davidsonian view according to which only eventive predicates have an
event argument (whereas stative predicates do not), the distinction between SLPs
and ILPs was reinterpreted as cutting across events and states: states were
considered to be ILPs and events to be SLPs (although it was very quickly noted
that some states are also SLPs, like ’be drunk’, see discussion in [Fernald, 2000]
and infra). This distinction was thus implemented in terms of the presence or
absence of an event argument in the logical form of SLP and ILP sentences.
Chierchia assumes that generic sentences (more precisely, characterizing sentences)
are to be analyzed as tripartite structures, as in (70). Specifically for
characterizing sentences with a singular indefinite, along the lines of [Heim, 1982],
the author assumes that a free variable is introduced in the LF by the indefinite.
The analysis of sentence (72-a) is given in (72-b), in which a silent generic
quantifier translated as ’always’ in the LF is provided.
(72) a. When a Moroccan knows French, she knows it well ([Kratzer, 1995,
129])
b. Always x [Moroccan (x) ∧ know French (x)] [know well (x)]
Kratzer notes the ungrammaticality of (73).
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(73) *When Mary knows French, she knows French well
The problem here is that when the characterizing sentence does not involve an
indefinite DP, the quantifier has no variable to bind in its scope. Within this
framework the ungrammaticality of (73) is accounted for by appealing to the
principle of prohibition agains vacuous quantification (74), given in [Kratzer, 1995,
131].
(74) For every quantifier Q, there must be a variable x such that Q binds an
occurrence of x in both its restrictive clause and its nuclear scope.
In (73) there is no variable that the quantifier could bind in both the restrictive
clause and the nuclear scope, and thus the sentence is predicted to be
ungrammatical.
Remarkably, acceptability is restored if know French is replaced with speak French,
as in (75).
(75) When Mary speaks French, she speaks French well
The contrast between (73) and (75) is explained by assuming that SLPs (like
speak) have an additional Davidsonian argument. This argument provides a
variable for the spatio-temporal location of the eventuality that the predicate speak
describes. Along the lines of Davidson, this argument is missing for ILPs. The
resulting LF for (75) is given in (76).
(76) Always s [speak (Mary, French, s) ] [speak -well (Mary, French, s)]
5.2 ILP/SLP in the recent semantic debate
In pursuing the line of research initiated by Kratzer’s paper, the debate around
ILP and SLP has become part of the debate on events (considered as SLPs) and
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states (considered as ILPs), which has focused on establishing whether and to
what extent the correlation initiated by Kratzer (shown in (77)) holds.
(77) The view of SLP/ILP at the time of the Generic Book
ILP statives no event argument
SLP eventives event argument
5.2.1 Revisitation of the twofold distinction: ILP statives
It is easy to note that the correlation between ILPs and states does not always go
through as there are SLP states, ’like be on the boat’, etc (see [Fernald, 2000]).
Reconsidering the twofold distinction between ILPs and SLPs, [Jäger, 2001] has
identified multiple classes based on consideration of three features. The first is (1)
the ability to obtain an existential reading with bare plural subjects. In the table
that follows, we posit that a predicate has a feature [WS] if and only if it admits
an existential reading of the subject. The second feature (2) pertains to the ability
to occur as the infinite complement of a perception verb. If the predicate
concerned has this ability, the feature [PR] is used. Thirdly (3), if the predicate
denotes a transitory property, the feature [TR] is used. By combining these three
features, eight classes are identified.
[WS] [PR] [TR] Example Type of eventuality
A + + + shout, hear eventive
B + + - stand, sit, lie eventive
C + - + available eventive
D + - - situated at this river eventive
E - + + naked, drunk, sick eventive
F - + - to tover over eventive
G - - + love, hate, know states
H - - - to have blue eyes statives
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The split between classes G and H is particularly important, since it points to the
fact that the class of so called ’states’ needs to be further refined. However, this
refinement is not visible in the logical form, as[Jäger, 2001] assumes that all
predicates have an event argument. In particular, he argues that the Davidsonian
argument of statives ranges over time slices of possible worlds, and that these
cannot be object of perception.
5.2.2 In defense of the Davidsonian view
Katz is a true defender of the Davidsonian view, which claims that only eventives
are equipped with an event argument. This view contrasts with the
neo-Davidsonian view ([Parsons, 2000]), according to which all predicates,
eventives and statives, are equipped with an event argument.
Katz, unlike [Jäger, 2001] does not tease apart states from statives. He simply uses
the label ’statives’ for both verbs like love, know (Jäger’s class G) and have blue
eyes (Jäger’s class H).
Focusing on adverb modification, he argues that statives should not be treated on
a par with eventives. His well-known argument is based on the distribution of
adverbs (see e.g. [Katz, 2000], [Katz, 2003], [Katz, 2008]). Along with
[Jackendoﬀ, 1972] and [Thomason and Stalnaker, 1973], [Katz, 2003] observes that
there are two types of adverbs: S-Adverbs that combine at the sentence level and
modify propositions (78), and VP-adverbs that combine at the VP level and are
predicate modifiers (79) .
(78) a. John probably loved Mary
b. John probably kissed Mary
(79) a. *John loved Mary quickly
b. John kissed Mary quickly
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Katz further notes that while S-adverbs can combine with both eventive (78-b)
and stative predicates (78-a), the latter type can only combine with events (79-b)
and not with statives (79-a). He further observes that there are no VP-adverbs
that can combine with states/statives but not with events. He calls this
phenomenon ’stative adverb gap’.
According to the author, this shows that statives are not equipped with an event
argument. The reasoning goes as follows. According to the neo-Davidsonians (i.e.
on the assumption that all predicates, including statives have an event argument),
verbs (80-a) and VP-adverbs (80-b) denote predicates of eventualities.
VP-adverbial modification is thus simple conjunction, as illustrated in the
following derivation [Katz, 2003, 457] (’<’ indicates temporal precedence).
(80) a. John leave λe[leave(e, John)]
b. slowly λPλe[P (e)&slow(e)]
c. John left slowly ∃e[leave(e,John) & slow(e) & e < now]
The conclusion follows that if states were equipped with an event argument, the
derivation should go through and (79-a) would have to be acceptable, contrary to
fact. The picture is thus identical to that earlier proposed by [Kratzer, 1995].
5.2.3 Kimian states
As mentioned, neo-Davidsonians, and more precisely, Parsonians (Parsons, ibid.),
argue instead that all eventualities (i.e. events and states, see [Bach, 1986]) are
equipped with an event argument (se e.g. [Dölling, 2005], [Higginbotham, 2005],
[Rothstein, 2005]). Followers of this view give up the assumption that eventualities
are located in space and suggest, for instance, that ’eventualities are abstract
entities with constitutive participants and with a constitutive relation to the
temporal dimension’ ([Ramchand, 2005, 372]).
In this framework, various authors have noted that statives can be modified by
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adverbs.
(81) a. John was a Catholic with great passion in his youth ([Jäger, 2001])
b. Dan is in the country illegally ([Mittwoch, 2005])
c. The board is coarsely grooved ([Parsons, 2000])
Maienborn (e.g. [Maienborn, 2001], [Maienborn, 2003], [Maienborn, 2004],
[Maienborn, 2007]) defends the idea that adverb modification can occur with
statives at the price of a coercion of the predicate from stative to eventive. He
argues that (81-a) should be interpreted as describing a passionate way of John of
living his Catholicism. Maienborn thus proposes considering statives10 as Kimian
states ([Kim, 1969], [Kim, 1976]).
(82) Kimian states : K-states are abstract objects for the exemplification of a
property P at a holder x and a time t.
Maienborn identifies some ontological properties of Kimian states and some
linguistic diagnostics.
(83) Ontological properties
a. K-states are not accessible to direct perception and have no location
in space
b. K-states are accessible to (higher) cognitive operations
c. K-states can be located in time
(84) Linguistic diagnostics
a. K-states expressions cannot serve as infinitival complements of
perception verbs and do not combine with locative modifiers (85-a)
b. K-states are accessible for anaphoric reference (85-b)
c. K-states can combine with temporal modifiers (85-c)
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(85) a. *John saw Mary know French
b. Carolin
Carolin
is
is
wütend.
angry.
Das
This
wird
will
bald
soon
vorbei
over
sein
be
c. Carolin
Carolin
war
was
gestern/immer/zweimal
yesterday/always/twice
müde
tired
In recent work, [Rothmayr, 2009] has argued that Davidsonian events are derived
from Kimian states. This is discussed by Moltmann, in the present volume, in her
research dealing with states, statives and Kimian states.
5.3 ILP / SLP in the recent pragmatic debate
In another recent paper, [Magri, 2009] proposed a pragmatic view of the
distinction between SLP and ILP predicates. Following [Chierchia, 1995], he
recognizes that there are diﬀerences between the two types of predicates that
surface in the grammar (he acknowledges the distinctions provided, in (65)-(69)).
However, Magri claims that there is no diﬀerence at the level of the logical form (in
particular, all types of eventualities, statives and eventives are equipped with an
event argument), and that the grammatical diﬀerences are predicted on the basis
of calculation of inferences that appeal to common knowledge.
As for the predicate tall, the ILP interpretation is calculated in the following way.
If we look at the entire set of possible worlds, there is no diﬀerence between ILPs
like tall and SLPs like available. There are worlds in which John is available only
at some times in his life span and there are also worlds in which John is tall only
at some times in his lifespan.
The diﬀerence between the two categories emerges as soon as we restrict ourselves
to consideration of worlds compatible with common knowledge. Magri argues that
there are indeed worlds compatible with common knowledge where John is
available only at some times in his life span, whereas there are no worlds
compatible with common knowledge where John is tall only at some times in his
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life.
Magri (ibid.) formulates the assumption (86)
(86) There is no world compatible with common knowledge [...] where John
happens to be tall at some times in his life only but not at some others
As a generalization, Magri states a rule for what he calls the ’homogeneous’
predicates.
(87) A predicate is homogeneous w.r.t. a Restrictor if and only if there is no
world compatible with common knowledge where some elements in the
Restrictor satisfy the Predicate and some others don’t (i.e. (88)
([Magri, 2009, 271]) is not allowed for homogeneous predicates).
(88)
✛
✚
✘
✙Predicate
✬
✫
✩
✪
Restrictor
For the predicate be tall, the Restrictor part contains the times at which John is
alive. The Predicate part contains the times at which John is tall.
Magri considers various cases, including the following contrast (89)
(89) a. ??John is sometimes tall
b. John is sometimes available
By calculation of the implicatures associated with homogeneous predicates, Magri
explain the oddness of (89-a) in the following manner.
(90) a. Because of the existential Q-adverb, (89-a) triggers the scalar
implicature that John is not always tall
b. But common knowledge entails that, if John is sometimes tall, then he
must always be tall by assumption (86)
c. The oddness of (89-a) thus follows from the mismatch between the
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implicature (90-a) and the common knowledge (90-b)
Magri captures the ILP/SLP distinction within a broader perspective that includes
other cases like (91). Its oddness is explained by the reasoning in (92) that
parallels that in (90).
(91) ??Some Italians come from a wonderful country
(92) a. The use of some triggers the scalar implicature that not all Italians
come from a wonderful country
b. But common knowledge entails that all Italians come from the same
country (which is here described as wonderful) (86)
c. The oddness of (92) thus follows from the mismatch between the
implicature and the common knowledge
Magri’s theory thus extends to a variety of cases beyond genericity, sheds a new
light on the nature of ILPs, which are explained within a more general theory of
homogeneous predicates and calculation of implicatures associated with such
predicates.
5.3.1 Summary
To conclude, the table below summarizes the developments that the foundational
two-fold distinction has undergone in the debate that the Generic Book has
initiated.
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Author Stative/eventive ILP/SLP Event argument
Kratzer / Katz Stative ILP No
Eventive SLP Yes
Jäger Eventives (classes A-F) SLP Yes
States (class G) SLP Yes
Statives (class H) ILP Yes
Maienborn Eventives (not at issue) Yes
Kimian states (not at issue) No
Magri Eventives / Statives ILP / SLP Yes
6 Unboundedness and Plurality
6.1 Unboundedness
6.1.1 Unboundedness in the Generic Book and before
A property of characterizing sentences which has often been regarded as essential
to their generic meaning is temporal unboundedness, namely the property by
which such a sentence is not true relative to a time interval with definite bounds,
but rather relative to an indefinitely large interval, or even in a timeless way.11
The relevant observation has been that generics cannot be felicitously modified by
adverbs denoting particular temporal locations, unlike sentences that report
singular episodes, as illustrated by the contrast in acceptability between (93) and
(94) (a question mark before a sentence indicates oddness):
(93) Dogs were barking at 3 pm.
(94) ?Dogs bark today.
Temporal unboundedness is intuitively related to the law-like or nomic character
(Dahl 1975) of generics, another property that has been considered essential to
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such sentences. Laws indeed do not refer to singular events but rather express
regular patterns of occurrence of certain types of events; as such, their truth is not
relative to bounded time intervals, unlike the truth of sentences reporting singular
events. For the sake of precision, and to avoid misunderstanding, we should note
that the particular type of generic meaning called reference to a kind in
[Krifka et al., 1995, 2], which consists of kind-referring DPs, is in fact compatible
with predications specifying a temporal localization, as shown by (95) and (96):
(95) Potatoes were imported to Europe at the end of the XVI century.
(96) The dodo became extinct in the late XVII century.
Such sentences, however, should be disregarded as irrelevant: they involve
kind-referring DPs in subject position (the bare plural potatoes and the singular
definite the dodo) and report particular episodes concerning the kinds referred to,
where the episodes in question can be naturally ascribed a bounded temporal
location; it is indeed these episodes which are ascribed a temporal location in (95)
and (96) by the use of time adverbials. Thus, the temporal location in (95) and
(96) does not provide a case against temporal unboundedness as a characterizing
feature of genericity. In passing, we should also note that unboundedness is
arguably a characterizing feature of generically interpreted DPs as well, as shown
by the contrast in acceptability between (97-a) and (97-b) (from [Carlson, 1982]):
(97) a. Desks that have metal tops are increasingly rare. (= Carlson’s [25b])
b. ?Desks that Bill is looking at right now are increasingly rare. (=
Carlson’s [26b])
On the one hand, the relative clause in the bare plural subject of (97-a) expresses
the general property of having metal tops, through which the kind desks can be
restricted to a particular subkind, i.e. desks that have metal tops. In (97-b), on the
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other hand, the relative clause in the bare plural subject refers to a particular
episode which is located at the time of utterance by the temporal adverbial right
now. The introduction of such temporal bounds is incompatible with the subject
DP being interpreted generically, i.e. as a kind-referring DP. Given that the
predicate of (97-b) can be meaningfully applied only to kind-referring subjects, and
given further that the subject of (97-b) fails to refer to any kind, the sentence
turns out to be unacceptable. We seem thus entitled to conclude that generic DPs
too require unboundedness. The importance that has been attached to
unboundedness as an essential property of generics is apparent by considering
[Chierchia, 1995]’s arguments for classifying individual-level predicates (ILPs) as
inherent generics. The empirical evidence on which Chierchia bases his view
crucially incorporates the property of non-localizability displayed by predicates like
be French, as opposed to episodic predicates like be tired. Note the contrast in
acceptability between (98) and (99), which is strictly parallel to the contrast
considered at the outset between (93) and (94).
(98) Jean was tired this morning.
(99) ?Jean is French today.
Chierchia’s point is that an ILP predicate like ’be French’ contributes a type of
property predication to the sentence meaning which does not allow for temporal
restrictions, and thus patterns with generic predications like (94) above. We
consider several questions in the following sections, including: how is the
unboundedness property that scholars have recognized both in generics and in
ILPs to be properly understood? How essential is the role that unboundedness
plays in the emergence of generic readings? Is unboundedness a suﬃcient factor for
an account of how generic meaning is generated, or must we invoke a generic
operator or quantifier of some sort to make such an account work?
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6.1.2 Unboundedness as an eﬀect of a generic operator
We begin by considering what can be fairly seen as the most common view about
characterizing sentences, i.e. the idea that their generic meaning is obtained as the
eﬀect of an underlying operator or quantifier which is not phonologically realized
but which is still active in the composition of the sentence meaning. On this view,
the unboundedness property of generics, if considered at all, is taken as an eﬀect of
the underlying operator. To cite just a few representative examples of this view,
[Lawler, 1972], [Carlson, 1977b], [Farkas and Sugioka, 1983], [Heim, 1982] and
most of the contributions in [Carlson and Pelletier, 1995] all proposed accounts of
generics based on such covert operators or quantifiers. Much of the evidence for
these proposals came from the interpretation of English simple present tense
sentences with dynamic predicates, like (100):
(100) Mary smokes.
Such sentences cannot be interpreted as reporting one single episode of the type
described by the verb (unlike English progressive sentences), but can only be
interpreted as generalizations over episodes of that type. The common idea
pursued by these authors is that the generalization in question is eﬀected through
a syntactically covert operator, which in some proposals operates at the level of the
verb phrase, thus deriving an individual-level predicate from a basic stage-level
predicate ([Carlson, 1977b]), while in some others operates at the level of the
sentence ([Farkas and Sugioka, 1983], [Heim, 1982], [Carlson and Pelletier, 1995]),
where it acts as a dyadic generic quantifier with syntactic and semantic properties
similar to the ones of the quantificational adverb always. To illustrate the
diﬀerence between these two types of analysis, we consider which logical forms are
predicted by each for the sentence (100). According to [Carlson, 1977b], (100) is
analyzed as a simple subject-predicate structure in which the subject DP Mary
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refers to the individual Mary herself, as opposed to any temporally bounded stage
of this individual (e.g. the temporally bounded stage of Mary consisting of Mary
smoking a cigarette on a particular occasion), and the episodic or stage-level verb
smokes is shifted to an individual-level predicate via a monadic operator Gn,
whose semantic contribution is constrained as follows (here, x∧o and x∧s are sorted
variables which range over objects and stages respectively):
Sentence (100) is translated as the formula (101), whose intuitive interpretation is
given by the paraphrase below:
(101) [Gn (∧λxs.smoke￿(xs))](Mary)
The individual Mary has the property of generally or habitually smoking.
By the semantics of Gn given above, no requirement on the number of episodes in
which Mary smokes is imposed by the truth of the predication that Mary
habitually smokes - the only requirement is that there has been at least one such
episode. While this might well appear too weak for the example at hand, this
weakness was meant to account for the great variability in "quantificational force"
of habituals, which has been recognized since [Lawler, 1972]. Carlson’s idea was
that a specification of the number of episodes which should be necessary for the
truth of a habitual sentence cannot be the business for a semantic theory of
generics but must be left to extra-semantic considerations. According to the dyadic
quantifier analysis (e.g. [Krifka et al., 1995]), (100) is to be analyzed as a tripartite
quantificational structure of the form GEN(restrictor ; matrix), as in (102):
(102) GENs [s is suitable for Mary smoking] [ Mary smokes in s]
All / most possible situations s which are suitable for Mary smoking are
such that Mary indeed smokes in s.
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Here GENonly binds a situation variable, the restrictor, i.e. the property of being
a situation suitable for Mary smoking is a contextually supplied property that
constrains the domain of GEN, and the matrix is the property of being a situation
in which Mary smokes. Since it is treated as an unselective quantifier (see (70)), in
other cases GEN may bind individual variables as well, e.g. when indefinite DPs
occur in the restrictor, as in the sentence (103), whose logical representation is
given in (104):
(103) A cat has a tail.
(104) GEN x, s [x is a cat in s] [x has a tail in s]
All normal individuals x and situations s such that x is a cat in s are
such that x has a tail in s.
There are diﬀerences between the account based on the VP-level monadic operator
and the one based on the dyadic operator, discussed by [Carlson, 1988] and
[Krifka et al., 1995], who both take the latter to be superior. One phenomenon
that has played a crucial role in determining the switch from Carlson’s monadic
operator to the dyadic operator GEN is the ambiguity of (105). This sentence has
two diﬀerent generic readings. On one reading (referred to as ‘Reading 1’ below),
the sentence means that hurricanes in general have the property of arising in that
part of the Pacific which is demonstratively referred to, and on this reading the
sentence is false. On the other reading (reported as ‘Reading 2’ below), which
corresponds to a prosodic pattern where focus is placed on hurricanes, the sentence
means that there are hurricanes that arise in the part of the Pacific referred to,
and on this reading the sentence is true.
(105) Hurricanes arise in this part of the Pacific.
Reading 1: ‘In general hurricanes arise in this part of the Pacific.’
Reading 2: ‘This part of the Pacific is such that there are hurricanes that
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arise in it.’
Carlson’s original theory is not equipped to deal with eﬀects of prosody on logical
form and only predicts the reading of (105) in which the BP subject is interpreted
generically, with the whole sentence reporting a property of the kind hurricanes
(Reading 1). This reading, which corresponds to the normal out-of-the-blue
intonation of (105), is captured by the following analysis:
(106) [Gn(∧λxs.arise-in-this-part-of-Pacific(xs))](hurricanes)
The problematic reading of (105), i.e. Reading 2, would be captured by having the
DP this part of the Pacific come out as the logical subject of the sentence and by
having its surface position abstracted over by a λ operator, thus generating the
logical predicate λxs.hurricanes arise in xs. The latter is fully translated as
λxs.∃ys[R(ys,hurricanes)∧arise-in(ys, xs)]. This stage-level predicate would then be
shifted to an individual-level predicate via the Gn operator before being applied to
the logical subject. The final result would be the following formal analysis, given
along with an informal paraphrase:
(107) [Gn(∧λxs.∃ys[R(ys, hurricanes)∧arise-in(ys, xs)])](this part of the Pacific)
This part of the Pacific has the property of generally having hurricanes
arising in it.
This analysis, however, is out of reach of Carlson’s original theory. The theory
based on the dyadic operator, on the other hand, can naturally handle focus and
eﬀects of prosody on meaning, so it can easily account for the problematic reading
of (105) once it is supplemented with the standard assumption that focused
material goes in the nuclear scope (see the Standard Prosodic Hypothesis of Asher
and Pelletier 2011, this volume). Thus the logical form of (105) will be as follows:
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(108) GENs [s is suitable for something arising in this part of the Pacific] [
there are hurricanes that arise in this part of the Pacific in s]
The formal accounts that we have considered thus far converge on the idea that
generic interpretations result from an underlying generic operator, the semantics of
which has been thought of either in terms of an aspectual shift from stage-level
interpretations to individual-level interpretations of verbal predicates, or in terms
of a (quasi) universal quantification over situations/individuals. We want to
emphasize that the proponents of such operator-based accounts have also generally
recognized the importance of a notion of unboundedness for a theory of genericity,
at least for the sake of a descriptive characterization of generics. Proponents of
such accounts, however, will typically view unboundedness as an eﬀect of the
underlying generic operator, while they will not see unboundedness as a primitive
factor playing a role in the construction of generic interpretations. It is interesting,
in this respect, to consider the position of [Carlson, 1988], which gives us the
occasion to bring imperfectivity to the fore. Departing from the original proposal
in his dissertation, [Carlson, 1988] assumes a dyadic operator relating a restrictive
part, which he calls related constituent, and a matrix - exactly the same idea that
will be later systematized in The Generic Book. However, he also entertains a
notion of unboundedness in order to characterize generics in opposition to
universal statements that contingently hold of bounded circumstances. He
considers the contrast in acceptability between (109-a) and (109-b):
(109) a. A cat runs across my lawn every day.
b. ?A cat runs across my lawn every day this week and last.
What is at stake in (109-a) and (109-b) is the possibility of an unbounded reading
of the universally quantified time adverbial. This is only possible in (109-a), not in
(109-b), where the adverbial must express universal quantification over a bounded
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domain of days, namely the days in this week and in last week. As a consequence
of the bounded interpretation of the time adverbial in (109-b), only an episodic
reading of the sentence would be possible, if it weren’t the case that the English
present tense does not allow for episodic readings (i.e. event-in-progress readings)
of eventive sentences. As a consequence, (109-b) is not acceptable. Carslon’s point
can perhaps be better appreciated if we consider the past tense counterparts of
(109-a) and (109-b), which are both acceptable:
(110) a. A cat ran across my lawn every day.
b. A cat ran across my lawn every day this week and last.
Only (110-a) can be interpreted as a generic, stating that on every day within a
past situation lacking specified bounds a cat ran across my lawn. The sentence
need not be so interpreted, as it can also have an episodic reading in which it refers
to a past bounded situation and quantifies over a finite set of days within this
situation. Crucially, however, if it is interpreted generically, it makes a nomic
statement which is not bounded to a finite set of actual days in the past. Sentence
(110-b), on the other hand, can only be accepted as a universal quantification
contingently holding of a bounded situation: on every day within this week and
last week it turned out that a cat ran across my lawn on that day ((110-b) only
has the meaning of an accidental generalization). Yet other examples discussed by
Carlson, which nicely highlight the relevance of unboundedness to the availability
of generic meaning, are the following sentences involving clausal adverbials instead
of quantified time adverbials in the role of the related constituent:
(111) a. John jumped when the fire alarm went oﬀ. [Bounded, Episodic]
b. John eats when he gets hungry. [Unbounded, Habitual]
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Unfortunately, Carlson is not very explicit on the notion of unboundedness that he
makes use of. He suggests that in (109-a) this notion cannot be taken to be
unboundedness of the domain of the universal quantifier, i.e. quantification over an
unlimited number of days, and that the notion in question is rather related to
intensionality in this context. His somewhat vague remark is that "(t)he
beginnings of a satisfactory analysis would treat the meaning of the phrase [every
day ] in (109-a) as a function from contexts to all days in that context, and it is
this meaning that is related in the generic interpretation of (109-a)"
([Carlson, 1988, ]). Before moving to the next section, we note that in languages
with a perfective/imperfective distinction morphologically realized in their
aspectual systems, examples (110-a) and (111-b), on the one hand, and examples
(110-b) and (111-a), on the other hand, would be translated using diﬀerent
aspectual forms, namely the imperfective for (110-a) and (111-b) (past for the
former, present for the latter), and the perfective (past) for (110-b) and (111-a), as
shown by the following sentences from Italian:
(112) a. Ogni giorno un gatto attraversava correndo il mio prato.
Every day a cat crossed(3sg,past impf) running the my lawn
Every day a cat used to run across my lawn. [Habitual]
b. John mangia quando gli viene fame.
John eat(3sg,pres impf) when to-him come(3sg,pres impf) hunger
John eats when he gets hungry. [Habitual]
(113) a. Ogni giorno di questa settimana e di quella scorsa un gatto ha
attraversato correndo il mio prato.
Every day of this week and of that past a cat has crossed running the
my lawn
Every day of this week and of the last week a cat ran across my lawn.
[non-Habitual]
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b. John ha saltato quando l’allarme anti-incendio ha smesso.
John has jumped(past perf) when the alarm anti-fire has
stopped(past perf)
John jumped when the fire alarm went oﬀ. [non-Habitual]
Imperfectively-marked verb forms, as in (112-a) and (112-b) above, are the natural
option for expressing generic meaning in Italian. Only imperfective forms are
compatible with an unbounded temporal interpretation in this language, while
perfective (past) forms locate an eventuality within the limits of a bounded
situation, even in sentences containing a universally quantified time adverbial, e.g.
(113-a) above.12 Imperfective forms allow for both episodic (event-in-progress) and
generic interpretations, as shown by the ambiguity of (114) between the two
readings given below:
(114) Gianni guidava un’auto sportiva.
Gianni drive(3sg,past impf) a sports car
Reading 1. ‘Gianni was driving a sportscar.’ Reading 2. ‘Gianni used to
drive a sportscar.’
The diﬀerence between the two interpretations seems to reduce to the following
fact: in the episodic reading the sentence is interpreted relative to a small time
interval (e.g. yesterday at 3 p.m.), in the generic reading it is interpreted relative
to an interval lacking specified temporal bounds (Gianni’s life span? Gianni’s
youth?). It is thus tempting to assume that the diﬀerence between the two
readings of (114) is not a matter of semantic ambiguity aﬀecting some part of the
sentence, or a matter of the presence or absence of a generic operator, but that it
is uniquely due to a diﬀerence in the size of the interval relative to which the
sentence is interpreted. This observation points to a view in which temporal
unboundedness plays a primary role in determining the emergence of generic
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meaning, as will be discussed in the following section.
6.1.3 Genericity and unboundedness: a pragmatic issue
The alternative view that we consider in this section is that the main factor
responsible for the emergence of generic meaning is a general property of
unboundedness, not the presence of a generic operator in the logical form of the
sentence. [Declerck, 1988] is a representative of this view. The starting point of
Declerck’s analysis is significantly diﬀerent from the traditional one, being mainly
concerned with the generative issue of how generic readings should be derived in
compositional semantics, and is rather concerned with the processing issue of how
speakers interpret certain sentences as episodic and others (even though they may
be structurally similar to the former) as generic, as illustrated by the interpretive
contrast between (115) and (116):
(115) The boy is cunning.
(116) The fox is cunning.
Declerck’s idea is that there is no deep diﬀerence in logical form between
non-generics and generics. In particular, the latter do not diﬀer from the former in
having a hidden generic operator which should be made explicit at logical form,
but the diﬀerence between them has to do with whether the sentence
interpretation is pragmatically restricted to a bounded domain or not. The
interpretive rules that are relevant for the contrast at hand are claimed to be
derivable from the Gricean maxims, specifically the maxim of Quantity. On this
approach, the unbounded character of generics ultimately depends on interpretive
rules requiring that the information conveyed by an utterance be maximized (the
maximal-set principle, that the maximal set of entities allowed by the contextual
restrictions be referred to, and the inclusiveness principle, requiring application of
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predication on a set X to all members of X; see [Declerck, 1988, 83-84]). These
rules interact with other rules prescribing relevance and truthfulness, whereby the
"unbounding" eﬀects of the former are constrained in the appropriate contexts.
The maximizing rules account for the emergence of the generic interpretation of
(116) (provided that in the utterance context there is no relevant individual fox
immediately accessible to the hearer as the referent of the definite DP): by the
maximal-set principle, reference is achieved to what is called the generic set of
foxes, i.e. the set of all actual and possible (past and future) foxes, and by the
inclusiveness principle the property of being cunning is then predicated of each
individual in this unbounded set, conveying the information that being cunning is
an essential property of foxes, as opposed to one that is contingently predicated of
some foxes only. What prevents a similar generic interpretation of (115) is the
interaction between the maximizing rules and other rules prescribing truthfulness
and relevance: an unbounded interpretation of the subject DP the boy as referring
to the generic set of boys would in principle be possible, but ascribing the property
of being cunning to all possible boys would result in a false statement, hence the
hearer goes for a weaker interpretation here, one in which reference is made to a
contextually relevant boy (provided that there is one in the immediate context), of
which the property of being cunning is predicated. Declerck’s analysis relating
genericity to unboundedness can explain why sentences like (122-a) and (122-b) are
not acceptable as generics:
(117) a. ?Twelve cats are intelligent when they have blue eyes.
b. ?A cat has a tail these days.
Sentence (122-a) is claimed to be odd because it is numerically bounded by the
indefinite ’twelve cats’, while if we remove the numerical determiner ’twelve’ and
leave the bare plural ’cats’ in place, we obtain an acceptable generic sentence:13
75
(118) Cats are intelligent when they have blue eyes.
The kind of oddness observed in (122-b) above, on the other hand, is explained as
follows: by the pragmatic rules of interpretation, the clause a cat has a tail is
interpreted as implying that any arbitrary cat has a tail, i.e. having a tail is a
property which is essential to cats; this character, however, is incompatible with
the temporal restriction introduced by the time adverbial these days.
6.1.4 Problems and perspectives
Unboundedness of generics with respect to time has been questioned (e.g.
[Krifka et al., 1995, 36]) on account of the observation that at least generics from
the variety of habituals are felicitously localizable to past time and present time
periods, as shown in (119-a) and (119-b):
(119) a. These days Mary smokes Marlboros.
b. In those days / In the nineties Mary used to smoke Marlboros.
If we are willing to pursue a characterization of generic sentences in terms of
temporal unboundedness, we then face an empirical challenge posed by such
examples. The use of the time adverbials these days and in the nineties to locate
Mary’s habit of smoking Marlboros in (119-a) and (119-b) does not seem to give
rise to oddness in the same way that the use of temporal modifiers does in
examples (94) and (122-b). However, we believe that the intuition behind the idea
of temporal unboundedness is valid, and examples like (119-a) and (119-b) simply
demonstrate the necessity of suitably restricting the unboundedness requirement.
Although (119-b) shows that generics (in their sub-variety of habituals) do admit
to temporal restrictions, we observe that not just any temporal restriction would
work. For example, restriction to a particular point in time as in (120) would not
do:
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(120) ?On that day at 4 pm Mary used to smoke Marlboros.
It seems that a more appropriate way to characterize generic meaning would be to
say that it is triggered whenever the reference situation which underlies the
interpretation of the sentence has either unspecified temporal bounds, or a suitably
large temporal size. By further pursuing this line of thought, we could end up with
a scale of generic sentences, with sentences like Dogs bark at the top of the scale
(the underlying reference situation has unspecified temporal bounds in these
cases), and sentences like These days Mary smokes Marlboros somewhere lower on
the same scale (the underlying reference situation has a large temporal size in
these cases). To illustrate this idea, we consider some more examples from Italian
Ű in this language, genericity is expressed by imperfective sentences, which also
allow for episodic, event-in-progress readings when the reference situation is small.
Compare (121-a) - (121-c), which are anchored either to unbounded or to large
situations and have generic meaning, with (122-a) and (122-b), which are anchored
to small situations and have episodic meaning:
(121) a. Gianni è intelligente.
Gianni is intelligent.
b. Gianni suona la chitarra.
Gianni plays guitar.
c. In questi anni, Gianni gioca a calcio in una squadra locale.
Nowadays, Gianni plays football in a local team.
(122) a. Gianni è oﬀeso.
Gianni is oﬀended.
b. Gianni legge un articolo in cucina. Gianni is reading an article in the
kitchen.
c. ?In questi anni, Gianni è contento. ? Nowadays, Gianni is glad.
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Sentences (121-a), (121-b), unlike (122-a), (122-b), have reference situations which
lack specified temporal bounds, in the sense that a time adverbial could not be
used in either (121-a) or (121-b) to constrain the size of the reference situation.
For example, it would be odd to say Questa mattina Gianni è intelligente ’This
morning Gianni is intelligent’ or Questa mattina Gianni suona la chitarra ’This
morning Gianni plays the guitar’ (with the generic interpretation of the VP suona
la chitarra, which is similar to the interpretation of the ILP is a guitar player);
however, such constraint of the reference situation through a time adverbial is
possible in (3), as we could felicitously say In questo momento Gianni è oﬀeso ŚAt
this moment Gianni is oﬀendedŠ or In questo momento Gianni legge un articolo in
cucina ŚAt this moment Gianni is reading an article in the kitchenŠ. On the other
hand, (121-c) has a Şlarge sizeî reference situation which is constrained by the time
adverbial in questi anni Śin these yearsŠ, while the same adverbial gives rise to
anomaly in (122-c), given that the predicate essere contento Śto be gladŠ denotes
a set of transitory states which do not hold of year-sized intervals. This proposal
will make sense of a theory which allows for diﬀerent degrees of genericity.
Basically, a distinction will be drawn between Şstrongî generics which do not have
any specified temporal bounds, and Şweakerî generics which do have more
constrained reference situations, although characterized by a large size. This paves
the way for empirical studies aimed at assessing the extent to which such theory is
supported by real data.
In conclusion, all parties recognize that some not well-defined property of
unboundedness is central to generics. We saw above that [Carlson, 1988], though
proposing a dyadic operator analysis which anticipates that of Krifka et al.,
devotes much attention to a notion of unboundedness which he proposes as a
feature discriminating between truly generic sentences and those which only
express accidental generalizations. In this respect, it is particularly interesting to
consider Krifka et al.’s perspective on Declerck’s proposal to have a property of
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unboundedness explain the interpretation of restrictive when-clauses in generics:
"[Declerck] argued that [unboundedness], rather than the presence of a generic
operator, is the essence of restrictive when-clauses. We agree with his observation
concerning the "unspecified" nature of when-clauses, but we claim that it is the
presence of a generic operator (or of explicit quantificational adverbs) which causes
the when-clause to be "unspecific."" ([Krifka et al., 1995, 36]). Thus, the general
point is that it is clear that unboundedness truly is a property characterizing
generics; what is in question is whether unboundedness should be viewed as the
primary notion in the semantic theory of generics or whether it is an eﬀect
dependent on an underlying generic operator. According to this perspective, the
real alternative to the prevailing analysis based on some sort of covert generic
operator is not simply to emphasize the presence of an unbounded interpretation,
but rather to claim that the unbounded interpretation is not the eﬀect of the
semantic functioning of an ad hoc generic operator, but an independent ingredient
of the semantics of generics which, by itself or in interaction with some other
ingredient, produces generic meaning. An alternative of this kind, even though
restricted exclusively to habitual generics, is proposed in Del Prete in this volume.
Del Prete considers habitual generics in Italian, typically consisting of
imperfectively marked sentences. His proposal is based on a modal-temporal
analysis of the morphologically overt imperfective aspect in a branching-time
model, where the semantic contribution of imperfective is a forward expansion of
an input reference situation in the model of the branching futures. This
contribution of the imperfective is constant across the progressive and the generic
readings of imperfective sentences, and is not specifically invoked to account for
the intensional character of generics in particular. The diﬀerence between
progressive and generic readings is thus explained in terms of a diﬀerence in the
temporal size of the input reference situation: small reference situations give rise to
event-in-progress readings, where typically a singular event of the type described
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by the VP is considered as covering the forward extended situation, whereas large
reference situations set the ground for the emergence of generic readings, where
typically plural events of that type are needed to cover the forward extended
situation.14
6.2 Plurality
6.2.1 State of the question in the Generic Book and Problems
On the analysis of habituals in terms of the covert operator GEN proposed by
[Krifka et al., 1995], it is not trivial to explain the contrast between (123) and
(124) below. In particular, given that the logical form of (124) could be either the
formula (125) or the formula (126), a missing explanation of the "same object"
implication of (124) makes this sentence odd - indeed this sentence, to the extent
that it is acceptable, is understood as implying that John writes the same song
over and over, but neither (125) nor (126) has this implication.
(123) When John writes a song, he goes to the Irish pub.
(124) ?John writes a song at the Irish pub.
(125) GENs(John is at the Irish pub in s] [∃x [John writes x in s & x is a song
in s])
‘Generally, when John is at the Irish pub, he writes a song there.’
(126) GENs,x(John writes x in s & x is a song in s] [ John is at the Irish pub in
s)
‘Generally, when John writes a song, he is at the Irish pub.’
A less recognized point is that Carlson’s analysis in terms of the monadic operator
Gn would also have diﬃculties in accounting for the oddness of (124).
[Carlson, 1979]) shows that the Gn analysis predicts that (127) does not imply that
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there is a particular knife used by John on every occasion. The way this prediction
is borne out is by the occurrence of the existential quantifier corresponding to a
knife in the intensional context set up by Gn, as shown in the formal analysis ??:
(127) John eats his dinner with a knife.
(128) [Gn (∧λx∧s.∃y[knife(y) ∧ eat-dinner-with￿(x∧s, y)])](John)
‘The individual John has the property of habitually eating his dinner
with a knife.’
While this prediction is correct for (127), Carlson’s theory is bound to make a
similar but wrong prediction for (124), according to the formal analysis (129):
(129) [Gn (∧λxs.∃y[song(y) ∧ write-at-the-Irish-pub￿(x∧s, y)])](John)
‘The individual John has the property of habitually writing a song at the
Irish pub.’
The latter prediction is wrong, since sentence (124) does imply that there is a
particular song written by John on every occasion. On a covert operator analysis,
to account for the oddness of examples like (124) one would need to assume that
the singular indefinite obligatorily takes scope over the generic operator in such
cases, while it can scope below the generic operator in sentences like (127). In the
absence of a principled explanation of the contrast between (124) and (127),
however, such an account could be criticized as stipulative. It is worth noting that
(124), if embedded in a suitable discourse context, no longer implies that John
writes the same song over and over. One such context is provided below (Sandro
Zucchi, p.c.):
(130) Here’s what John does during the day. He drinks a glass of wine at the
restaurant and writes a song at the Irish pub.
81
Our intuition is that the first sentence of (130), through the generic interpretation
of the free relative what John does during the day, sets up a restriction for the
interpretation of the following sentence. The latter is thus interpreted along the
lines of the paraphrase (130), whose logical form may plausibly involve a dyadic
operator corresponding to the adverb generally, similar to Krifka’s GEN, as in
(132):
(131) Generally, during the day, John drinks a glass of wine at the restaurant
and writes a song at the Irish pub.
(132) GENs [s is during the day] [ ∃x∃y [x is a glass of wine in s & y is a song
in s & John drinks x in s & John writes y in s])
Our proposal concerning (130) is thus that this example bears a relation to the odd
sentence (124) which is the same relation as (133) bears to the odd sentence (134):
(133) Mary smokes a cigarette after dinner.
(134) ?Mary smokes a cigarette.
In both (130) and (133), a generically interpreted time adverbial (during the day in
the former, after dinner in the latter) sets up a restriction for a tripartite
quantificational structure. Crucially, our claim is that such a tripartite structure is
not available for simple sentences like (124) and (134), which we believe, following
[Ferreira, 2005], express genericity that does not depend on an underlying
quantifier. In the next section we sketch some ways to address the problem raised
by (124). The central concept that we introduce is that of verbal plurality.
6.2.2 New proposals
The issue of the temporal size of the situation to which generics are anchored
interacts with the orthogonal issue of verbal plurality, which we mean to refer to
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plurality as it manifests itself in the domain of verb predicates ([Cusic, 1981],
[Landman, 2000], [Van Geenhoven, 2004], [Kratzer, 2008]). The interaction
between large-size temporal anchors and verbal plurality in habituals is explored in
Del Prete’s paper in this volume. The crucial point here is that not only are
habituals observed to be predicated of large situations, but also that
"macro-events" are intuitively involved in such predications. In the formal
semantics literature, verbal plurality has been modeled by extending [Link, 2008]’s
algebraic treatment of plural and mass nouns to the event domain. Here, we
consider [Landman, 2000]’s technical implementation, which is closely related to
Krifka ([Krifka and Gerstner-Link, 1993], [Krifka, 1998]). Throughout this section,
when we talk of sums of events/individuals (also occasionally referred to as plural
events/individuals), we will thus be assuming an algebraic approach such as has
been familiar since Link’s work.
[Landman, 2000] proposes dealing with a number of phenomena, in particular
cumulative and distributive readings of sentences with plural subjects and/or
plural objects, on the basis of the assumption that verbs can refer to plural events.
The basic idea that he pursues is to allow for an ontology with a domain of events
including sums of atomic events alongside atomic events themselves, and to have
verb predicates denote event sums as well as atomic events. Thematic roles map
events, either singular or plural, onto their participants. Participants of an event
sum or plural event e are individual sums or plural individuals made up by the
atomic individuals which are the participants of the atomic parts of e.
In other work, [Van Geenhoven, 2004] mainly focuses on frequentative readings of
achievement and accomplishment sentences with bare plural and singular indefinite
complements. Her paper brings into focus the problem of the diﬀerent ways in
which verb plurality and plural vs. singular complements scopally interact with
each other. A problem she considers that is relevant here is the wide scope of
singular indefinites with respect to for -adverbials in sentences like (135), as
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opposed to the narrow scope reading of bare plurals in the same position - as in
(136) (such examples had already been discussed by [Verkuyl, 1972] and
[Dowty, 1979]):
(135) Bill dialed a phone number for an hour. ’Bill dialed the same phone
number over and over for an hour.’
(136) Bill dialed phone numbers for an hour. ’Bill dialed diﬀerent phone
numbers for an hour.’
She explains the contrast between (135) and (136) by assuming a silent V-level
pluralization operator which in these examples returns a plurality of dialing events,
and by further assuming that singular indefinites cannot be distributed over the
atomic parts of a plural event, unlike bare plurals. This issue is closely related to
the contrast between Mary smokes a cigarette and Mary smokes cigarettes, which
has been discussed in the literature on generics (this problem is considered in the
papers by Cabredo-Hofherr and Del Prete in this volume). The relation between
van Geenhoven’s plurality-based account and habituality, however, is not
developed in her paper.
[Kratzer, 2008]’s core contribution is the Lexical Cumulativity Hypothesis (LCH),
according to which verbs (as well as nouns) are born as plurals, which means that
they have cumulative reference in [Krifka, 1998]’s sense: P has cumulative
reference iﬀ if x is P and y is P then the sum of x and y is also P . This is
proposed as a language universal property. Regarding verb predicates, Kratzer
construes LCH in an event-based framework a la Krifka - Landman. Thus,
lexically, verb predicates denote sums of events (with singular events as the
limiting case). Note that the adoption of LCH allows prediction of the availability
of plural (i.e. iterative, and possibly habitual) interpretations of sentences like
John jumped, notwithstanding the fact that such sentences lack overt marking of
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plurality on the verb. Amongst the data that Kratzer deals with, sentences with
wide-scope singular indefinites are once again crucial. Like van Geenhoven, she
also focuses on the property of singular indefinites by which they do not distribute
over the atomic parts of plural events in the denotation of the verb.
Generics - at least in their habitual sub-variety, which is the primary focus of this
section - seem to involve reference to plural events, for example the truth of (137)
seems to require a plurality of events of Mary’s smoking a cigarette after dinner to
have already occurred and another plurality of such events to be expected to occur
in the future.
(137) Mary smokes a cigarette after dinner.
This plural feature of (137) is in clear contrast with the singular character of the
episodic sentence (138), which intuitively refers to a single event of Mary’s smoking
a cigarette after dinner:
(138) At this after-dinner moment, Mary is smoking a cigarette.
The relation between habituality and verbal plurality has been emphasized by
[Ferreira, 2005], and is elaborated upon in the papers by Cabredo-Hofherr, Del
Prete, and Boneh and Doron in this volume. According to Ferreira, bare habituals
like (123) above (repeated below as (139)), i.e. habituals with no adverbs of
quantification, should not be analyzed as quantificational tripartite structures as in
the classical GEN-analysis, but rather should be analyzed as involving reference to
plural events, along the lines of the semi-formal paraphrase in (140).
(139) When John writes a song, he goes to the Irish pub.
(140) The events e such that John writes a song in e are such that John goes to
the Irish pub in e.
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Ferreira’s claim is that bare habituals involve a covert plural definite determiner
over events, rather than the covert generic operator GEN. According to Ferreira,
there is a parallel between (139) and (141), which contains an overt plural definite
description restricted by a relative clause.
(141) In my family, the women who married a professor are happy.
The when-clause in (139) is claimed to be parallel to the relative clause in (141), in
the following sense: both the when-clause and the relative clause introduce a
distributive operator in the sentence, with the eﬀect of ascribing the relevant
property (i.e. the property of being an event in which John writes a song in (139),
and the property of being married to a professor in (141)) to every atomic part of
the plural event/individual referred to by the definite description. This distribution
to the atomic parts of the pluralities involved is shown in the formal analyses (142)
and (143) (ι is a plural definite determiner, ‘E’ and ‘X’ range over plural events
and individuals respectively, ‘e’ and ‘x’ over atomic events and individuals
respectively, ‘<AT ’ is the atomic-part-of relation between events or individuals):
(142) ιE[∀e(e <AT
E)(∃ysong(y) ∧ writes(John, y, e))][goes-to(Irish-pub, John, E)]
(The plural event E such that for every atomic part e of E there is a song
that John writes in e is such that John goes to the Irish pub in E.)
(143) ιX[∀x(x <AT X)(woman(x) ∧ ∃yprofessor(y) ∧married(y, x))][happy(X)]
(The plural individual X such that for every atomic part x of X, x is a
woman and there is a professor that x married, is such that X is happy.)
An important piece of evidence in favour of Ferreira’s analysis comes from bare
habituals embedding singular indefinite DPs, which imply that the referent of the
indefinite is the same across the diﬀerent atomic parts of the plural event referred
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to. The relevant contrast is between the good sentence (139) above and the bad
sentence (144) (the same as (124) above), whose analysis is given in (145) (capital
letters signal prosodic stress; stressed material goes into the matrix at logical form):
(144) ?John writes a song at THE IRISH PUB.
(145) ιE[∃ysong(y)∧writes(JJohn, y, E)][at-the-Irish-pub(John, E)] (The plural
event E such that there is a song that John writes in E is such that John
is at the Irish pub in E.)
Sentence (144) is odd because it implies that John writes the same song over and
over. This is correctly predicted by the analysis (145), as the existential quantifier
∃y in this formula directly operates at the level of the plural event E, and not at
the level of the atomic parts of E, unlike what happens in the analysis of (139)
which we just saw in (142). Note that there is a parallel contrast between (141)
and the odd sentence (146), whose analysis is given in (147):
(146) ?In my family, the wives of a professor are happy.
(147) ιX[∃yprofessor(y) ∧ wives(X, y))][happy(X)] (The plural individual X
such that there is a professor of which the atomic individuals in X are
wives is such that X is happy.)
Sentence (146) is also odd because it implies that in my family there are many
women married to the same professor. This is also correctly predicted by the
analysis (147), in a structurally similar way: the existential quantifier ∃y in this
formula directly operates at the level of the plural individual X, and not at the
level of the atomic parts of X, unlike what happens in (143).
Thus, according to Ferreira, only in (139) is the property of being an event in
which John writes a song distributed over the atomic sub-events of the plural event
referred to, and this is achieved through the distributive operator introduced by
87
the when-clause. On the other hand, no such distribution is possible in (144),
hence in the latter case it is not possible to have diﬀerent songs for diﬀerent
writing episodes. Analogously, only in (141) is there distribution of the property of
being married to a professor over the atomic parts of the plural individual referred
to, and this is achieved through the distributive operator introduced by the
relative clause. On the other hand, there is no such distribution in (146), hence in
the latter case it is not possible to have diﬀerent professors for diﬀerent women.
Ferreira also proposes an analysis of habituals with an even simpler structure than
(139)’s, namely habituals such as (148), which he calls simple habituals
([Ferreira, 2005, 93]).
(148) Mary smokes.
Not only do such habituals lack an overt Q-adverb, but they also lack a restrictive
clause or any other material that could provide a restriction for a covert operator
at logical form. Ferreira’s claim is that simple habituals can be uttered out of the
blue with no need of an implicit restrictor for a covert operator, since they do not
actually have a covert operator in the first place. As soon as some
linguistic/non-linguistic material is supplied, however, sentences become
potentially ambiguous in being interpreted both as simple habituals or as bare
habituals with a covert definite event determiner. For example, regarding (148),
two options seem to be possible: either the clause Mary smokes is used as a
stand-alone sentence to express a self-standing habitual proposition, or it provides
the material to be predicated of an underlying plural definite description of events,
as in the context set up by the question (149). In the former case the logical form
would be as in (150), in the latter as in (151):
(149) What do your friends do after dinner?
(150) ∃E[smokes(Mary,E) ∧ now ≤ τ(e)]
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‘There is a plural event E such that Mary smokes in E and the running
time of E includes the present time.’
(151) ιE[∀e(e <AT E)(after-dinner(e) ∧ ∃xdo(my-friends, x, e))][∀e(e <AT
E)(smokes(Mary, e))]
‘The events e which are after-dinner events in which my friends do
something are such that Mary smokes in e.’
Boneh and Doron ([Boneh and Doron, 2008b], [Boneh and Doron, 2009]) develop a
view of habituality that takes into account event plurality, but casts it within a
theory that relies on hidden operators HAB. Hebrew distinguishes between a
simple form (152-a) for habituality and a periphrastic form (152-b).
(152) a. yael
Yael
nas’a
went
la-’avoda
to-work
ba-’otobus
by-bus
Yael used to go to work by bus
b. yael
Yael
hayt-a
were
nos’a
go
la-’avoda
to-work
ba-’otobus
by-bus
Yael used to go to work by bus
The first one expresses habituality as a modal notion, that is to say as a
disposition. The periphrastic form expresses habituality as an extensional notion:
repeated events are interpreted as a habit. They thus distinguish two operators
HABmod and HABasp. The authors define HABmod as an operator that depends on
the summation of events in all the accessible worlds of the modal base MBi,w
which is a set of gnomic alternatives to world w at time i, ordered with respect to
an ideal world where dispositions hold indefinitely once initiated. They thus claim
that HABmod is dispositional. Crucial to their analysis is that HABmod requires the
existence of an iteration of events which ’continues’ an actual event, for each and
every world w’ of the appropriate sort.
Boneh and Doron (present volume) explore the issue further, considering a
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variety of habitual constructions in English. Analyses that consider generic
sentences as purely dispositional (i.e. not even requiring the existence of a sole
instantiation) have also been developed. We turn to this issue in the next section.
7 Genericity and the semantics of abilities and
dispositions
Generic statements have been argued to express dispositions and abilities since
[Dahl, 1975] and later [Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet, 2000]. A sentence like
(153-a) has been paraphrased as (153-b).
(153) a. A Ferrari goes at 200km/ph
b. A Ferrari can go at 200k/ph
More fundamentally, abilitative and dispositional statements have been seen as
intrinsically generic ([Kenny, 1975], [Fara, 2008]), since they persist beyond actions
and are independent of particular circumstances.
In this section we first consider in subsection 7.1 sentences like (153-a), for which it
can be argued that there is a covert can. We then turn to overt can in subsection
7.2 and raise the question of its interpretation in relation to tense and aspect.
There we two notions of abilities: generic and specific abilities.
7.1 Covert can
If generic statements are associated with a covert modal operator, then the
question arises as to how this operator should be interpreted, and more specifically,
how does it diﬀer from the overt one.
It has been repeatedly noted that ’one of the main functions of generic sentences
appears to be that of expressing capability or possibility’
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([Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet, 2000]).
(154) a. John runs 50 miles without ever stopping
b. John can run 50 miles per hour without ever stopping
(155) a. This program parses complicated sentences
b. This program can parse complicated sentences
It has also been noted that generic sentences with covert modality cannot be
interpreted as those with overt ones, as the oddness of (156-b) reveals.
(156) a. A boat floats
b. ??A boat can float ([Krifka et al., 1995, 54])15
The question of the interpretation of covert modality is addressed in
Menendez-Benito’s paper in the present volume.
7.1.1 Menendez-Benito’s account and one amendment
[Menendez-Benito, 2005] proposes that covert can is used uniquely for ’inner
dispositions’. One of the major advances of this view is that it does not require the
property to be actually instantiated. Stating that a boat floats means that a boat
has the ability to float in virtue of some inner property, not that a boat has
necessarily floated.
However, as noted by Menendez-Benito (ibid.), not all generic sentences work this
way. For example, the immediate reading of (157) is that John has already played
the trombone.
(157) John plays the trombone
Menendez-Benito explains that in order to acquire the ability, humans must have
exercised it.
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This explanation nevertheless fails to predict some contrasts. Only (158-b) means
that John has already read 1000 signs, whereas (158-a) only means that a Chinese
five year old boy is able to read 1000 characters. In (158-b) read has an ’agentive’
interpretation.
(158) a. A Chinese five year old boy can read 1000 characters
b. John can read 1000 characters
The problem here for Menendez-Benito account is that, although ’a Chinese five
year old boy’ introduces an animate entity it is not required that the property be
instantiated, as predicted by the account.
To solve this issue, one can appeal to the question of degrees of specificity. In the
generic sentence (158-a) the indefinite DP introduces a non specific entity.
Another potential shortcoming for the account pertains to human behavior.
Humans have, like robots, inner dispositions. For instance, unless a newborn has a
particular abnormality, he is predisposed to smile at about 4 weeks of age. When
the newborn is three weeks old, a mother can utter (159). The only possible
interpretation, though, is that the child has already smiled and not that he will
eventually smile as predicted by Mendenez-Benito’s account.
(159) My child smiles
A potential solution to these problems involves the following principle of agency
maximization.
(160) Maximize agency. If the subject entity is specific and is human, then it is
inferred that s/he is an agent that has exercised his/her capacity and
that action has taken place.
Since the entity in (158-a) is not specific, the property need not be instantiated
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(see [Krifka et al., 1995] for the foundational idea that indefinite generic sentences
do not require actual individuals. See discussion in section 8).
7.1.2 Intensional AB without initiating events
There is a variety of generic sentences that the ’inner disposition’ view cannot
cover. For instance there is no ’inner disposition’ that explains that a refrigerator
costs a lot of money
(161) A refrigerator costs $1000
In a diﬀerent account appealing to a cover abilitative operator, Mari
(forthcoming), following [Eckardt, 1999], argues that characterizing sentences are
about ideal worlds, i.e. the modal basis is restricted to worlds without accidents
and proposes the analysis in (162). It must be emphasized here that this analysis
applies only to indefinite generic sentences.
(162) ∀w￿ ∈MB(w), x[w￿is sucht that there are no
impediments][P (x, w￿) → Q(x, w￿)]
Paraphrase: in all worlds w￿ in the modal basis of w such that there are
no impediments, if x is a P entity in w￿, it is also a Q entity in w￿.
The conditional analysis of generic sentences is not new (see Part 3 of the
introduction). What matters here is that the modal basis is restricted to worlds in
which there are no impediments. This restriction is is derived in a principled way
from the semantics of abilities and dispositions. The argument goes as follows:
1. The indefinite provides a free variable ([Heim, 1982]), which is existentially
bounded if there is a spatio-temporal location specified (see for discussion,
[Chierchia, 1995]; [McNally, 1998])
(163) a. A bird flies over the roof (∃)
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b. A bird flies (∀)
2. In the latter case (163-b), following [Kenny, 1975], one can assume that the
sentence has an ’abilitative’ interpretation, i.e. the predicate in the present tense
denotes an ’ability’. An ability is a state of the agent that has an explanatory
value w.r.t. action. In (163-b), ’flies’ denotes an ability of a bird.
3. Generic indefinites, which denote unspecific entities can be attributed abilities
(they cannot be attributed habits, however, since habits can only be attributed on
the basis of observation of repeated action, for a specific entity). Mari
(forthcoming) proposes that a silent AB operator be reconstructed. Distinct from
Boneh and Doron’s HABmod operator, AB does not require even the existence of
events, and does not imply summation. It is a mere intensional operator that
describes un-actualized abilities.
4. Abilities lead to success when there are no opposing conditions (see
[Fara, 2008]).
5. Hence, worlds with no accidents are triggered by the type of modal that is
reconstructed to get the generic interpretation of the indefinite with the present
tense.
The notion of world without impediments elaborated in Mari’s account is
contrasted with two other conceptions. Firstly, it is contrasted with
[Cohen, 1999]’s view according to which a normal world is one in which regularities
observed in the past are considered to hold in the future (see section 8.2.1).
According to this view of normality (164) is predicted to be false since most turtles
are caught by predators and die young.
(164) A turtle has a long life span
Secondly, it is contrasted with [Nickel, 2008]’s view according to which things are
normal in diﬀerent ’ways’ (see section 8.2.3), but the notion of normality is not
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further spelled out. On Nickel’s view it is unclear what it might mean for a
refrigerator to be normal (to cost $1000?, see (161)).
7.2 Tensed abilitative can and two types of abilities: generic
and specific abilities
Much of the recent and ongoing debate on the semantics of abilities and
dispositions has focused on tensed abilitative can in Romance languages (see e.g.
[Hacquard, 2006], [Mari and Martin, 2007], [Mari and Martin, 2009b],
[Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria, 2008], [Homer, 2010], [Mari, 2001],
[Mari and Schweitzer, 2010]). It has been in fact noted that abilitative can in the
perfective and imperfective aspect is (prima facie) associated with two diﬀerent
types of entailments (see [Bhatt, 1999]). Here we focus on French. In particular,
while pouvoir in the imperfective does not entail the truth of the event denoted by
the embedded predicate, this entailment is derived when pouvoir is in the
perfective aspect. Both the following sentences have an epistemic and an
abilitative interpretation. We focus here on the abilitative one.
(165) a. Jean
John
pouvaitimperfect
could
déplacer
move
la
the
table,
table,
mais
but
il
he
ne
did
l’a
that
pas
not
fait
do
John could move the table, but he did not do it
b. Jean
John
a
could
pupresent.perfect
move
déplacer
the
la
table,
table,
but
#
he
mais
did
il
that
ne
not
l’a
do
pas fait
John could move the table, but he did not do it
On the initial explanation of Bhatt (ibid.), who first noted this contrast in Hindi,
two lexical entries for can were distinguished: an abilitative can and an action can.
This contrast is studied in [Hacquard, 2006], who aims to keep only one lexical
entry for can. In comparing the abilitative reading of (165-b) with the epistemic
reading which is also available, Hacquard explains that the abilitative reading is
95
obtained when the modality is interpreted below aspect and scopes over a property
of events (on the epistemic reading the modality is considered to scope over tense).
While capturing the distinction between abilitative and epistemic modality (see
counter-proposals in [Homer, 2010] and [Mari, 2001]), this view does not tell us
much about abilitative modality itself which is treated as circumstantial modality.
The contrast in (165) has been revised in subsequent literature. In particular
[Mari and Martin, 2007] point to the fact that the actuality entailment is not
derived when an overt temporal adverb is specified as in (166)16
(166) Le robot a pupresent perfect repasser les chemises à un stade bien précis de
son développement, mais il ne l’a pas fait
The robot could iron skirts at a precise stage of its development but it
never did
Here a so-called ’quasi-counterfactual’ meaning is obtained (see Mari, forthcoming).
The intended meaning is that the robot would have been able to iron skirts during
a certain period of time during its development, but that functionality was then
suppressed and thus the robot never ultimately ironed skirts. The conditional is
more likely to be used in this context but the present perfect is also acceptable.
In explaining these data, [Mari and Martin, 2009b] propose an ontological view,
and build on the Aristotelian distinction between two types of abilities.
This distinction is formulated in the following terms by Aristotle (de
Interpretatione, 4,23):
" . . . ’Possible’ itself is ambiguous. It is used, on the one hand of facts
and of things that are actualized; it is ’possible’ for someone to walk,
inasmuch as he actually walks, and in generally we call a thing
’possible’ since it is now realized. On the other hand, ’possible’ is used
of a thing that might be realized; it is possible for someone to walk
96
since in certain conditions he would . . . "
This distinction has been adopted or proposed in similar terms by a number of
authors (although not all recognize that the distinction was initiated by Aristotle),
most notably by [Austin, 1979], [Von Wright, 1963] and [Thalberg, 1972]. There
are various ways to understand the notion of capacity in acto (i.e. the actualized
capacity). The most radical view consists in denying of this type of capacity the
status of ’ability’ (Thalberg, ibid.; in the linguistic literature, [Bhatt, 1999]). In this
case ’ability’ means ’action’. According to the pragmatic view, a capacity in acto
is a capacity that is ’attributed’ on the basis of the fact that an action has been
observed (Austin, ibid. and recently, in the linguistic literature, [Piñón, 2009]).
Across these understandings of the Aristotelian distinction, all authors agree on the
fact that the capacity in acto is considered to be specific, that is to say, relative to
an occasion for acting. A general ability is instead a state of the agent that holds
across situations (for the first use of specific vs. generic ability, see [Honoré, 1964]).
[Mari and Martin, 2007] spell out an ontological distinction for this view. They
re-label the Aristotelian distinction between two types of abilities as generic and
action dependent abilities (respectively GA and ADA). They propose the following
definitions, which consist of three ontological constraints, plus a fourth
epistemological one, which guides the criterion for ability attribution.
(167) Generic abilities
•GAs do not require verifying instances (one does not have to kill a
rabbit to have the GA to kill a rabbit);
•GAs are ascribed to an agent i only if i could perform repeatedly the
action if desired;
•GAs are conceived by default as unbounded (temporally persistent):
if a GA is ascribed to i in t, it is typically assumed that i has the
same GA in some t’ ⊃ t;
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•GAs are a positive explanatory factor in accounting for the agent’s
performance of an action (attributing to the agent i the GA to
perform the action a can explain the fact that he performs a; ’he was
able to do it, so he did it’)
Generic abilities are abilities à la [Kenny, 1975].
(168) Action dependent abilities
•ADAs require an action to exist - actually, an ADA ontologically
depends on the corresponding action
•ADAs are weaker abilities than GAs because a unique and non
repeatable performance suﬃces to imply the corresponding ADA
•ADAs have the same temporal boundaries than the action on which
they depend and are thus bounded (Paul was able to hit three
bullÕs eyes in a row exactly at the interval t he hit three bullÕs eyes
in a row)
•The attribution to the agent i of the ADAs to do the action a is not
typically used as an explanation of the fact that i did a. It is rather
because a performs an action a that we attribute him the ADAs to
perform a (’he did it, so he was able to do it’).
This distinction between two types of abilities is revealed in the distinction
between the perfective and imperfective aspect. As was discussed in section 6.1,
the imperfective denotes an unbounded period of time in Romance languages and
thus is likely to be used to express a generic meaning. The perfective denotes a
bounded period of time and is more likely to be used to express punctual or
accidental occurrences of events or states.
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As for pouvoir (’can’), Mari and Martin explain that when this verb is in the
perfect aspect it can either denote a bounded generic ability (as in (166)) or an
action dependent ability (as in (165-b)). They explain that the actuality
entailment arises in the latter case, since this entailment is characteristic of the
action dependent ability, which, in and of itself, requires an action to exist17. They
explain that the actuality entailment does not arise when pouvoir is in the
imperfective aspect as it then denotes a generic ability, which is not associated
with an actuality entailment.
Without stating this overtly, the authors assume an optimality theory framework.
Generic abilities are states and are thus unbounded. Action dependent abilities
depend on action and are thus bounded. Since the imperfective and the perfective
aspect denote respectively an unbounded and a bounded period of time, they are
chosen to express, respectively, generic (unbounded) abilities and action dependent
(bounded abilities).
The robot example in (166) illustrates the case in which the perfective is also used
to express a generic ability (i.e. an ability which is not instantiated by an actual
action), as a bounded period of time at which the ability holds is targeted (that
bounded period of time is provided by the temporal adverb)18
The work of Giannakidou and Staraki (present volume) builds on Mari and
Martin’s distinction, but shows that the distinction between generic and specific
abilities is not determined by aspect. They examine data from Greek and show
that both types of abilities can be associated with both perfective and imperfective
aspect.
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PART III: GENERICITY AND THE SENTENCE
The discussion in the last part of this introduction begins by acknowledging that
there is a variety of generic sentences and addresses the question of whether this
variety correlates with particular linguistic forms. Generic sentences with singular
indefinites on the one hand and bare plural generics (in English) and definite
plural generics (In Romance languages) on the other are considered. Section 8
discusses the contribution of diﬀerent determiners to the interpretation of the
sentences. Section 9 addresses the question of the notion of normality and
compares normative to statistical views of this notion.
8 Interpretations of GEN
The final part of this introduction is dedicated to the interpretations of GEN. The
tripartite structure on which most of the current approaches build (169) was
introduced by [Farkas and Sugioka, 1983], as a major novelty against Carlson’s
unitary operator Gn (see discussion in section 6.1). Let us recall here that GEN is
a sentential operator (see (169)), taking a restrictor and a nuclear scope. More
specifically, it is an unselective quantifier that can bind any variable in it scope.
For reasons of clarity we specify which variables are bound in each case we discuss.
(169) GEN [restrictor] [nuclear scope]
On the foundational analysis of GEN, (see [Farkas and Sugioka, 1983],
[de Swart, 1993], [Chierchia, 1995], [Kratzer, 1995]), GEN means essentially
’generally, always’. Farkas and Sugioka’s theory is grounded in the Lewisian
([Lewis, 1975]) view that always, generally are unselective quantificational adverbs
which take sentential scope. GEN is argued to be triggered by a silent
’when’-clause, on the basis of the following argument. (170-a) is interpreted as in
(170-b). When a when-clause occurs with an overt AdvQ (170-c), the when-clause
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provides the restriction for AdvQ. Hence in (170-a) a silent AdvQ called GEN
must be reconstructed, for which the silent when-clause provides the restriction.
GEN is considered to mean ’always’.
(170) a. Fido barks
b. Fido barks (when he is hungry)
c. Fido usually barks when he is hungry
The resulting LF for (170-a) is given in (171):
(171) a. GEN s[in(s,Fido)][barks(s,Fido)]
b. Always/Usually in relevant situations that involve Fido, Fido barks
Being unselective, GEN can also bind individuals. The sentence (172-a) receives
the analysis in (172-b) (here we suppress the details of the author’s account
pertaining to the relation between kinds and their realizing instances).
(172) a. Bears are intelligent when they have blue eyes
b. GEN x [bear(x) & have blue eyes (x)] [intelligent (x)]
In Farkas and Sugioka two questions are raised, which punctuate the subsequent
literature on generics. The first is the relation between GEN and universal
quantification. GEN is known to tolerate exceptions, and Farkas and Sugioka
subsequently argue that GEN should be interpreted as a vague universal quantifier.
The second pertains to the causal reasoning that underlies GEN. They explain
that a pragmatic component must dismiss as irrelevant cases in which the
restrictor is false (making the sentence come out true).
Krifka et al. propose a modal analysis of GEN (they mainly discuss the matter in
relation to indefinite singular generic sentences as they treat BNs as referring to
kinds).
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On this intensional analysis of GEN, (173-a) is interpreted as in (173-b). The
if -clause provides the restriction for GEN. GEN is interpreted as an intensional
unselective universal quantifier meaning ’must’ ([Krifka et al., 1995]). On the
assumption that indefinites contribute a free variable ranging over individuals
([Kamp, 1981], [Heim, 1982]), that variable can be bound by the available
universal quantifier as well (for further details, see [Eckardt, 1999]).
Krifka et al. assume a classical modal framework in which W is a set of worlds, D
a domain of entities and ￿ an ordering source on worlds according to normality.
(173) a. A dog barks
b. If something is a dog, it barks
c. ∀w￿ ￿w, x[dog(x, w￿)][barks(x, w￿)]
Paraphrase: in all worlds which are ’normal’, if something is a dog in
those worlds, then it barks in those worlds.
Current analysis of GEN is divided on the matter of whether GEN means ’always’
or if it is an intensional operator. In section 6.2, we discussed criticisms of those
approaches that hold GEN to mean ’always’ (see [Ferreira, 2005] for criticism of
[de Swart, 1993]’s approach). In the rest of this introduction we mostly consider
the modal analysis of GEN (although we return to the view of
[Farkas and De Swart, 2007] in section 8.1.5).
The current debate between can be mainly categorized into two types of
approaches. Firstly, in section 8.1, we consider the views which have provided
diﬀerent interpretations for GEN according to the linguistic form used for the
generalization, and, in particular, according to whether an indefinite singular
(174-a) or a bare plural (174-b) (or a definite plural in Romance languages (174-c))
is used.
(174) a. A raven is black
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b. Ravens are black
c. Les corbeaux sont noirs
Secondly, we dedicate section 9 to some other new approaches to GEN and
characterizing sentences more broadly, which have not paid attention to the
linguistic diﬀerences between types of generic sentences, and which have mainly
considered bare plural sentences such as (174-c).
8.1 Indefinite singular, bare plural and definite plural
generics in contrast
8.1.1 Empirical scope
As was made clear in Krifka et al. 1995, and as noted in section 1, there are
essentially two means for obtaining the generic interpretation. The first is by direct
reference to kinds. This can be obtained by using the singular definite (175-a) or
(according to certain authors, see in particular [Carlson, 1977b] and subsequent
work), by using bare plurals (BP), as in (175-b). The BP is, according to this
view, the name of the kind ’lion’.
(175) a. The lion has a mane (reference to kind)
b. Lions have a mane
The second way to obtain the generic interpretation of the sentence is by using
characterizing sentences. Indefinite singular (IS) sentences (176) are agreed to be a
type of characterizing sentence.
(176) A lion has a mane
As we are discuss in the sequel, according to some authors (e.g. [Cohen, 2001],
[Greenberg, 2002]) BP statements such as (175-b) are also characterizing sentences,
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in the sense that the BP does not directly refer to kinds. From now on we refer to
indefinite singular generic sentence as ISs, and to bare plural generic sentences as
BPs.
In some Romance languages, aside from direct reference to kinds obtained when
the singular definite is used (177-a)-(178-a), when singular indefinites
(177-b)-(178-b) and plural definites (177-c)-(178-c) are used, characterizing
sentences are obtained. We refer to plural definite generic statement as DGs.
(177) a. (It.) Il leone ha una criniera
The lion has a mane
b. (It.) Un leone ha una criniera
A lion has a mane
c. (It.) I leoni hanno una criniera
The lions have a mane
(178) a. (Fr.) Le lion a une crinière
The lion has a mane
b. (Fr.) Un lion a une crinière
A lion has a mane
c. (Fr.) Les lions ont une crinière
The lions have a mane
Here we consider theories of BPs and DGs that analyze them in ways other than as
names of kinds, and strive to explain them in relation to ISs.
8.1.2 Analytic vs. Synthetic?
ISs and BPs in English, like ISs and DGs in Romance languages, do not seem to
express the same type of generalizations.
ISs, in English and in Romance languages, have been claimed to express law-like
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statements and to be compatible only with essential properties, as the contrast in
(179-a)-(179-b) illustrates. (179-a) has been argued to be acceptable as
’polyphonic’ is a definitional property of madrigals, whereas (179-b) would be
unacceptable as ’popular’ is not a definitive property of madrigals. BPs have been
noted to be compatible with both essential properties (180-a) and accidental
generalizations (180-b) ([Lawler, 1972], [Dahl, 1975], [Burton-Roberts, 1977],
[Cohen, 2001], [Greenberg, 2002], [Mari, 2008a], [Mari, 2008b]).
The same observations hold for ISs ((181-a) vs. (181-b)) and DGs ((182-a)
(182-b)) in Romance languages (here we consider Italian, but the same contrasts
hold for French).
(179) a. A madrigal is polyphonic
b. *A madrigal is popular
(180) a. Madrigals are polyphonic
b. Madrigals are popular
(181) a. Un madrigale è polifonico
A madrigal is polyphonic
b. *Un madrigale è popolare
*A madrigal is popular
(182) a. I madrigali sono polifonici
’The’ madrigals are polyphonic
b. I madrigali sono popolari
’The’ madrigals are popular
Much disagreement remains however when it comes to the analysis of these
statements.
In the following sections we first consider the shortcomings of the theories
elaborated at the time of the Generic Book in section 8.1.3, and then move on to
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new approaches in section 8.1.4.
8.1.3 ISs and BPs in Krifka et al.
Krifka et al. begins by explaining that the main diﬀerence between bare plurals
and singular indefinites is that the former but not the latter can be used for direct
kind predication.
(183) a. Dinosaurs are extinct
b. *A dinosaur is extinct
On this view, (183-a) expresses a property of the kind ’dinosaur’, represented as
￿ ↑ dinosaurs￿. (183-b) are instead considered as characterizing sentences and the
singular indefinite does not support a predicate of kinds.
Krifka et al. (ibid.) thus focus on ISs and assume as a starting point the
intensional analysis in (173-c) repeated in (184).
(184) ∀w￿ ￿w, x[dog(x, w￿)][barks(x, w￿)]
Contra the commonly-held assumption that ISs express only definitional
statements (e.g. [Lawler, 1972], [Burton-Roberts, 1977]), Krifka et al. note that
there are a variety of ISs, including definitional and non-definitional, (see also
Putnam, 1995). What varies according to Krifka et al. is the type of modal base:
this can be abilitative, deontic, circumstantial . . ..
The modal base is deontic in (185-a), ablitative in (185-b) and realistic in (185-c).
The choice of modal base is determined by the corresponding sentence with an
overt modality, as presented in (186-a), (186-b) and (186-c).
(185) a. A gentleman opens the door for ladies
b. A boat floats
c. A turtle lives a long time
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(186) a. A gentleman must open the door for ladies
b. ??A boat can float
c. A turtle can live a long time
This treatment encounters at least two shortcomings that Krifka et al. did not fail
to note (see also discussion in [Mari, 2001]).
Firstly, ISs with covert modality are not always synonymous with those with overt
modality, as the oddness of (186-b) reveals ((185-b) is however perfectly fine).
Consequently, cases in which the modal is overt or covert should be distinguished
and treated separately. As we show below, while it is reasonable to endorse a
classical treatment of modal statements when the modal is overt, extending the
account to cases in which it is covert is a more risky theoretical choice.
A second shortcoming pertains to (185-c). Krifka et al. ibid. p. 56 write:
". . . This sentence evokes a kind of "realistic" modality in which the
laws of biology hold. However, the worlds in which no turtle ever dies a
premature death are biologically highly abnormal . . ."
Another potential problem for the modal account as stated in Krifka et al. (ibid.)
is that allowing the use of any type of modal base cannot rule out temporary
properties (187), since in most circumstantially normal worlds it is true that raps
are popular.
(187) *A rap is popular
Various theories have been proposed, which are an elaboration of the LF in (184).
These theories also do not claim that BPs are names of kinds, and thus closely
consider the elaboration of (184) that is induced by the use of an indefinite
singular, and that which results from the use of a bare plural (in English) or a
definite plural (in Romance languages).
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8.1.4 New approaches of IS/BP and IS/DG
Unified quantificational account [Greenberg, 2002]’s account, while
recognizing the contrast between and (see [Lawler, 1972] and [Dahl, 1975]), does
not subscribe to the claim that ISs are definitional whereas BPs express descriptive
generalizations, as for instance (189) is a perfectly acceptable sentence, although it
is not definitional.
(188) a. A madrigal is polyphonic / *popular
b. Madrigals are polyphonic / popular
(189) A Norwegian student wears green socks
Greenberg’s claim is that both ISs and BPs should be treated as quantificational
statements. In essence, bare plurals are treated as indefinites, which also provide a
variable bound by GEN. GEN is analyzed in an intensional framework. The
novelty of Greenberg’s account is that it captures the variety of available
interpretations for ISs and BPs by appealing to two diﬀerent types of accessibility
relations (in the framework of [Kratzer, 1991]).
Specifically, in Greenberg’s setting, the accessibility relation between worlds can be
of two types. It can be an ’in virtue of’ property or a ’maximal similarity relation’.
ISs appeal to an ’in virtue of’ property.
(190) a. A boy does not cry (in virtue of ’being tough’)
b. ∀w￿[∀x[boy(x, w￿)] → [tough(x, w￿)]] →
[∀x, s[boy(x, w￿)] → [∼cry(x, w￿)]]
c. Paraphrase: In all worlds where every boy is tough, every boy does
not cry (in all relevant situations s).
This analysis is strongly reminiscent of the treatment of dispositional statements.
Saying that sugar is soluble means that it dissolves in water in virtue of an
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intrinsic property of sugar. Similarly, to state that a boy does not cry means that a
boy does not cry in virtue of some intrinsic property of boys. This
straightforwardly and correctly captures that madrigals are polyphonic by
appealing to the internal makeup of madrigals (e.g. [Fara, 2008]).
Greenberg extends the quantificational approach to BP statements, whose analysis
is given in (191-a). Here the accessibility relation between worlds is simply
maximal similarity (Max).
(191) a. Professors wear a tie
b. ∀w￿[Max(w,w￿)] →
[∀x, s[professors(x, w￿) ∧ C(s, x, w￿)] → [wear a tie(s, x, w￿)]]
c. Paraphrase: The generalization "every professor wears a tie" is
non-accidental - not limited to the actual world - but is expected to
hold in other, non-actual worlds which are maximally similar to the
actual world.
Both (190-a) and (191-a) express generalizations over individuals. The normative
vs. descriptive flavor distinction is thus derived by accommodating two diﬀerent
types of accessibility relations.
This type of quantificational account has been criticized on diﬀerent grounds.
Firstly, with regard to universal quantification over possible worlds,
Menendez-Benito ([Menendez-Benito, 2005] and present volume) has recently
noted that some cases are not properly captured; (192-a) is paraphrasable as
(192-b) but not as (192-c).
(192) a. A car goes 200 KPH
b. A car can go 200 KPH
c. A car must go 200 KPH
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Secondly, there are cases for which it is hardly possible to find an ’in virtue’ of
property that justifies the causal relation between property P and property Q, as
in the cases following in (193) (see also Corblin, this volume).
(193) a. A refrigerator costs $1000 in Europe
b. A soccer player earns a lot of money
Thirdly, if by some means an ’in virtue of’ property were to be found that enabled
(193), then this same procedure could be used to justify A madrigal is popular.
Greenberg’s account thus seems to be overgeneralize (see Krifka, present volume).
Finally, it has to be emphasized that Greenberg’s account is specific to English.
Here bare plurals are used, which are considered to provide a variable to be bound
by GEN. This quantificational approach cannot be adopted as such for DGs in
Romance languages since descriptive generalizations are expressed by definites,
which are referential expressions and consequently cannot provide a variable in the
way bare plurals do (see [Beyssade, 2005], [Farkas and De Swart, 2007], and
section 8.1.5 of this introduction).
Non-unified quantificational accounts: the rules and regulations
hypothesis The alternative approach, namely the non-unified quantificational
account, also strives to capture the intuition that IS sentences have a definitional
flavor that is absent from BP sentences. We consider the treatment of ISs and BPs
in turn.
ISs in non-unified quantificational accounts: theory
This alternative view claims that IS statements are not generalizations about
individuals but rather they assert the existence of a rule. The main exponents of
this view are [Burton-Roberts, 1977], revived and formalized in [Cohen, 2001]19.
Under the rules and regulation hypothesis it has been argued that (194-b) is
felicitous only if a rule is posited that regulates the opening days of Italian
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restaurants. In fact, it has been argued that it is not even necessary that there are
actual Italian restaurants and that, as often noted (see Krifka et al. p.49)
indefinite generic sentences do not require that actual individuals exist.
(194) a. (It.) Un ristorante Italiano è chiuso il martedì
b. (En.) An Italian restaurant is closed on Tuesday
A sentence like (195) is thus analyzed as expressing the proposition in (196). The
proposition is shifted into a rule by an appropriate operator ’ !’ (see [Lewis, 1979]).
A rule does not express propositional content and Cohen (ibid.) argues that rules
only have to conform to the models in which the proposition expressed by the
entailment is true. The major question that remains open is what is the analysis of
the proposed entailment should be.
(195) A gentleman opens the doors for ladies
(196) !(gentleman(x) → open-doors-for-ladies(x))
On a technical basis, Cohen explains that ISs are not quantificational on the
following grounds. The peculiarity of generic indefinites is that they do not refer to
a particular entity. In his words, they do not provide a topic. A topic is argued to
be necessary in order to feed the restriction of a quantifier. Hence GEN cannot be
used as its restriction would be empty.
The exact form of the entailment in (196) is intentionally left unexplained, and
Cohen suggests that it might be further elaborated into universal quantification
over possible worlds and individuals, thus espousing the classical view of
unselective binding approaches.
Cohen (ibid.) then develops a theory of rules as expressing non propositional
content, and argues that all indefinite generics express is that there is a rule which
conforms to the models in which the proposition expressed by the entailment is
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true.
Proponents of the rules and regulations hypothesis have also paid a great deal of
attention to the pragmatic behavior of IS sentences and have emphasized the fact
that indefinite statements have a prescriptive use ([Corblin, 1997]) or a moral
flavor ([Cohen, 2002]).
(197) Una pianta ha bisogno di acqua per vivere!
A plant needs water to live!
On this view, it has been argued that ISs are in fact not compatible with
exceptions. For instance, Burton-Roberts [Burton-Roberts, 1977] observes that ‘if
Emile does not as a rule open doors for ladies, his mother could utter (195) and
thereby successfully imply that Emile was not, or was not being a gentleman’. One
cannot thus maintain that if Emile does not open doors for ladies he could be an
exception to the generalization. The generalization holds ’necessarily’ for all
individuals. If one does not satisfy the generalization he is simply not a gentleman.
The rules and regulations hypothesis also faces some problems.
1. Firstly, it undermines the fact that exceptional individuals can still be
accommodated. (198-a)-(198-b) are compatible with the fact that there are soccer
players (in the third French league, for instance) who do not earn a lot of money,
they are nonetheless soccer players. What defines a soccer player is not his earning
a lot of money, as advocated in Mari and Martin (ibid.).
(198) a. A soccer player earns a lot of money
b. (Fr.) Un footballer gagne beaucoup d’argent
It is nevertheless correct that in some cases, IS sentences have a prescriptive use
and are used as definitions. However, IS statements with prescriptive use usually
have an overt modality as in (197) or (199), as noted in [Carlier, 2000] for French.
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(199) Une jeune femme doit bien se comporter
A young lady must behave well
In these cases the standard Kratzerian analysis of deontic modality can apply.
Here, the choice of the modal base is determined by the modal itself (see
[Krifka et al., 1995]). In (199) the modality is deontic and the prescriptive use is
enhanced by the deontic reading of the modal. The sentence (197) with the
semi-modal need is thus analyzed as ’it is necessary that plants get watered’ (see
(197)).
In cases which have been argued to have a prescriptive use, and in which there is
no overt modality, such as (195), the role of prosody has been undermined20.
These statements can become rules only if they are turned into imperatives by the
appropriate intonation. In this case, their prescriptive use correlates with their
being imperatives rather than assertions (for more on the relation between deontics
and imperatives, see [Ninan, 2005], [Schwager, 2006], [Portner, 2007]). In
conclusion, IS statements have truth values, unlike what is claimed by the rules
and regulations like accounts.
2. The major diﬃculty encountered by the rules and regulations hypothesis is that
the relation between facts and rules is not suﬃciently spelled out. A rule that is in
eﬀect, is in eﬀect in the actual world. However, sometimes facts do not conform to
the rule. Let us consider the case of the old turtle again:
(200) A turtle lives a long time
The rule that a turtle lives a long time is in eﬀect. Sill, most of turtles die young
(because of predation). How can one reconcile facts with rules ? After all, what
the generalization expresses is still a generalization about the turtle that dies
young because of predators. It is true that this turtle also has the property of
dying old (in the absence of predators). In other words, the rule according to
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which turtles die old is in eﬀect even for turtles that die young.
Developments of the rules and regulations hypothesis
[Mari, 2008a] proposes dissecting the common ground into a world index w and a
perspective index i. Facts are one and the same in the actual world, but they can
be enlighten by diﬀerent perspectives. A turtle dies old under the biological
perspective. However, the perspective is about turtles that are in the actual world.
In [Mari, 2008b], the index i is assimilated to the judge parameter and she claims
that ISs have diﬀerent truth conditions according to diﬀerent judges.
Krifka (present volume) criticizes this approach. Krifka espouses the view that
the common ground can be dissected into two indices - a world index w and an
interpretation index i Ð and maintains that ISs are definitional, along the lines of
Burton-Roberts.
BPs in non-unified quantificational approaches
As mentioned at the beginning of section 8.1.3, Krifka et al. (ibid.) propose
treating BPs as cases of direct kind predication. [Cohen, 2001] extensively criticizes
this view with the aim of showing that a quantificational account using GEN
should be used for bare plurals as well. Cohen’s arguments proceed as follows:
1. Generic sentences postulated to be cases of direct kind predication are
intuitively about individuals, as in (201).
(201) Kings are generous
2. One way of testing cases of direct kind predication is by showing that it is
impossible to modify the sentence by an overt adverb of quantification (202).
(202) Dinosaurs are *always/*usually/*sometimes extinct
However, the following sentences are acceptable, showing that these are not cases
of direct kind predication.
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(203) a. Madrigals are always popular
b. Kings are usually generous
c. Rooms are sometimes square
3. A third problem for Krifka et al.’s view of BPs as names of kinds arises when
one considers scope ambiguities. If BPs were cases of direct kind predication, they
should not involve scope ambiguities, and yet the data shows that they do. The
following example is from [Cohen, 2001].
(204) Madrigals are popular with exactly one music fan
Cohen (see [Cohen, 2001, 187]) argues that on one reading, for any given madrigal
there is exactly one music fan with whom it is popular; on a second reading the
sentence asserts that there is exactly one music fan who likes madrigals. These
readings could not be diﬀerentiated if the logical form of (204) involved no
quantification.
Having argued that generic BPs do not primarily refer to kinds (see facts
(201)-(204)) Cohen maintains a quantificational approach using GEN. As distinct
from singular indefinites, BPs provide a specific entity which the sentence is about,
hence a topic. A topic is argued to be needed to provide the restriction of a
quantifier and GEN can thus apply. While arguing that BPs are not cases of direct
kind predication, Cohen posits that for providing a specific entity they contribute a
kind in the first place. However, admitting that the sentence in (205) is not about
kinds, but about individual kings, Cohen argues that individual kings are triggered
by an appropriate coercion operation and the LF proposed for BPs is as in (206).
↑king stands for the kind ’king’ and C returns the instances x belonging to the
kind ’king’.
(205) Kings are generous
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(206) GENx [C(x, ↑king)] [generous(x)]
Paraphrase: in general the x that belongs to the kind ’king’ are generous
8.1.5 A comparison between BP and DG
Empirical resemblances The idea that BPs refer to a specific entity underlies
number of approaches to the analysis of DGs in Romance languages (see (207)).
Various authors have claimed that they denote maximal sums (see e.g.
[Beyssade, 2005], [Dobrovie-Sorin, 2004], and more particularly
[Farkas and De Swart, 2007], Mari, forthcoming).
(207) Les rois sont généreux
Kings are generous
As a matter of fact, BPs in English and DGs in Romance languages give rise to
very similar interpretations, and seem to pattern alike in many respects.
Firstly, they both express generalizations about individuals.
(208) Les rois sont généreux
Kings are generous
Secondly, each can express both definitional and accidental generalizations.
(209) a. Madrigals are popular
b. Les madrigaux sont populaires
Thirdly, they both contrast with the singular definite, in that they can express
generalizations that concern individuals, regardless of whether they belong to
well-established kinds or not (see discussion in [Vendler, 1971], [Carlson, 1977b,
433] and recently, for French, [Beyssade, 2010]).
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(210) a. The Bengal tiger is dangerous
b. ??The wounded tiger is dangerous
(211) a. Le tigre du Bengale est dangereuse
b. ??Le tigre blessé est dangereux
(212) a. Bengal tigers are dangerous
b. Wounded tigers are dangerous
(213) a. Les tigres du Bengale sont dangereux
b. Les tigres blessés sont dangereux
Fourthly, they seem to exhibit the same scope ambiguities. As was seen in (204),
(214) also has two diﬀerent interpretations. As above, on one reading, for any
given madrigal there is exactly one music fan with whom it is popular; on a second
reading the sentence asserts that there is exactly one music fan who likes
madrigals. Again, this should lead us to conclude that these readings could not be
diﬀerentiated if the logical form of (204) involved no quantification.
(214) I madrigali sono popolari con esattamente un fan
Madrigals are popular with exactly one music fan
Ultimately, given these resemblances, various authors have tried to trigger a
quantificational analysis from the premise that a definite plural refers to a specific
entity (i.e. a maximal sum). Here we consider two recent works which have
provided fully-fledged logical forms for DGs.
Farkas and de Swart, 2007 Farkas and de Swart (ibid.) propose a unified
account for BPs and DGs. To begin with, following [Ojeda, 1993], they assume
that BPs and DGs denote kinds, and they identify kinds with the highest node of a
lattice (e.g. [Link, 1983]). Following [Chierchia, 1998], they also assume that
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maximal sums are intensional. They explain that both BPs and DGs refer to such
plural objects in virtue of their plurality feature.
For DGs,they propose the following analysis.
(215) a. (Fr.) Les chiens sont intelligents
The dogs are intelligent
b. GENs[!dog(x) ∧ Pl(x)∧in(x, s)][intelligent(x, s)]
The first assumption is that GEN quantifies over situations. They also assume
that DGs introduce a determined referent (’ !’ in (215-b) expresses determined
reference) that participates in the situation s. This referent is a maximal set of
individuals (Pl) and it is the kind. GEN compares two sets of situations in which
the elements of the kind are involved. Members of the kind are triggered by a
distribution operation yielded by the distributive predicate to be intelligent (as for
[Cohen, 2001]). In (215), the interpretation is obtained that most of the situations
that comprise a determinate set of dogs are situations in which dogs are intelligent.
On the same assumption that GEN quantifies over situations, the analysis of BPs
is given in (216) (dog(x) in the following LF is a term).
(216) a. Dogs are intelligent
b. GENs[dog(x) ∧ Pl(x)∧in(x, s)][intelligent(x, s)]
The authors explain that the BP does not assert determined reference. However, in
virtue of its plural morphology, such a determined referent is accommodated and
this referent is again the kind. Again, GEN compares two sets of situations, each
involving the elements of the kind. Here ’ !’ is missing as the BP is not considered
to primarily assert determined reference, rather determined reference is triggered
via the plural feature of the BP.
It is easy to see that from the perspective of the operation of generalization, it does
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not really matter whether the determined reference is asserted or accommodated
and the same interpretation is in fact obtained for BPs and DGs.
In spite of the numerous similarities between BPs and DGs, in Romance languages
(219) is not ambiguous in the same way as its English correspondent (217) is, as
illustrated in their corresponding available paraphrases given respectively in (220)
and (218).
(217) Typhoons arise in this area of the Pacific
(218) a. Paraphrase 1: In general typhoons arise in this area of the Pacific
b. Paraphrase 2 There are typhoons arising in this area of the Pacific
(219) I tifoni sorgono in questa parte del Pacifico
Typhoons arise in this area of the Pacific
(220) a. Paraphrase 1 In generale i tifoni sorgono in questa parte del Pacifico
In general typhoons arise in this area of the Pacific
b. Paraphrase 2 ??Ci sono i tifoni in questa parte del Pacifico
There are typhoons arising in this area of the Pacific
Under the interpretation in (220-b), (219) expresses in fact that it is a property of
this part of the Pacific that there are typhoons, and it thus expresses a
generalization about a location (see [Kratzer, 1989]) rather than about individuals.
This interpretation is unavailable with DGs in Romance.
This constraint can be derived from a general requirement about DGs, namely that
they denote a set of entities whose existence is asserted (or presupposed21).
Since BPs and DGs are treated on a par in [Farkas and De Swart, 2007], this
discrepancy between the available uses of BPs and DGs cannot be captured.
However, in view of the fact that their analysis explains most of the similarities
between BPs and DGs, it should not be abandoned entirely.
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8.1.6 DG in Romance: more on individuals and situations
Building on Farkas and de Swart’s idea that DGs assert the existence of a maximal
plural entity, [Mari, 2011a] proposes an analysis which captures the ability of DGs
to express both inductive generalizations (221-b) and definitional statements
(221-a). Inductive generalizations rest on observation, whereas definitional
statements do not.
(221) a. (It.) I madrigal sono polifonici
’The’ madrigals are polyphonic
b. (It;) I madrigal sono popolari
’The’ madrigals are popular
She also notes that DGs support various types of exceptional individuals,
according to whether they express inductive generalizations or definitional
statements. According to the non-definitional (inductive) interpretation, actual
individuals can be used as exceptions, as in (222). In this case, reference is made
to an actual set of professors.
(222) I professori nella mia università portano la cravatta. Ma no, guarda
Giovanni.
’The’ professors in my university wear a tie. Oh no ! Look at John !
When a rule is asserted, as in (223-a), where a rule of my university is being
described, the generalization hardly tolerates actual individuals as exceptions.
Classes of individuals can be instead used as exceptions to rules.
(223) a. Nella mia università i professori portano la cravatta, (*)tranne
Gianni
In my university, the professors wear a tie, (*)but John
120
b. Nella mia università i professori portano una cravatta, tranne quelli
associati
In my university, the professors wear a tie, but the associate ones
Based on Farkas and de Swart’s assumption that DG denote a maximal set of
entities, Mari (ibid.) proposes an account that explicitly captures these distinctions
and which spells out more carefully the role played by situations. Moreover, the
proposed account derives the intensionality of the maximal referent introduced by
the definite in a more principled way (without assuming that by virtue of denoting
the maximal entity of a lattice, that entity is intensional, as in [Chierchia, 1998]).
Her view builds on [Schwarzschild, 2009]’s recent implementation according to
which definites denote a fixed set of elements in a situation and come equipped in
the logical form with a situation variable. Along with [Kratzer, 2002], Mari
assumes that situations are parts of worlds. Situations and worlds are thus
introduced as variables in the LF. Various operations can be enacted over the
domain of these variables, and thus various interpretations can be obtained.
1. The world variable and the situation variable are lambda abstracted (224). In
this case, once the world and the situation of evaluation are fixed, what the
sentence asserts is that the members of a maximal sum (represented as ιX) all have
a certain property Q. Q being a distributive predicate, universal quantification
over members of the maximal entity denoted by the plural definite is obtained.
(224) λs, w ιX(P (ιX, s, w) ∧ ∀x ∈ ιXQ(ιX, s, w))
For a given world w, a situation s and the maximal sum X of individuals,
the maximal sum is P in s,w, and for all elements x in X, x is Q in s,w.
With these binding of the variables s and w, the inductive generalization is
obtained. This analysis applies to (222). Since it is entailed that there are actual
individuals, actual exceptional individuals can be accommodated.
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2. The world variable and the situation variable are bound by a universal
quantifier (225). In this case the definitional reading of the sentence is obtained: if
one of the members of the maximal sum is a P entity, then it is also a Q entity.
(225) ∀s, w ιX(P (ιX, s, w) → ∀x ∈ ιXQ(x, s, w))
For all worlds w, situations s, and the maximal sum X , if the maximal
sum is P in s,w, then, for all elements x in X, x is Q in s,w.
This analysis applies to (223-b). Since the existence of actual individuals is not
entailed by the expressed definition, it is diﬃcult to accommodate actual
individuals as exceptions.
The idea behind the latitudes of accommodation of exceptions is that these have to
be of the same semantic type of the individuals of which the generalization is
about. When the generalization is about actual individuals, actual individuals can
be used as exceptions. When the generalization is about classes (i.e. sets of actual
and non-actual individuals bearing a certain description), classes can be used as
exceptions.
3. In a third configuration, the world is lambda abstracted and the situation
variable is bound by the universal quantifier.
(226) λw, ∀s ιX(P (ιX, s, w) ∧ ∀x ∈ ιXQ(ιX, s, w))
For a given world w, for all situations s and the maximal sum X, the
maximal sum is P in s,w, and for all elements x in X, x is Q in s,w.
This derives the intended interpretation for (227). In these worlds, in all situations
in which there is a madrigal, a madrigal is popular.
(227) I madrigali sono popolari (see (221-b))
The madrigals are popular
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The analysis proposed by Mari (ibid.) strengthens the point we have made above:
the force of the generalization depends on the type of the situation/world that is
targeted (see also Corblin, present volume). If actual situations and worlds are
considered, (224) is obtained. If non-actual situations and worlds are considered
(225) is obtained. This explains how DGs are able to express both definitional and
non-definitinal statements, as only (225) expresses the causal relation which is
characteristic of definitional statements and is absent from non-definitional ones
(analyzed as in (224)).
Moreover, treating DGs (and BPs) as referring to sets of individuals, and treating
universal quantification as brought about by the distributive predicates finds some
support in recent works in cognitive science showing that generics appear earlier
than quantifiers in natural language (see discussion in section 9.3).
8.1.7 Plural indefinites in French
The question of the interpretation of plural generic indefinites (des (Fr.); dei, It.,
...) in Romance languages has been overlooked in the literature on generics, mostly
because the distributions are puzzling. Here we focus on French. The core
observations related to the use of des N in generic sentences are the following.
1. Des N is not always felicitous in contexts where un N is.
(228) Un carré a quatre côtés
A square has four sides
(228) *Des carrés ont quatre côtés
’des’ squares have four sides
2. Des can be used when a group22 denoting noun is used.
(229) Des jumeaux se ressemblent dans les moindres détails
’Des’ twins resemble each other to the smallest detail
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3. Des N can be used when N is modified (see [Heyd, 2002]).
(230) Des carrés bien formés ont quatre côtés
’Des’ well-formed squares have four sides
Various views have been proposed for these data (see in particular
[de Swart, 1993], [Corblin, 1997], [Dobrovie-Sorin and Laca, 1994], and
[Dobrovie-Sorin and Mari, 2007]). As for the latter case, it has been argued that
the modifier introduces a when-clause, which goes into the restriction of GEN,
which, in this case quantifies over the situations that this restriction provides (the
analysis provided is along the lines of [de Swart, 1993]). Individuals are bound to
situations via a skolem function f .
(231) GEN s [well-formed (f(s), s)] [four-sided (f(s), s)]
A disagreement remains for the contrast between (228) and (229).
[Corblin, 1997] explains that des is avoided in generic sentences for optimality
reasons. Since the generalizations using the indefinite singular (228) and the
indefinite plural would both concern singular individuals, the indefinite singular is
preferred. This explanation does not elucidate under what conditions des can be
used.
[Dobrovie-Sorin and Mari, 2007]) have proposed that des can be used only if the
nouns contribute a suitable domain of quantification (namely GEN). They propose
the following rule of quantification:
(232) Constraint on quantification: a quantifier can only bind individuals.
Following [Link, 2008] and [Landman, 1989], they assume that groups are
individual and thus can be bound by GEN. The LF that they propose for (229) is
given in (233)
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(233) GEN X[X is a group of twins][X resemble each other]
Dobrovie-Sorin, present volume, further explores this hypothesis, resorting to a
ban against quantification over part-whole structures, in line with
[Dobrovie-Sorin and Mari, 2007].
9 Genericity and normality
We conclude this introduction by comparing three views of the notion of
normality. The theories presented here do not consider the lexical contribution of
the determiners, and mainly focus on plurals in English. We begin by considering
[Cohen, 1999]’s statistical view, and contrast it with more normative views, such as
those of [Asher and Pelletier, 1997] and [Nickel, 2008].
9.1 Inductive judgments
[Cohen, 1999] proposes a unified account of generics, e.g. (253), and frequency
statements, e.g. (235), in terms of relative probability.
(234) Birds fly.
(235) Birds always fly.
His probability-based analysis is intended to account for some puzzles, among
which are the following:
1. A generic can be true even in the absence of instances supporting the
generalization it expresses, as shown by the classical example (236):
(236) Mary handles the mail from Antarctica.
This is said to be true even for the descriptive reading of (236): according to
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Cohen, in order to have the truth of (236) without actual supporting
instances it is not necessary to give a prescriptive reading of this sentence,
which would be motivated e.g. by the description of Mary’s duties in her job
contract23
2. Generics and frequency statements are time-intensional but not
world-intensional, as is shown by the truth conditional diﬀerence between
(237) and (238) in the scenario described below (238), and by the truth
conditional equivalence between (237) and (239) in the scenario described
below (239).
(237) A computer (always) computes the daily weather forecast.
(238) A computer (always) computes the main news item. Scenario: The
daily weather forecast turns out to be the main news item today, as
it is predicted that a big rain storm will hit Paris.
(239) A computer (always) computes Mary’s favorite column. Scenario:
Mary’s favorite column in the newspaper is the column of the daily
weather forecast.
Notice that in the rain storm scenario the descriptions the daily weather
forecast and the main news item turn out to corefer w.r.t. the present time,
but do not corefer w.r.t/ any time, as tomorrow the main news item might
well be something other than the weather forecast. This means that the two
descriptions are not intensionally equivalent w.r.t. the time parameter. On
the other hand, in the scenario of Mary’s favorite column not only do the
descriptions the daily weather forecast and Mary’s favorite column corefer wrt
the present time, but, given the general stability of people’s preferences, they
corefer w.r.t. any time within a significant part of Mary’s lifespan (possibly
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within the whole of Mary’s lifespan, if Mary’s preference persists throughout
all her life), so that they can be said to be (at least in part) intensionally
equivalent w.r.t. the time parameter. However, given the contingence of
Mary’s preference for the weather forecast, which need not hold in other
possible worlds, the descriptions the daily weather forecast and Mary’s
favorite column are not intensionally equivalent w.r.t. the world parameter.
This would show that intensional equivalence w.r.t. the time parameter is all
that is required to preserve the truth of generics and frequency statements.
3. They are diﬀerent from temporary generalizations, as shown by the fact that,
if all Supreme Court justices by sheer happenstance have a prime social
security number at this moment, (240) would be true but (241) would be
false:
(240) All Supreme Court justices have a prime social security number.
(241) Supreme Court justices have a prime social security number.
4. They imply a regular distribution of events in time.
5. Judgments concerning their truth are more uncertain than judgments
concerning the truth of quantified sentences.
6. For them to be true it is not enough that the majority of individuals which
are in their actual domain satisfy their predicates.
As to the Logical Form of such statements, he assumes that they involve dyadic
quantifiers expressing relations between properties. The quantifier in a frequency
statement like (235) is the frequency adverb always, whereas in a generics like
(253) it is a covert generic quantifier GEN. The Logical Forms of (253) and (235)
are (254) and (243), respectively, given along with the relative probability
judgments that they correspond to:
127
(242) GEN(bird(x), fly(x)) P(fly | bird) > 0.5 (the probability of an object
flying given that the object is a bird is greater than 0.5)
(243) always(bird(x), fly(x)) P(fly | bird) = 1 (the probability of an object
flying given that the object is a bird is equal to 1)
The probability judgments reported above are interpreted in a Branching Time
framework, the idea being that when we make a probability judgment, not only do
we consider the sequence of events that we have actually observed, but we also
consider possible continuations of that sequence into the future.
Definition: Relative probability in Branching Time P(ψ | φ) = l iﬀ for every
admissible history H and ￿ > 0, there is an initial segment H’ of H such that for
every H” which is a continuation of HŠ and is continued by H the relative
probability of ψ among φ in H” diﬀers from l by less than ￿. (the relative
probability of ψ among φ in H” is defined as the ratio of the number of instances of
ψ ∧ φ in H” to the number of instances of φ in H”) Admissible histories are required
to be suﬃciently long so as to have the relative probabilities in the sub-histories H”
come close to the limiting value l by whatever value ￿, however small it may be,
and to contain instances of φ, as histories without such instances will make the
relative probabilities of ψ among φ undefined, they are required to be
continuations of the actual history, and to be similar to the actual history. On this
analysis (253) is true just in case in every admissible history H the probability of
an object x flying in H given that x is a bird in H is some value l greater than 0.5.
A homogeneity requirement is introduced as a presupposition of generics and
frequency statements, according to which the relative probability in every part of a
suitable partition of any admissible history H must be the same as the probability
in the whole H. Suitable partitions are contextually determined, and sometimes it
may be unclear what partition is relevant and diﬀerent speakers may entertain
diﬀerent partitions. This explains why speakers give more uncertain judgments
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about the truth of generics than about the truth of overtly quantified statements.
9.2 Reasoning with default
[Asher and Pelletier, 1997] propose a modal conditional analysis of generics in
which a relation of accessibility between worlds based on a relativized notion of
normality plays a crucial role. One of the main points on which the authors base
their proposal is that generics have truth-conditions, though these are more
complex than the truth-conditions of episodic sentences. As we have mentioned
above, the opposite view that they reject is that generics have the status of rules
and thus would not be truth-valued assertions in the first place. Another point to
which they devote significant discussion is the intensional character of generics,
and in this respect they make an extensive criticism of purely extensional
quantificational theories. A central property that they wish to explain is the
well-known tolerance to exceptions, e.g. the fact that the truth of (244) is
compatible with the existence of dogs that due to particular accidents are not
four-legged, and their related ability to trigger logical inferences based on a
defeasible rule of modus ponens, as shown by (245).
(244) Dogs have four legs
(245) (a) Dogs have four legs. (b) Fido is a dog. (c) Therefore (defeasibly) Fido
has four legs.
Concerning the problem of tolerance to exceptions, particularly puzzling are
sentences like (246), which have been discussed at length in the literature:
(246) Peafowls lay eggs
Sentence (246) poses a special problem insofar as the tolerance to exceptions that
it displays is massive: assuming temporarily that generics are quantificational, all
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male peafowls are excluded from the domain of quantification. On the intensional
analysis they propose, generics turn out to have truth-conditions, which for the
authors is a welcome result. The modal conditional analysis can be illustrated by
considering the logical form that it assigns to sentence (247). This is given in
(248), and makes use of a dyadic operator GEN with similar syntactic properties
as the GEN of [Krifka et al., 1995]. The modal truth-conditions of the GEN
formula are then given by the quantificational formula (249) below, according to
which the generic operator is defined by means of a universal quantifier binding x
and another universal quantifier over possible worlds entertaining a certain relation
to the actual world (as in [Stalnaker, 1968]’s and [Lewis, 1973]’s classical analyses
of conditional sentences):
(247) Birds fly.
(248) GEN[x][bird(x)] [ fly(x)]
(249) ∀x∀w [(x is a bird in w & w is normal with respect to w0 and to x’s being
a bird) → (x flies in w)]
The truth-conditions in (249) can be paraphrased as follows: for every object x,
the set of worlds that are normal with respect both to the actual world and to the
proposition of x’s being a bird is a subset of the set of worlds in which x flies. This
analysis, though involving a universal quantifier over individuals, can account for
the fact that (247) can be true in spite of some birds (e.g. penguins, or ostriches)
not being able to fly. The mechanism by which this is accounted for is the
intensional component represented by the universal quantification over possible
worlds: individual birds (including penguins) are considered with respect to
possible worlds in which they possess all the properties that are normal for a bird
in the actual world, and then they are claimed to fly relative to such worlds. The
intuition is that relative to worlds in which penguins possess all the properties that
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are normal for a bird in the actual world, penguins do fly. This is an intuition that
we could express by the true conditional If penguins possessed all the properties
that are actually normal for a bird, then penguins would fly. This analysis also
explains why logical inferences based on a rule of modus ponens, drawn from a
major generic premise, are defeasible: the reason is that the minor premise, being a
factual statement, does not say whether the world relative to which Birdie is said
to be a bird (i.e. the actual world) is one in which Birdie possesses all the
properties that are normal for a bird in the actual world. The crucial point here is
that by the accessibility relation underlying GEN it is not guaranteed that the
actual world itself is among the possible worlds accessible from it (the accessibility
is not a reflexive relation). To deal with the massive exception tolerance of the
duck example considered above, the authors acknowledge that the intensional
component encompassing the normality condition is not enough. For one thing, we
may observe that besides sentences like (246) above, there are also sentences like
(250), which also exhibit massive exception-tolerance:
(250) Peacocks have colorful feathers on their tails.
If the only factor that was responsible for the exception-tolerance property of (246)
was the normality condition seen above, then (246) and (250), which are intuitively
both true, could not be both true: if it were normal for peafowls to lay eggs, then
this would imply that it would be normal for peafowls to be hens (as only female
peafowls can lay eggs), and this in turn would imply that it would not be normal
for peafowls to have colorful feathers on their tails (as only male peafowls can have
such colorful feathers), but this would mean that (250) would be false, which is
not. The authors propose that there is also a mechanism of covert domain
restriction which is operative in examples like (246) and (250), by which the former
is somehow restricted to peahens, while the latter to peacocks. This suggestion is
tentative, but the authors present it without developing it into an explicit account.
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Asher and Pelletier (this volume) take on this issue and deal with it more in depth.
9.3 The notion of ’normality’
[Nickel, 2009] criticizes quantificational views of generics by showing the failure of
what he takes to be the best possible implementation of the quantificational
paradigm, namely the view for which the generic quantifier has the force of most.
He refers to quantificational views of generics based on most as majority-based
views, and criticizes them on the basis of true generics like (251), which he claims
to be equivalent to the sentential coordination (252):
(251) Elephants live in Africa and Asia.
(252) Elephants live in Africa and elephants live in Asia.
What makes his criticism particularly interesting for us is that unlike previous
criticisms of the quantificational view of generics, such as the now classical analysis
of [Asher and Pelletier, 1997], it does not consider an extensional version of this
view, but a sophisticated intensional version, and shows how even such a
sophisticated version does not stand up to the threat of cases like (251) above.
Consider a simple version of the majority-based view (one which is already
sophisticated enough to account for the intensional character of generics). On this
account, (253) has an LF like (254), whose truth conditions are informally stated
in (255):
(253) Ravens are black.
(254) GEN[ravens] [black]
(255) GEN[ravens] [black] is true iﬀ in a suitable domain, most ravens are
black
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By relativizing to a suitable domain in , one accounts for the modal nature of
generics, in particular one excludes that (253) may wind up false in a case in
which, by a mere accident, all ravens actually existing at the time of evaluation
have become white. While this analysis may well account for the truth-conditions
of (253), Nickel observes that in order to cope with (256), and with the fact that
this sentence does not entail (257) (far from being so, the former is true while the
latter is false), a majority-based view has to accommodate a restriction of the
domain of quantification.
(256) Chickens lay eggs.
(257) Chickens are hen.
Intuitively, when we evaluate (256), we consider the distribution of the property of
laying eggs not amongst chickens tout court, but amongst a restricted domain, the
domain of those chickens "that are even in the business of producing oﬀspring"
([Nickel, 2009, 634]) – where this restrictive condition entails that such chickens
must be hens. This domain restriction, as Nickel recognizes was pointed out by
[Cohen, 1999], is determined on the basis of the sentence main predicate lay eggs,
which is clearly related to the possible ways of producing oﬀspring. This account
can predict why (257) is false: the restriction induced by the predicate hen is to
chickens that have some gender, and this is a much larger domain than in the case
of (256). Following [Cohen, 1999] in assuming predicate-induced domain
restrictions, the general form of the majority-based view can be represented as in
(258), where ALT(F) is the set of alternatives to the property F and ∨ALT(F) is
the property of having at least one of the properties in the set ALT(F):
(258) GEN[A] [F] is true iﬀ in a suitable domain, most As that are ∨ALT(F)
are F
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In the case of (256), ∨ALT(lay eggs) is equivalent to the property of being able to
produce oﬀspring in some way or other, so that the sentence is predicted to be true
just in case in a suitable domain (larger than the actual world at the time of
evaluation), most chickens that are able to produce oﬀspring in some way or other,
produce oﬀspring by laying eggs. Nickel shows that even this very sophisticated
majority-based view of generics cannot account for the truth of the equivalent
generics (251) and (252). According to this theory, (252) has the LF (259), whose
truth-conditions are (260):
(259) GEN[elephants; live in Africa] & G[elephants; live in Asia]
(260) GEN[elephants] [live in Africa] & GEN[elephants] [live in Asia] is true iﬀ
in a suitable domain, most elephants that are ∨ALT(live in Africa) live in
Africa and in a suitable domain, most elephants that are ∨ALT(live in
Asia) live in Asia
Given the plausible assumptions that the suitable domains in the two conjuncts of
the truth-condition in (260) are the same domain, and that the domain restriction
properties ∨ALT(live in Africa) and ∨ALT(live in Asia) in this truth-condition are
the same property (plausibly, the property of living in some habitat or other), the
majority based analysis makes the wrong prediction that for (252) to be true (and
the same holds for (251)), there must be elephants that live both in Africa and in
Asia, which is plainly incorrect. In view of problematic examples like (251), Nickel
proposes an inquiry-based account in which the truth of a generic sentence is not a
matter of what is true most of the time but a matter of what inductive target is
established in a conversation, where an inductive target in turn determines a way
(or, possibly and crucially, diﬀerent alternative ways) of being normal in some
respect. The concept of being normal is assumed by Nickel as a primitive concept,
for which no analysis in statistical terms is provided. In the case of the
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problematic (251), a plausible scenario in which we can imagine this sentence
uttered is one where the inductive target of the conversation concerns the habitats
in which elephants normally live, and the crucial point is that this inductive target
determines more than one way of being normal: relative to one such way w1, it is
normal for elephants to live in Asia, while relative to another such way w2, it is
normal for them to live in Africa. Nickel’s intuitive point here is that it is equally
normal for elephants to live in Africa and to live in Asia, although relative to
diﬀerent ways of being normal (with respect to the same feature of living in a
certain habitat). The truth-conditions that Nickel’s account assigns to (252) (and
hence to the equivalent sentence (251)) are given in (261), where we still have
(universal) quantification over elephants, but this is crucially dependent on a
higher existential quantification over ways of being normal, so that the domain of
the universal quantifier is not the same in the two conjuncts:
(261) GEN[elephants] [live in Africa] & GEN[elephants] [live in Asia] is true iﬀ
there is a way w1 of being a normal elephant wrt its habitat, and all
elephants that are normal in w1 live in Africa, and there is a way w2 of
being a normal elephant wrt its habitat, and all elephants that are
normal in w2 live in Asia
We observe that Nickel’s semantic account of generics, like those of
[Asher and Pelletier, 1997] and [Cohen, 1999], retains a crucial aspect of the
quantificational views, namely the idea that generics of the form As are Bs do
ultimately involve a form of quantification over individuals exemplifying A’s
property, in this case universal quantification. In this respect, it must be noted
that, although he criticizes previous accounts of generics based on the idea that
they express some kind of quantificational relation between the subject and the
predicate, and in particular Cohen’s proposal to specify the quantificational import
of the generic quantifier in terms of relative frequency of a property inside a
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reference class, Nickel’s own account as well seems to leave it open how we should
make sense of the observation made by some psychologists who report that
generics are acquired comparatively earlier than quantificational sentences (e.g.
[Leslie, 2008]) – which would seem to suggest that generics might not be
quantificational in the end (as noted by [Carlson, 1977b]). [Cimpian et al., 2010]
have recently claimed: ’Although generics imply that the properties they refer to
are prevalent (Gelman, Star, and Flukes, 2002), we argue that they do not mark
quantification per se (see also Carlson, 1977; Leslie, 2008; Prasada, 2000). Generics
are a linguistic means of expressing knowledge about categories, and as such their
interpretation is unlikely to be based solely on frequency information.’ Even
though Nickel’s proposal still retains semantic machinery from quantificational
approaches, his emphasis on the process by which the topic of a conversation
determines a way in which members of a category can be said to be normal and on
a primitive concept of normality, not defined in frequentist terms, makes it closer
to such theoretical perspectives, currently more familiar amongst cognitive
scientists, as we have briefly recalled above.
10 Presentation of the papers in the volume
The volume is structured into three main parts. The first part contains papers that
investigate genericity in the subject DP.
Bert Le Bruyn, Min Que, Henriëtte de Swart ’s paper ‘The scope of bare nominals’.
[Carlson, 1977b] established that bare plurals in English always take narrow scope.
They give a full presentation of the English version of the experiment and a
preview of the Mandarin Chinese and Dutch versions. These results shed doubt on
the received view of the scopal properties of English bare plurals and, if replicated
for other languages, will force a change in the way we model the semantics of bare
nominals universally.
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Carmen Dobrovie-Sorin’s paper ‘Generic Plural and Mass Indefinites’ investigates
the constraints on the distribution of plural indefinites generics in French and
investigates the constraints on plural quantification.
Stefan Hinterwimmer ’s paper ‘Free Relatives as Kind Denoting Terms’ shows that
the puzzling behavior of Free Relatives as definites in some contexts and indefinites
in others is best accounted for if we locate the ambiguity in a covert operator that
either returns an extensional or an intensional (maximal) sum individual.
Gerhard Schaden, in his paper ‘Two Ways of ‘Referring to Generalities’ in
German’, shows that in nominal “reference to a generality” in German, nouns may
appear either bare or with a definite determiner. He investigates the distribution of
both variants and the relative impact of discourse structure.
The papers contained in the second part address the question of genericity in the
verbal domain.
Nora Boneh and Edit Doron’s paper ‘ab and Gen in the Expression of Habituality’
argues, based on the study of English habitual forms, that two diﬀerent modal
operators may be found in the expression of habituality: Gen, a quantificational
modal operator, and Hab, a summational modal operator. The paper also
discusses how the proposed operators interact with mood on the one hand, and
two diﬀerent aspectual dimensions on the other: a viewpoint aspect distinction
between imperfective and perfective, and a perspective distinction between internal
and external (retrospective) perspective.
Patricia Cabredo-Hofherr ’s paper ‘Bare habituals and singular indefinites’
examines habitual sentences across various languages. Based on the scope
properties of bare singulars in bare habituals she argues that habituals should not
be analysed in terms of a scope-taking plurality operation but in terms of a
plurality allowing distributive readings with plural arguments. This plurality
resembles degree expressions such as beaucoup “a lot”, as degree expressions
similarly do not induce scope ambiguities.
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Fabio Del Prete’s paper, ‘Imperfectivity and Habituality in Italian’ proposes a
semantic analysis of Italian imperfective sentences which uniformly accounts for
their habitual and progressive readings. The main contribution is a
non-quantificational account of imperfective habituals, based on a semantic
analysis of verbs in terms of plural events and a modal/temporal analysis of
imperfective aspect as a forward-expanding operator in a branching time model.
Anastasia Giannakidou and Eleni Staraki ’s paper ‘Ability, action and causation:
from pure ability to cause’ shows empirically that Greek distinguishes ability as a
precondition for action, and ability as initiating and sustaining force for action.
The key, they argue, is not perfective aspect (as is commonly thought), since
actualized ability emerges in Greek also with imperfective aspect and present
tense. The crucial factor, we argue, is causation, which triggers a shift from pure
ability to ability as action-initiating energy.
Paula Menendez-Benito’s paper ‘On Dispositional Sentences’ deals with the
interpretation of dispositional sentences such as This car goes 200 khp. It defends a
hypothesis, originally proposed by [Dahl, 1975], according to which dispositional
sentences express existential quantification over worlds. Following up on work by
[Lekakou, 2005], the covert possibility modal contributed by dispositionals is taken
to select a particular type of circumstantial modality.
Friederike Moltmann’s paper ’On the Distinction between Abstract States,
Concrete States, and Tropes’ discusses and defends a distinction between ‘abstract
states’ and ‘concrete states’, a distinction that has recently been proposed by
Maienborn to account for the peculiar semantic behavior of stative verbs. An
explicit ontological account of the notion of an abstract state is given and the
distinction between abstract and concrete states is related to the category of tropes
(particularized properties).
The papers in the third part of the volume address the question of the
interpretation of generic sentences.
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Nicholas Asher and Francis Jeﬀery Pelletier, in their paper ‘More Truths about
Generic Truth’, defend and extend the modal approach to the analysis of generics.
They review several recent criticisms of this view and argue that the view
withstands them. We extend the modal approach by providing a sketch of a
compositional analysis.
Ariel Cohen’s paper ‘No Quantification Without Reinterpretation’ asserts that the
covert quantifier GEN is generated by the hearer, as a process of reinterpretation
of the input. It establishes a diﬀerence between the generic and the habitual
readings. In generics, GEN is generated by a pragmatic process of Predicate
Transfer, whereas in habituals it is generated by a semantic process of
type-shifting. Thus while it is the same quantifier in both constructions, the
process by which it is generated is responsible for the diﬀerences between them.
Francis Corblin’s paper ‘The roots of genericity: indefinite singulars vs. definite
plurals’ builds on the observation that generic readings of singular indefinites in
French (as opposed to plural definites) are rare and always come with a modal
flavor. It is assumed that this reading is triggered by a mechanism of Universal
Closure, which is only triggered when the default mechanism, Existential Closure,
is ruled out.
Manfred Krifka’s paper ‘Definitional generics’ investigates the interpretation of
indefinite generic sentences and argues that these are definitional statements.
Bernhard Nickel ’s paper ‘Dutchmen are Good Sailors: Generics and Gradability’
presents a novel treatment of generics such as ‘Dutchmen are good sailors’, exploiting
the interaction between a generic operator and gradable predicates.
Notes
1Nevertheless, it is important to note that substitutional interpretation of (9-a) and (10-a) is
possible if and only if there are names for all the men and names for all the species of birds. This
is a limit to this approach, which doesn’t account for the intensional dimension of kinds.
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2In the following formulas, the same predicate, run, is applied both to an individual and to
a stage of individual. This can be resolved using the notation proposed by [Parsons, 1979]. We
supress this notation sake of simplicity.
3We return to this distinction in more detail in part 2 section XX, where we present some recent
developments in the area.
4In this short presentation of Chierchia’s proposal, we only consider count nouns. But in his
paper, Chierchia also accounts for mass nouns. On his analysis, mass nouns come out of the
lexicon already pluralized, they neutralize the singular/plural distinction. In other terms, mass
nouns denote plural properties. See [Chierchia, 1998, 346] and sq.
5Carlson and Chierchia observed that BPs such as parts of that machine or boys sitting here,
people in the next room give rise to wide scope readings. They cannot account for that in their
framework, since according to them, all bare plurals refer to kinds. Nevertheless, they recognize
that intuitively these BPs are not associated with anything suﬃciently law-like as to be regarded
as a kind. The open issue is to determine why such bare plurals are unable to denote kinds. Cohen
suggests an alternative explanation, that does not require kind reference. According to him, such
BPs allow wide scope readings because they refer to a specific group of individuals, anchored in
time and space and consequently are strong DPs.
6In this introduction, we leave aside the case of mass nouns, and merely note that Krifka assumes
that they lack such a number argument. So a mass noun such as gold has the following lexical
representation, and is of type ￿s,￿e,t￿￿. Thus, mass nouns are semantically comparable to count
plurals, as in [Chierchia, 1998].
(262) [[gold]] = λwλx[GOLD(w, x)]
7This distribution is unexpected in [Chierchia, 1998]’s framework, since according to the Nom-
inal Mapping Parameter, Catalan and Spanish are identified, like all Romance languages, as be-
ing of type [-arg, +pred]. In these languages nouns denote properties rather than individuals
and determiner-less nominals are expected to behave as predicates, not as arguments. Conse-
quently, BNs should not be allowed in argument position unless a D category is projected (see a.o.
[Longobardi, 1994]).
8We leave aside this aspect of incorporation in this introduction.
9We can find the same type of conclusion in [Kwon and Zribi-Hertz, 2006] on bare objects in
Korean, which presents a descriptive study of Korean ’bare’ objects.They call bare objects those ob-
jects which fail to be suﬃxed by the marker (l)eul, commonly glossed as an accusative case marker.
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A systematic survey of LEUL-marked and bare objects reveals that the latter verify two properties
currently regarded as characteristic of semantic incorporation. It appears, however, that although
they are semantically incorporated, Korean bare objects may be fully referential. The authors
are led to assume that the interpretive eﬀects of semantic incorporation may derive from either
referential or informational deficiency, and that these two types of deficiency are quite independent
from each other. They conclude contra [Van Geenhoven, 1998] that semantic incorporation cannot
be regarded as a subtheory of indefiniteness.
10Maienborn subscribes to the distinction between states and statives and assumes that the latter
only are to be treated separately.
11Here we do not concern ourselves with spatial unboundedness, which has also been claimed to
be characteristic of genericity.
12As such, perfective forms in Italian are unable to express generic meaning. By this remark,
we do not intend to exclude the possibility of referring to a habit through a perfective form, as in
Gianni ha fumato la pipa per tutta la sua vita (‘Gianni smoked a pipe all his life’). The natural
reading of this sentence expresses a habit of Gianni’s (in a perfective way). It should be mentioned,
however, that it is one thing to achieve reference to a habit, and quite another thing to express a
habitual meaning: the former admittedly can be done through a perfective sentence, but the latter
can only be done by using an imperfective sentence. For example, the perfective sentence given
above, though referring to a habit, does not express generic or habitual meaning - for one thing, it
lacks the intensional character that true generics have.
13Note that a simple restriction requiring the use of BPs or singular indefinites, however, would
not work (as already noted by [Krifka et al., 1995]). This is shown by the acceptability of (263):
(263) Two friends help each other.
Notice that the numeral two in (263) is acceptable because it does not introduce an arbitrary
numerical restriction, but serves to specify that the sentence is about groups of friends containing
two individuals each. Accordingly, the sentence gets the generic interpretation that any group of
two friends x and y is such that x helps y. The conclusion is that (263) does not pose a real problem
to the unboundedness analysis. Compare the acceptability of (263) with the non-acceptability of
(264), in which the numerical restriction introduced by four is not as easily motivated as the one
in (263):
(264) ?Four friends help each other.
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We will not consider numerical unboundedness any further.
14This type of analysis is something that, as far as we can tell, was briefly touched on by Ferreira
in his Ph.D. dissertation [Ferreira, 2005], although he is not explicit about the role of the temporal
size of the input situation in the emergence of generic readings, and mainly focuses on the role of
event plurality.
15It has not been previously noted that ‘A boat can float thanks to its concave shape’ is in fact
acceptable. However further discussion of this example would lead us astray from our discussion
on genericity and abilities. See Mari, 2011b.
16For additional data see [Homer, 2010].
17This view has been criticized by [Piñón, 2009] who claims that there are only abilities as
explanatory factors for action and proposes treating the distinction on a pragmatic level elaborating
on the fourth epistemological condition and overtly using abductive reasoning. For a discussion of
ability attribution and abductive reasoning, see [Mari, 2001])
18For a formal analysis that uses the bounded-unbounded distinction without resorting to an
optimality framework, see Mari, forthcoming).
19see [Mari, 2008a], [Mari and Martin, 2009b] for French
20Note that without specific prosody the sentence is also acceptable. However, in that case the
prescriptive reading is unavailable and the sentence merely expresses a generalization about what
gentleman do.
21Two explanations can be given according to whether definites are considered to assert existence
and maximality à la Russell, or whether they are considered to contribute maximality plus a
presupposition of existence à la Frege-Strawson. Let us adopt the Russelian view. According to
Russell, indefinites also contribute assertion of existence. In this respect both BPs (considered
as indefinites) and DGs would be out in these constructions since for both existence would be
asserted twice. Maintaining the Russelian view for definites and adopting the Kamp-Heim view for
indefinites (according to which they only contribute a free variable) is one way to solve the problem:
existence is asserted twice only for definites and for this reason they are ruled out ??. Alternatively,
one can assume with [Zucchi, 1995] that definites cannot be used in there-constructions because
strong determiners presuppose the existence of their referent (according to the Frege-Strawson view
of definites).
22Here we use the term informally.
23Our intuition does not coincide with Cohen’s. It seems to us that the truth of (236) under its
descriptive reading requires that actual instances of Mary handling the mail from Antarctica have
occurred by the reference time. It is precisely the past occurrence of events of the relevant type
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which enables one to make a descriptive generalization.
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